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For more than 20 years, analysts have reported on the so-called “energy paradox” or 
the “energy efficiency gap”, referring to the fact that economic agents could in 
principle lower their total cost at current prices by using more energy-efficient 
technology but, nevertheless, often decide not to do so.  
Theory suggests that providing information in a simplified way could 
potentially reduce this “efficiency gap”. Such simplification may be achieved by 
providing the estimated monetary operating cost and life-cycle cost (LCC) of a given 
appliance—which has been a recurring theme within the energy policy and efficiency 
labeling community. Yet, little is known so far about the causal effects of LCC 
disclosure on consumer action because of the gap between the acquisition of 
efficiency information and consumer purchasing behavior in the real marketplace.  
This dissertation bridges the gap by experimentally integrating LCC 
disclosure into two major German commercial websites—a price comparison engine 
for cooling appliances, and an online shop for washing machines. Internet users 
  
arriving on these websites were randomly assigned to two experimental groups, and 
the groups were exposed to different visual stimuli. The control group received 
regular product price information, whereas the treatment group was, in addition, 
offered information about operating cost and total LCC. Click-stream data of 
consumers’ shopping behavior was evaluated with multiple regression analysis by 
controlling for several product characteristics. 
This dissertation finds that LCC disclosure reduces the mean energy use of 
chosen cooling appliances by 2.5% (p<0.01), and the energy use of chosen washing 
machines by 0.8% (p<0.001). For the latter, it also reduces the mean water use by 
0.7% (p<0.05). These effects suggest a potential role for public policy in promoting 
LCC disclosure. While I do not attempt to estimate the costs of such a policy, a 
simple quantification shows that the benefits amount to 100 to 200 thousand Euros 
per year for Germany, given current predictions regarding the price of tradable 
permits for CO2, and not counting other potential benefits. 
Future research should strive for increasing external validity, using better 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Statement of the problem 
For more than 20 years, analysts have reported on the so-called “energy paradox” or the 
“energy efficiency gap”, referring to the fact that economic agents could in principle 
lower their total cost at current prices by using more energy-efficient technology but, 
nevertheless, often decide not to do so (Shama 1983; Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Sanstad and 
Howarth 1994; Howarth and Sanstad 1995). 
Given the negative external effects due to energy-related carbon dioxide 
emissions (Watson 2001), the policy question is how to foster the effective and efficient 
diffusion of more energy-efficient technologies. On the demand side management part of 
the problem, policy interventions have included a combination of command-and-control 
and incentive-based mechanisms. The latter include product information requirements 
such as labeling. Labeling refers to the disclosure of information that otherwise would not 
be readily available to potential buyers (Stavins 2001, 31).  
Energy efficiency labels for household appliances are used in the US, the 
European Union (EU) and other parts of the world (Wiel 2005, 21). In the EU, the overall 
energy efficiency of household appliances has increased since the mandatory introduction 
of labels in 1992, although it is hard to say to what extent this development is attributable 
to the labels (Enerdata sa and Fraunhofer ISI 2003, 62). Still, household appliances 
contribute substantially to overall energy consumption. They can be classified into six 





and various smaller ones. In the EU, the share of all large appliances in total energy 
consumption for electrical appliances and lighting amounted to 45% in 2001 (Enerdata sa 
and Fraunhofer ISI 2003, 52).  
Since the early days of energy efficiency labeling, an important question has been 
whether information about energy use should be expressed in physical or monetary terms 
(McNeill and Wilkie 1979). Today, the debate is not settled; and policy-makers in the US 
and the European Union are currently considering changing their respective existing label 
formats to include monetary information (European Commission 2005a; Federal Trade 
Commission 2006).  
Due to advances in communication technology, monetary information provision is 
also interesting in another respect. With the rise of the internet the way appliances are 
sold is changing, and online sales of large household appliances are growing. Varying by 
appliance type, their share in total German sales quantity ranged from 4% to 9% in 2004 
(Gesellschaft für Konsumforschung 2005). For electronic commerce across all product 
categories, about 50% of all Germans report having incorporated available online 
information into their purchasing process, and about 45% of all Germans deem price 
comparisons to be the single most important element (Nielsen/Netratings 2004; van 
Eimeren, Gerhard et al. 2004). 
Price comparisons on the internet exemplify a new kind of product information in 
the form of interactive decision aids (Guttman, Moukas et al. 1998). These aids are 
intended to reduce the cognitive effort of the consumer, and to increase the accuracy of 
her decision (Payne, Bettman et al. 1993; Häubl and Trifts 2000, 5). As to decision aids 





energy tools (hereafter referred to as “energy efficiency calculators”). These enable 
consumers to convert the efficiency values of a given product into monetary operating 
cost. While differing in degree of interactivity, most of them additionally allow 
consumers to base this conversion on individual assumptions and preferences. The 
underlying logic is that consumers should be able to make a more conscious 
intertemporal trade-off between purchase price and future operating cost. A common way 
to reveal this trade-off is trough the presentation of life-cycle cost (LCC)—that is, in its 
simplest form, the sum of purchase price and estimated operating cost for a given 
appliance (Hutton and Wilkie 1980; McMahon, McNeil et al. 2005, 160).  
These two examples—conventional static labeling and energy efficiency 
calculators online—show that monetary cost disclosure is a salient energy policy 
problem. Yet, little is known so far about the causal effects of operating and life-cycle 
cost disclosure on consumer behavior because of the gap between the acquisition of 
efficiency information on the one hand, and the actual purchasing decision on the other 
hand (Wilbanks and Stern 2002).  
1.2 Purpose of the dissertation 
The purpose of this dissertation is to assess the effect of life-cycle cost disclosure on 
consumer behavior.  
A survey of the literature suggests that the observed energy efficiency gap may be 
partially due to limited information and the cost of processing the information. Analysts 
from different theoretical backgrounds may differ in their exact characterization of the 





gap. Monetary cost figures, in turn, may simplify energy information by providing a 
common unit of measurement. In addition, consumers often demand monetary 
information when asked about their preferred information format (du Pont 1998; Thorne 
and Egan 2002). Yet, existing empirical findings about the effect of monetary 
information disclosure are ambiguous (McNeill and Wilkie 1979; Hutton and Wilkie 
1980; Anderson and Claxton 1982). 
In order to evaluate the effect of monetary information, I implemented two 
randomized online field experiments at distinct commercial websites in Germany that 
deal with household appliances. In both experiments, the control group was shown 
regular product information, whereas the treatment group received life-cycle cost 
estimates (i.e., the sum of purchase price and estimated operating cost) in addition to 
regular product information. 
The first experiment for cooling appliances took place in a German 
“shopbot” (Smith and Brynjolfsson 2001). A shopbot differs from an online shop in that 
it only acts as an intermediary, and that it does not actually sell appliances itself. 
Consumer behavior was measured as click-throughs on products from the shopbot to final 
online retailers.  
The second experiment focused on washing machines, and was conducted in a 
German online shop. As in the shopbot experiment, user reactions were evaluated by 
analyzing their click-throughs on appliances. Here, click-throughs represented washing 





1.3 Research questions 
In order to better understand the potential effects of life-cycle cost disclosure both from 
an environmental policy and a business perspective, this dissertation asks: 
• Does life-cycle cost disclosure make online-shoppers opt for more energy-efficient 
household appliances? 
• Does life-cycle cost disclosure make online-shoppers opt for more water-efficient 
washing machines? 
• Does life-cycle cost disclosure have a positive or negative impact on retail volume? 
Answering these questions requires experimental life-cycle cost disclosure and an 
associated quantitative analysis. In addition, this dissertation answers the following 
questions through an evaluation of qualitative customer feedback: 
• How do online shoppers perceive life-cycle cost disclosure for household 
appliances? 
• Do they easily understand the calculation of life-cycle cost?  
• Do they feel that life-cycle cost disclosure helps them with the intertemporal trade-
off between purchase price and future operating cost? 
1.4 Significance of the dissertation 
The primary objective of this dissertation is to determine the potential benefits of policies 
that promote monetary life-cycle-cost disclosure. It differs from earlier studies in several 
respects: 
First, the dissertation focuses on the effectiveness of monetary information 





predominantly evaluated consumer perception. In going beyond awareness and 
understanding, this dissertation addresses the research need to measure how information 
provision is related to actual consumer behavior (Wilbanks and Stern 2002, 341-346). 
More specifically, to the best of my knowledge, it is the first experimental evaluation in 
the real marketplace where consumers could actively adjust the underlying assumptions 
of life-cycle cost estimation. Also, it simultaneously addresses the impact that life-cycle 
cost disclosure has on retail volume to evaluate the likely impediments to a potential 
wider implementation of energy efficiency calculators. 
Second, the experiments in this dissertation were conducted as online field 
experiments. Methodologically, this approach has several advantages. Consumers in 
actual shopping situations had tangible incentives to find suitable products at low cost. 
Comparable laboratory experiments suffer from their hypothetical character and may not 
be generalizable to real purchasing situations. Ecological validity was high because 
effects attributable to being in an unfamiliar setting could be reduced (Reips 2002b, 247). 
Moreover, by relying on the internet, the experiments were purified from any 
experimenter effect and unreliable stimulus delivery due to human failure.  
In sum, by evaluating the effectiveness of life-cycle cost disclosure in a realistic 
setting, this dissertation makes a substantial contribution to better understanding the 
potential gains from life-cycle cost disclosure for environmental policy. 
1.5 Organization of the dissertation 
The remainder of this dissertation is organized as follows. Chapter 2 presents a survey of 





theoretical approaches that have been used to explain this gap (2.3). One relevant factor 
in explaining the gap is missing information, or too complex information. Potential 
solutions include information provision in the form of energy labeling and monetary cost 
disclosure (2.4). The latter is especially attractive from a cognitive perspective because it 
reduces the number of dimensions in a complex decision problem by converting physical 
energy units into monetary units. This simplification has been a recurring theme within 
the energy policy community, and has gained renewed attention with the rise of the 
internet. In several countries, energy information organizations nowadays provide 
operating cost estimates for household appliances on specific websites. Still, few 
evaluations have assessed whether monetary information effectively adds anything to 
physical energy use information with respect to consumer behavior. The small number of 
experimental studies available contains ambiguous results (2.5). Therefore, it may be 
instrumental to make use of the internet as a research tool (2.6). In light of the prior 
findings, I discuss the possibility of using online field experiments for assessing the 
causal effect of life-cycle cost disclosure on consumer behavior (2.7). 
Chapter 3 describes the shopbot experiment. The data from a major German web 
portal consist of observations for refrigerators, fridge-freezers and freezers (3.2). All 
variables of interest refer to appliances for which users have clicked-through from the 
shopbot to final online retailers. The research hypotheses (3.3) concerning the effects of 
life-cycle cost disclosure on energy use, the estimated life-cycle cost of clicked 
appliances, and the number of click-throughs are tested. In terms of methods, these 
hypotheses are tested in two-group posttest-only randomized experiments with multiple 





find that in the first treatment round, life-cycle cost disclosure reduces the overall mean 
energy use of clicked cooling appliances by 2.5%; and it leads to a decrease in click-
throughs from the shopbot to final retailers by about 23%. Conversely, estimated life-
cycle cost does not differ significantly between experimental groups (3.5). The most 
important limitations to the experimental results have to do with the reliance on browser 
cookies and potential self-selection bias (3.6). 
Chapter 4 reports results from the online shop experiment. The data contains 
observations from an experimental recommendation agent for washing machines (4.2). In 
addition to energy use, estimated life-cycle cost, and click-throughs, the research 
hypotheses also refer to water use (4.3). As in the shopbot case, the hypotheses are tested 
in two randomized experiments and with the aid of multivariate methods. Furthermore, I 
conduct in-depth interviews with selected customers from the treatment group (4.4). I 
find that life-cycle cost disclosure for washing machines is associated with a reduction in 
overall mean energy use by about 0.8%, and with a reduction in water use by about 0.7%. 
Supplementary results from the customer interviews indicate that the visual presentation 
of life-cycle cost may be decisive for the outcome (4.5). All results are discussed in 
section 4.6.  
In chapter 5, I summarize all experimental findings (5.1) and draw policy-relevant 
conclusions (5.2). Although the evidence suggests that life-cycle cost disclosure reduces 
energy use, policy-makers should weigh the costs and benefits of a potential 
implementation. While the costs of implementation cannot be quantified, I provide an 
order-of-magnitude estimate of the benefits for Germany. These amount to 100 to 200 





for CO2. Finally, future research should strive for increasing external validity, using 
better instruments, and evaluating the effectiveness of different information formats for 






Chapter 2: Review of the literature 
2.1 Introduction 
The following literature review introduces the discussion on the energy efficiency gap 
(2.2), presents theoretical approaches to the gap (2.3), compares conventional labeling 
with monetary cost disclosure (2.4), describes the evidence regarding the effectiveness of 
labeling (2.5), provides an overview of internet-based research approaches (2.6), and 
discusses the possibility of using online field experiments for assessing the effect of life-
cycle cost disclosure on consumer behavior (2.7). 
2.2 The energy efficiency gap 
The fact that economic agents could in principle lower their cost at current prices by 
using more energy-efficient technology but, nevertheless, often decide not to do so has 
been called the “energy paradox” or “energy efficiency gap” (Shama 1983; Jaffe and 
Stavins 1994; Sanstad and Howarth 1994; Howarth and Sanstad 1995). 
At the core of the energy policy debate about the efficiency gap are the issue of 
market barriers versus market failures, and a possible justification of governmental 
intervention. Market barriers are referred to in explanations of why investment options 
shown to be cost-effective at current prices have only limited success in the market (Jaffe 
and Stavins 1994, 804). By contrast, a market failure points to a situation that leads to 
inefficient resource allocation. Different from the former, the latter may justify 
government intervention in the market, if such an intervention would in fact increase 





Evidence of the energy efficiency gap has been interpreted in several ways. On 
the one hand, implicit discount rates estimated in the context of energy-related consumer 
decisions are much higher than the rate of return on available alternative investments 
(see 2.4.4.2 below). That is, the estimates seem to run counter to the efficient market 
hypothesis (Howarth and Sanstad 1995). In view of those findings, Sanstad and Howarth 
(1994) discuss several market imperfections related to energy efficiency, such as the 
existing regulatory environment, imperfect information, asymmetric information, 
transaction costs, imperfections in capital markets, and bounded rationality (see 2.3.2 
below) in energy decisions. In their view, many such market imperfections can be 
interpreted as market failures (Sanstad and Howarth 1994). 
Opponents, on the other hand, judge the evidence of the efficiency gap 
differently. Sutherland (1991) discusses possible alternative explanations. Whereas 
professionals make repetitive decisions with respect to energy efficiency investments and 
can therefore distribute search cost over several investments, private households must 
amortize their search and information costs with one or very few purchases. Given that 
investments with respect to energy efficiency are risky and illiquid for consumers, it is 
rational for consumers to demand a rate of return that is above the average market rate for 
risk-free and liquid assets. The author concludes that several market barriers, such as 
misplaced incentives, high initial cost, illiquidity, and high risk concerning energy 
efficiency investments, do not represent market failures (Sutherland 1991). Along the 
same line, Hassett and Metcalf (1993) reject notions of market failure or consumer 
irrationality with respect to the energy efficiency gap. Instead, they identify sunk cost and 





consumers’ implicit discount rates. According to their simulations, consumers’ “hurdle 
rates” should be about four times greater than the standard rate (Hassett and Metcalf 
1993).  
Overall, analysts do not agree on the extent to which the observed energy 
efficiency gap represents market failure. Nevertheless, many agree that limited 
information does matter, and that—depending on its characteristics—it may even 
represent market failure (Sutherland 1991; Jaffe and Stavins 1994; Sanstad and Howarth 
1994). 
2.3 Theoretical approaches to the energy efficiency gap 
The human behavior that leads to the observed energy efficiency gap can be seen through 
two lenses; a rational choice lens (2.3.1), or, alternatively, a broader behavioral lens 
(2.3.2). Although such a dichotomization does not do justice to the more differentiated 
existing research landscape, it is instrumental for the purpose of this dissertation. A 
broader exposition of behavioral decision research can be found in Jungermann, Pfister, 
and Fischer (2005) in general, and in Camerer and Loewenstein (2004) on behavioral 
economics in particular. 
2.3.1 Rational choice perspective 
From a rational choice perspective, consumers are expected to obtain energy-related 
services at least cost because cost minimization is necessary for utility maximization. 
When costs accrue at different points in time—as in the case of operating cost of durable 
goods—cost minimization conceptually involves intertemporal allocation. At a practical 





(Sanstad and Howarth 1994, 812; McMahon, McNeil et al. 2005, 158). Life-cycle costing 
can be understood as an application of investment theory to consumer behavior (Stern 
1978). Also, it includes explicit or implicit discounting on the part of the consumer 
(Liebermann and Ungar 2002, 730). For the purpose of discounting, economists 
traditionally rely on the discounted utility model, which condenses all motives that may 
underlie the decision into one single variable—the discount rate (Frederick, Loewenstein 
et al. 2002). 
Within a standard economic framework, the observed behavior that leads to the 
energy efficiency gap can be explained by market failures, such as the underprovision of 
information about the relevant technology, uncompensated positive externalities from 
technology adoption, and principal-agent problems caused by a separation of the user and 
the buyer of a given technology. Alternative explanations unrelated to market failure 
interpret the observed behavior of energy users as actually optimal. The explanations 
include uncertainty about future energy prices and associated, relatively high discount 
rates, undesirable product characteristics of more efficient technology, private transaction 
costs of information acquisition and adoption, and heterogeneity in the population of 
potential technology adopters (Jaffe and Stavins 1994, 805).  
2.3.2 Broader behavioral perspective 
Representatives of a broader behavioral perspective acknowledge the limits to intendedly 
rational behavior and rather work within a framework of “bounded rationality” (Simon 
1957, 198). Moreover, they may not approach human actions as being driven by a single 





for problem solving—simple rules for searching, stopping and decision-making (Simon 
1955; Payne, Bettman et al. 1993; Gigerenzer and Selten 2001).  
A related stream of research in economics is transaction cost theory (Coase 1937; 
Williamson 1975) with its emphasis on environmental and human factors that may affect 
market exchanges. In the underlying information-processing paradigm (Miller 1956), it is 
not only the availability of information that matters, but also the way in which humans, 
with their limited cognitive capacities, are able to handle it; for example, energy 
efficiency information on product labels. 
When incorporating label information into their purchasing decisions, humans try 
to reduce their cognitive effort (Shugan 1980). The chosen option can be described as a 
trade-off between effort and accuracy (Payne, Bettman et al. 1993) and may frequently be 
suboptimal relative to a benchmark situation without any decision cost. That is especially 
true for complex decision processes in which alternative options are difficult to compare 
(Häubl and Trifts 2000, 5). As to labels for household appliances, they provide 
information in distinct dimensions, such as kilowatt-hours (for electricity) or liters (for 
water) that may be difficult to compare to a product’s price in dollars or euros. The more 
cognitively oriented view of consumer behavior suggests that consumers may choose 
products that are less than optimal with respect to their operating cost.  
Representatives of both rational choice and broader behavioral approaches agree, 
at a general level, that human decision-making is influenced by prices and information. 
According to the broader behavioral perspective, individuals’ decisions do not, however, 
depend solely on prices, but are also influenced by a possible commitment to save 





the different motives that drive human behavior may vary with specific circumstances 
and situations (Stern 1992). 
Moreover, the framing of outcomes may be important. According to prospect 
theory, individuals will mentally represent alternative outcomes as losses or gains relative 
to a reference point. It is not the final state that matters, but the relative change. In 
addition, an individual is loss-averse, so that losing or gaining the same amount of money 
are not considered as symmetrical events. Both the way the reference point is perceived 
and the way the outcomes are framed can be affected by their presentation and by an 
individual’s prior expectations (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). In the context of energy 
cost disclosure, that becomes relevant when thinking about consumers’ frames of 
reference. Additional costs may be coded as losses and savings may be coded as gains 
(Tversky and Kahneman 1981).  
Finally, the standard economic discounted utility model has been scrutinized by 
behavioral researchers. Analyses conducted over the recent decades have cast doubt on 
the assumption that the discounted utility model can appropriately describe actual human 
behavior. The issue of discounting will considered in more detail in section 2.4.4. 
In summary, the observed energy efficiency gap may be partially explained by 
limited information and the cost of processing the information. Analysts from different 
backgrounds may differ in their exact characterization of the issue, but they generally 
seem to suggest that information provision and simplification can help reduce the 
problem. Monetary cost figures, in turn, may simplify energy information by using a 





2.4 Energy efficiency labeling and monetary cost disclosure 
This section covers energy efficiency labeling (2.4.1), consumers’ demands for monetary 
information (2.4.2), operating and life-cycle cost disclosure (2.4.3), a discussion about 
the inclusion of operating costs in energy labels (2.4.5), and the application of operating 
cost disclosure on the internet (2.4.6). 
2.4.1 Energy efficiency labeling 
Energy efficiency labels can be either endorsement labels or comparative labels. An 
endorsement label, such as, for example, the US Energy Star, shows the approval of a 
certain authority, stated in terms of pre-specified criteria; whereas comparative labels 
allow consumers to compare different products in terms of their energy efficiency (du 
Pont, Schwengels et al. 2005, 91). Given the inherently comparative nature of life-cycle 
cost disclosure, this dissertation focuses solely on the latter. More general reviews of 
labeling can be found elsewhere (Gallastegui 2002; Banerjee and Solomon 2003; Leire 
and Thidell 2005). 
Using a categorical or continuous scale, comparative labels rank a product’s 
performance within a spectrum of alternative products. Alternatively, such labels provide 
information only about the product under consideration, leaving to the consumer the 
responsibility to compare the information with that from other products. Whereas labels 
with a continuous scale usually provide additional information about energy use, cost, 
and further product characteristics (e.g., quality of lighting or amount of noise), labels 
with a categorical scale may or may not contain such information. Although the 





use continuous energy labels (du Pont, Schwengels et al. 2005, 89-94). 
A periodical redefinition of categorical labels becomes necessary for the 
following reason. Once label categories have been set, the affected products tend to 
become increasingly efficient. Eventually, all of them might fall into the most energy-
efficient category. At that point, the categories no longer serve their intended purpose; so, 
they need to be redefined or otherwise adjusted. Such adjustments may entail the revision 
of current categories or, alternatively, the introduction of new categories that represent 
higher efficiency (du Pont, Schwengels et al. 2005, 108). 
2.4.2 Consumer understanding of, and demand for monetary information 
Monetary information might help consumers better understand energy information. An 
early ethnographic study described “folk units” of measurement; that is, consumers’ 
quantifications of their energy use at home. The study sample consisted of 30 Michigan 
families who were interviewed without predefined questions. In the context of utility 
energy bills, the researchers showed that consumers better related to dollars spent per 
month rather than to physical units. The same held true for comparisons of different fuels 
and the interpretation of national energy policy. None of the interviewees mentioned 
abstract energy units, such as joules or British thermal units, and few referred to 
commercial units, such as kilowatt-hours. The researchers concluded that folk 
measurement in dollars was useful from a consumer’s perspective because it allowed to 
directly compare different household expenditures with energy cost (Kempton and 
Montgomery 1982). 





Thorne and Egan (2002) conducted research with consumer focus groups regarding a new 
design of the Energy Guide label. Asked about an ideal label, participants suggested, 
among other things, including and highlighting estimated annual operating costs. Overall, 
Thorne and Egan stressed the consumers’ strong preference for monetary units over 
physical units of energy efficiency (Thorne and Egan 2002). The same was observed by 
du Pont (1998, 8-15), whose interview respondents “overwhelmingly” favored dollar 
amounts over kilowatt-hours.  
Even though such insights gained from qualitative studies suggest consumer 
understanding of monetary information, the extent to which they might represent a larger 
population of shoppers is unknown (Kempton and Montgomery 1982; Thorne and Egan 
2002). Nor can the findings predict what kind of average consumer behavior we should 
expect as a result of life-cycle cost provision—which calls for a quantitative evaluation. 
2.4.3 Operating cost and life-cycle cost disclosure 
The notion of life-cycle cost (LCC) disclosure for consumers—as opposed to firms—
goes back more than 30 years, when the Center for Policy Alternatives at MIT conducted 
several LCC studies, partly as guidance for the US Energy Policy and Conservation Act 
of 1975. Lund (1978) described the early aspirations, the largest problem, and a possible 
solution related to LCC disclosure. 
LCC is given as the sum of purchase cost, annual operating and maintenance 
costs, and disposal cost, discounted over the lifetime of an appliance (Lund 1978). 
Variations of that definition may leave out the costs for disposal, installation, or 





uncorrelated with energy efficiency (McMahon, McNeil et al. 2005). 
Fundamentally, Lund saw LCC disclosure as a potential “societal instrument” 
(Lund 1978, 17) for influencing consumers’ buying decisions. The largest challenge to 
LCC disclosure is the variation among consumers’ preferences and situations, such as 
usage rate, discount rate, regional climate, etc. Simply calculating a reference LCC based 
on national averages does not provide for deviations and renders cost figures “virtually 
meaningless” for the individual consumer (Lund 1978, 19). Lund’s vision for countering 
the challenge was a computer-based decision-support system that would be readily 
available to consumers for calculating—at home or at the point of purchase—their 
individualized expected LCC. In Lund’s words, such a system “would revolutionize” the 
way consumers make decisions (Lund 1978, 21). With the rise of the internet and of 
mobile communication technologies, that vision has become feasible. 
2.4.4 The role of time preference in life-cycle cost analysis 
Time plays an important role in life-cycle cost analysis. In any practical application, one 
must consider discounting (2.4.4.1), empirically estimated implicit discount rates 
(2.4.4.2), and ways to elicit discount rates from consumers (2.4.4.3). 
2.4.4.1 Discounting in life-cycle cost analysis 
The life-cycle cost of a given appliance is the sum of purchase cost and other associated 
costs, discounted over the lifetime of the appliance. For discounting, economists 
traditionally rely on the discounted utility model, as introduced by Paul Samuelson when 
attempting to model decisions regarding intertemporal choice. The discounted utility 





discount rate. Research conducted over the recent decades has, however, cast doubt on 
the assumption that the discounted utility model can appropriately describe actual human 
behavior.  
A wide array of empirical studies, including both field and laboratory studies, 
shows huge variation in discount rates—not only between studies, but also for given 
individuals. Those variations in annual discount rates, ranging from minus six to infinity, 
suggest that individuals consider many aspects of a given decision when making 
intertemporal choices, and that those aspects may differ with varying circumstances. 
Even more, variations in discount rates for a given individual hint at multiple motives, 
with different implications for attitudes about the future that may be at work in the same 
person.  
The discount rates reported in the literature are derived from observations that are 
supposed to satisfy a net present value equation. The rates can be inferred from actual 
consumer decision making in the field, or by asking consumers to evaluate intertemporal 
trade-offs that may be either real or hypothetical. Potential confounding factors include 
consumption reallocation, intertemporal arbitrage, concave utility, uncertainty, inflation, 
expectations of changing utility, as well as habit formation, anticipatory utility, and 
visceral influences.  
Frederick et al. (2002) suggest applying discounting models that have proven 
most appropriate for a given domain. With respect to domains of multi-motive 
discounting models, they discriminate drug addiction, extended experiences, and brief, 
vivid experiences. For example, models of drug addiction may incorporate habit 






Liebermann and Ungar describe life-cycle cost analysis as an investment choice. 
They illustrate the intertemporal trade-off with two products, A and B, that have the same 
features except for their purchase prices (PA; PB) and operating costs (CA; CB). Product A 
has the lower purchase price (PA<PB) and the higher operating cost (CA>CB), whereas 













Choosing product B can be interpreted as investing the amount (PB-PA) in order to 
receive the return (CA-CB) per period. The formula calculates the “rate of return”—the 
implicit discount rate—at which consumers are indifferent between product A and B 
(Liebermann and Ungar 1983, 380). 
2.4.4.2 Estimated implicit discount rates with respect to appliances 
Implicit consumer discount rates that have been reported in the context of household 






Table 1: Empirically estimated implied discount rates 
Reference Appliance Real discount rate Comment 
(Hausman 1979) Air conditioners 5% to 89%  
(mean: 25%) 
Dependent on 
income class; US 
study 
(Gately 1980) Refrigerators 45% to 300% Depending on 
assumptions about 
electricity cost; US 
study 
(Meier and Whittier 
1983) 
Refrigerators r < 35%            
(40% of consumers) 
35% < r < 60  
(~20% of 
consumers) 








that there are no 
discount rates less 
than 20% or above 
120% 
 
In a more recent study, a representative sample of German adults was given the 
hypothetical choice between two refrigerators that were equal in all respects except 
purchase price and energy efficiency. The more expensive product was the more energy-
efficient, and it was preferred by 82% of the respondents; 12% favored the other product 
and 6% could not decide (“I do not know”) what product to choose (Kuckartz and 
Rheingans-Heintze 2004, 81). See the table below for the implicit discount rates that can 





Table 2: Implied discount rate with respect to appliances for German consumers  






Refrigerator r < 18%  
(82 % of 
consumers) 
 
r > 18%   
(12 % of 
consumers) 
 
r = 18%  
(6 % of 
consumers) 
German study; inferred discount rate is 
based on my own calculation that 
assumes an average refrigerator lifetime 
for Germany of N=14.4 years (GfK 
2006)  
Model A (12% of survey respondents): 
PA = €329, CA=€35/year 
Model B (82% of survey respondents): 

















(see 2.4.4.1 for the formula) 
 
2.4.4.3 Experimental elicitation of discount rates 
In experimental studies, discount rates are commonly elicited by means of matching 
tasks, pricing tasks, rating tasks, or choice tasks—the last being the most common. All of 
them can be conducted hypothetically; that is, by referring to hypothetical situations 
without real rewards. At a general level, no clear difference in discount rates could be 
observed between research involving hypothetical rewards, as opposed to that involving 
real rewards. 
Choice tasks require subjects to choose between two rewards—one that is 
immediate; the other, delayed. A subject may be asked, for example, whether he prefers 
100 units of something today over 110 units a year from today. In order to go beyond 
determining merely upper and lower bounds for discount rates, subjects may be presented 





researcher to determine the discount rate more precisely. Conducting research via a series 
of choice tasks may suffer from the „anchoring effect”, which means that the subject’s 
first choice may influence subsequent choices.  
Matching tasks requires subjects to fill in the blank in a given equation, such as 
„$100 now = ____ in one year“. The process makes it easier to determine exact discount 
rates through the point of indifference, and it does not suffer from the anchoring effect. 
Depending on what part of the equation is left blank, however, results obtained through 
this procedure may differ considerably.  
Rating tasks requires subjects to rate the attractiveness or unattractiveness of an 
outcome that occurs at a particular time.  
Pricing tasks requires subjects to give a willingness to pay to obtain or avoid an 
outcome that occurs at a particular time (Frederick, Loewenstein et al. 2002, 386-388). 
2.4.5 Operating cost disclosure on labels 
Following the early work at MIT, the inclusion of operating and life-cycle costs has been 
considered in the context of labeling. In 1979, the US Federal Trade Commission (FTC) 
presented its original Energy Guide label design for appliances that—except for room air 
conditioners and furnaces—showed estimated annual operating cost as the dominant 
piece of information, and a relative ranking of the product with respect to other available 
models. According to the then-current FTC regulations, a 15% change in energy prices 
with respect to the baseline for the label entailed a renewed calculation of operating cost 
for new labels. As a consequence, identical appliance models showing different operating 





1998). In addition, critics pointed out that local and temporal variance in energy prices 
risked confusing those consumers whose rates were far from the national average. Those 
problems led to a revision of the Energy Guide label in 1994. In its current design, it uses 
physical units as primary information—supplemented with annual operating cost in small 
font at the bottom of the label (Banerjee and Solomon 2003; du Pont, Schwengels et al. 
2005). Still, the debate is not settled. Some critics have, again, demanded monetary 
information to make the label easier for consumers to understand. To clarify such and 
other hypotheses, the FTC has recently proposed consumer research on the perception 
and comprehension of the Energy Guide label to test alternative label designs (Federal 
Trade Commission 2006). 
Along the same lines, operating cost disclosure is currently being considered in 
the European Union in general, and in Germany in particular. The European Commission 
recently presented its Green Paper on energy efficiency, which considers “improved 
product labeling” as a potential measure for reducing the energy efficiency gap 
(European Commission 2005a). Subsequent feedback from interested parties indicates 
that many would like to have energy labels show savings, cost and life-cycle cost for 
appliances and other products, such as cars (European Commission 2006b). In Germany, 
energy labeling is being discussed as part of the United Nations Marrakech process on 
sustainable consumption and production. Manufacturer and retail representatives are 
considering providing operating cost on household appliances—on a voluntary, but 
standardized basis, and as a supplement to the conventional European energy label 





2.4.6 Consumer websites with operating cost information 
Finally, operating cost and LCC disclosure are at the core of many existing consumer 
websites operated by energy information organizations in Europe and elsewhere abroad. 
Given their interactive character, they are in line with Lund’s (1978) notion of computer-
based LCC decision aids for consumers. They provide varying ranges of appliances to 
consumers who are about to buy a new appliance. Their incrementalist approach is 
different from more comprehensive, whole-building energy audit tools such as the US 
Home Energy Saver. See Mills (2004) for a recent review of tools for residential energy 
analysis.  
Table 3 evaluates websites from energy information organizations in Europe and 
Australia. The websites’ main purpose is to provide simple, static cost estimates over the 
lifetime of a given appliance that assume constant prices, and that are based on the 
physical efficiency performance of the appliances. The list is not intended to be 
comprehensive. Rather, it covers those websites mentioned in the recent literature. It does 
not include product ratings regularly published by organizations, such as Consumer 






Table 3: Websites that provide lifetime operating costs for household appliances 
Program Country Reported self-
evaluation 
Reference 
EcoTopTen c Germany Rising number of hits 
and visitors 
(Graulich 2006) 
Energiesparende Geräte d, e, f, g Germany n/a (Siderius 2003) 
Energyrating e, f, g, h Australia Over one million user 
hits in 2004 
(Harrington, Foster et al. 
2005; Australian 
Greenhouse Office 2006) 
European Appliance 
Information System d 
Europe No. of hits varies from 




2005b; Alexandru, Caponio 
et al. 2006; European 
Commission 2006a) 
Inititative Energieeffizienz – 
Gerätedatenbank a, e, g 
Germany n/a (Agricola and Ahrens 2005; 
DENA 2006) 
Spargeräte e, f, g, h, i Germany n/a (Graulich 2006; Niedrig-
Energie-Institut 2006) 
topten.ch b, h Switzerland One million visitors and 
27 millions hits in 2005 
(S.A.F.E. 2005; Bush, Attali 
et al. 2006) 
Note: This list of websites is illustrative, not comprehensive; n/a – not available;  
additionally offered information and interactive elements:  
a) price range of product  
b) price of product  
c) annualized life-cycle cost (i.e. annualized sum of purchase price and operating cost)  
d) savings compared with a reference appliance  
e) adjustable tariffs  
f) adjustable lifetime  
g) adjustable frequency of use, for example, for washing machines  
h) sortability of products  
i) directly links to retailer for selected products 
The websites are evaluated on several criteria. Most of them do not provide 
information about purchase price, which means that consumers cannot easily calculate 
LCC by themselves. Those that do offer price information provide either one single price 
(e.g., the suggested retail price) or a price range for each product. Nearly none of them, 
however, is connected to online retailers; so, consumer cannot easily access purchase 
price information for each product. An exception is the German “Spargeräte” website, 
which provides links to a specific retailer for selected products. Two of the websites also 





that of a reference appliance. 
Websites vary in their degree of interactivity. On the most static website, 
consumers cannot adjust any of the default assumptions that underlie the calculations. On 
the most interactive website, users can adjust lifetime, electricity tariffs, frequency of use, 
and sorting of the displayed products. None of the websites explicitly mentions 
discounting, and nowhere can discount rates be specified by consumers. That appears to 
be problematic because of the variation in individuals' discount rates that have been 
reported in the literature. In the context of household appliances, implicit discount rates 
have been shown to range from about 0% to 300% (see 2.4.4.2).  
Finally, four of the seven websites mention a form of self-evaluation. They 
measure their success by the number of online hits and visitors, which is derived from 
server log files. None of them indicates whether they have attempted to evaluate their 
effect on consumer behavior in a more substantial sense, as described in the following 
section.  
In summary, many people in the energy efficiency community seem to believe in 
the power of operating cost and LCC disclosure. That view seems to be supported by 
ethnographic studies and exploratory research, with small numbers of interviewees, in 
which consumers have demanded monetary information. Still, the policy-relevant 
question is whether LCC disclosure actually affects consumer behavior. 
2.5 Evaluating the effectiveness of labels and operating cost disclosure 
Methodologically, label evaluations may rely on observational or experimental data, and 





or behavior, or, alternatively, on the macro-level market effects of labeling. This section 
introduces research on awareness and market transformation (2.5.1), experimental 
research on antecedent strategies in general (2.5.2), and experimental research on labels 
with monetary information in particular (2.5.3). 
2.5.1 Research on awareness and market transformation 
Although, from a policy perspective, the decisive dependent variable at the micro-level is 
consumer behavior, past research has predominantly investigated consumers’ label 
awareness and understanding. A theoretical justification is that behavior is assumed to be 
predictable from consumer attitudes and intentions (Rubik and Frankl 2005). Practically, 
awareness and understanding can be evaluated more easily than behavior—through 
consumer surveys (US EPA 1994). Surveys have been used, for example, to determine 
the effect of the original US Energy Guide label on consumer awareness (Dyer and 
Maronick 1988). A more recent example is the research commissioned by the US 
Association of Home Appliance Manufacturers (AHAM 2006). Also, the FTC recently 
proposed an evaluation of label perception and comprehension though survey 
research (Federal Trade Commission 2006).  
At the macro-level, one can analyze time series of shipment-weighted average 
efficiencies in the market, and the temporal introduction and change of labeling 
programs. Given that labeling programs normally coexist with energy efficiency 
standards, it is difficult and costly to analytically separate the impact of one from the 
other (du Pont, Schwengels et al. 2005). Further problems arise when the analyst tries to 





appliance market (Wiel 2005). Finally, in any macro-level evaluation, it remains unclear 
how much of an observed effect in the market is attributable to the label itself. For 
example, the evaluators of the European Union’s appliance labeling program caution that 
it is difficult to separate labeling from other activities, such as the promotion of more 
energy-efficient appliances through retailers, as well as retail personnel better trained 
with respect to energy efficiency issues (Bertoldi 1999). 
2.5.2 Experimental research on antecedent strategies 
Since studies on the micro-effect of labeling on consumer behavior are in short supply 
(Bjorner, Hansen et al. 2004, 412; Sammer and Wüstenhagen 2006, 187), it is worth 
looking at psychological experimental research on antecedent strategies—that occur 
before an intended behavior—such as information programs more generally, before 
focusing on label experiments with monetary information in particular. 
Shippee (1980) reviewed field experiments on the effectiveness of providing 
energy information. Only minimal or non-significant reductions in electricity 
consumption could be shown for treatment groups that received the information, relative 
to the control group, or relative to pre-information conditions.  
Ester and Winett (1982) evaluated antecedent experiments from different areas of 
resource management, including residential energy conservation. In many cases, they 
found no effects or, at most, minimal effects. Effectiveness was somewhat higher when 
information was specific and when the study design considered proximity, convenience, 
and salience of the requested behavior.  





experiments, almost all of which shared the following characteristics: the random 
assignment of a small group of volunteers into treatment and control groups; an explicit 
invitation to conserve energy; the measuring of energy consumption before, during, and 
after the experiment; and the use of standard statistical tests for impact assessment. 
Overall, the evidence on the impact of antecedent strategies was inconclusive. Only little 
effect, if any, on energy consumption could be found for antecedent strategies. 
The reviews cited above caution that, in general, simply providing information 
may not be as effective as often thought.  
2.5.3 Experimental research on labels with monetary information 
Few experiments explicitly contrast physical and monetary information. The three journal 
articles cited below, about LCC disclosure for household appliances, show mixed results 
regarding the impact of different treatments on consumer behavior. Their results are 
summarized in table 4 below. 
McNeill and Wilkie (1979) conducted a series of experimental tasks with respect 
to providing energy information. Most of the tasks are not described here because this 
dissertation focuses on consumer choice, not on communication or learning. In the final 
experimental task, which was deemed closest to real shopping behavior, consumers were 
asked to hypothetically build their own refrigerators by choosing from different available 
features, such as size and defrost type. No significant effect could be detected for this 
final task. The 155 study participants—all females—were intended to represent a cross-
section of the population of the Gainesville, Florida area. The study was not conducted in 





Moreover, participants needed to remember a given feature’s energy performance from 
the preceding experimental task because no additional energy use information was 
supplied. The researchers applied six distinct treatment conditions, varying with the 
presence of energy-use data, the presence of comparative energy-use information, the 
unit of measurement, the time period under consideration, and the degree of disclosure. 
Differences in information format did not lead to consistent differences in energy use. 
Making energy-use information available led to a 2.3% decrease in energy use, relative to 
the control group; however, that was not a statistically significant difference. Changing 
the information format from kilowatt-hours to dollars did not lead to statistically 
significant differences between treatment groups either (McNeill and Wilkie 1979).  
Hutton and Wilkie (1980) examined the effect of life-cycle cost disclosure in a 
study of consumer behavior with 94 females from Gainesville, Florida. One of the tasks 
required participants to build their own hypothetical refrigerator models according to 
their individual needs. The after-only experimental design employed two experimental 
groups—one receiving LCC information; the other, information on dollars spent on 
energy per year. The control group did not receive any information about operating cost. 
None of the three groups received any physical energy use information. (Physical energy 
use information is not mentioned explicitly in the article. The authors’ intention, 
however, was to reflect the requirements of the original Energy Guide label, which 
showed only monetary cost information.) LCC figures were estimated, assuming an 
appliance lifetime of 14 years, average energy prices, and a net discount rate of zero. The 
researchers justified the zero rate on the grounds that energy cost increases would 





Participants who received the “energy dollars per year” treatment did not perform 
differently from those in the control group. Participants in the LCC treatment group 
constructed refrigerator models with both lower lifetime energy cost and lower LCC, 
relative to the control group. In two slightly different experiment settings, the average 
treatment effect sizes ranged from -12% to -27% for lifetime energy cost, and from -9% 
to -17% for LCC. Finally, the LCC group had significantly lower lifetime energy cost and 
lower LCC, compared with the “energy dollars per year” group. The authors concluded 
that life-cycle cost was a superior form of information when focusing on behavioral 
responses (Hutton and Wilkie 1980).  
Anderson and Claxton (1982) conducted a refrigerator sales field experiment and 
combined the effect of label information type (kilowatt-hours/month vs. dollars/year) 
with sales force emphasis (no emphasis vs. emphasis). Emphasis-on-energy information 
included providing, in addition, the estimated 10 year operating cost and LCC data for 
each model. That two-by-two design encompassed four possible treatment combinations 
that were complemented by a control group, which did not receive any energy 
information. The treatment was randomly assigned across 18 stores of a major 
department store chain in Western Canada. Results were differentiated into a total of 569 
large refrigerator sales and 119 small refrigerator sales. Within the latter category, the 
number of observations ranged between 16 and 26 per treatment category. Regarding 
large refrigerators, energy efficiency did not differ significantly among treatment 
conditions at a 5% level of significance. Regarding small ones, the providing of energy 
information improved mean energy use by 12%, relative to the control group. Yet, 





were statistically insignificant. A difficulty reported by the researchers was that the 
“emphasis” treatment, which included providing the additional life-cycle cost 















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 4 shows that providing energy information had no significant effect in 
several cases. Also, two of the three studies suggested that there was no clear superiority 
of monetary information over physical information (dollars vs. kilowatt-hours) when 
compared directly. That result stands in contrast to predictions derived from cognitive 
psychology, and in contrast to the consumer demands described above. Moreover, in the 
study by Anderson and Claxton (1982), the difference between dollars and kilowatt-hours 
had different signs, varying by appliance groups. 
Nevertheless, the LCC study by Hutton and Wilkie (1980) exhibits significant 
treatment effects for LCC disclosure whose sizes are in the same range as the one 
detected by Anderson and Claxton (1982) in the last row. Finally, yearly energy cost 
information does not seem to be effective; or, it seems to be less effective than LCC 
disclosure.  
Methodologically, two of the three studies have not been conducted in the field 
and relied exclusively on female participants. The third study—the sales field 
experiment—encountered implementation problems with the sales personnel. 
Overall, no clear picture arises from prior research on the effect of information 
programs or the provision of monetary information on consumer behavior. That finding 
will be discussed in section 2.7 below. 
2.6 The internet as a research tool 
Over the recent years, more and more analysts have begun using the internet as a research 
tool. The question here is whether internet-based research can help to shed light on the 





metrics for internet-based research (2.6.1) and several issues regarding the 
implementation and limitations of web-based experiments (2.6.2). 
2.6.1 Metrics for internet-based research 
Conducting internet-based research requires an understanding of internet metrics and 
their reliability. This section briefly reviews the relevant literature. After introducing 
common measures derived from server logs files, reliability issues related to the presence 
of robots, interruption of transmission, caching, and time measurement will be addressed.  
Although the internet encompasses a variety of services such as email, telnet, file 
transfer protocol, etc., experiments have been conducted mostly on the world wide web 
(Reips 2002b, 243). Throughout this dissertation, I will therefore use the terms online 
experiment, internet experiment, web experiment, and web-based experiment 
interchangeably. The same applies for terms such as online research, internet research, 
web research, and web-based research unless otherwise noted. 
Web-based research in general can be user-centric or site-centric. While user-
centric research tracks the behavior of individuals across websites of different 
institutions, site-centric research focuses on the website of a single institution. Site-
centric research usually relies on server log files, that is, recordings of all users’ requests 
to a given server. Each line of a log file contains a “hit” which represents a request for a 
single website component, be it a block of text or an individual graphic image (Mullarkey 
2004, 43-47). Besides “hits”, other measures are available. Comparing the use of 
different websites is difficult because of competing measurements such as “click-





Peterson 2004). Those measures that are important in the context of this dissertation will 
be described below at the respective necessary level of detail. 
A click-through (or simply “click”) occurs when a user clicks on a particular 
website element, such as a link or a button. Page views (or impressions) refers to the 
number of pages or screens viewed by a given user—regardless of the number of 
individual elements on the page (Nicholas, Huntington et al. 2002, 46-47; Peterson 2004). 
Visitors refers to separately identifiable users who view web pages (Peterson 2004).  
The reliability of some web metrics is problematic because of server requests by 
robots and spiders, interrupted requests, caching of web content, and the determining of 
session length. 
First, it may be difficult to distinguish human internet users from “non-human 
user agents” (Peterson 2004, 24). Server log files track all activity including website 
requests from robots, spiders, and crawlers—software that automatically scans the 
internet for information. These requests have to be filtered out if a log file analysis is 
supposed to focus on human activity only (Mullarkey 2004, 44; Jamali, Nicholas et al. 
2005, 559). Non-human user agents may be recognized and excluded from the analysis 
when they identify themselves as such (Nicholas and Huntington 2003, 392). Well-
known robots can also be identified by their Internet Protocol address and information 
from the “user-agent” field. Unfortunately, the updating of blacklists for robot detection 
cannot keep pace with the development of new robots. Moreover, some robots mask their 
user information, allowing them to look like standard internet browsers. Finally, “offline 
browsers” that download entire websites for offline viewing may behave similarly to 





Second, interrupted requests may be recorded as hits in the server log file. If a 
user requests a page, then subsequently decides to cancel the operation, the request may, 
nonetheless, be recorded as a hit (Mullarkey 2004, 44). 
Third, caching can bias the estimating of hits. Server logs do not provide the full 
picture of user activity because caching can occur at different levels of the internet 
system. The system consists of web servers, proxy servers, and client computers. While 
caching on web servers can be accounted for in log file analysis, the two other forms of 
caching cannot be accounted for. Proxy servers are in an intermediate position between 
web servers and clients. They store data from web servers and allow for requests by 
several clients, thereby speeding up the transmission process to the end users. Proxy 
server caching can be turned of by the server, which is typically the case for web pages 
that are generated dynamically (Mullarkey 2004, 44-50; Peterson 2004, 24). In addition, 
some elements of a website may be stored on a user's hard disk (“local caching”) so that 
subsequent requests for the same elements may be directed to the hard disk and not to the 
remote web server (Mullarkey 2004, 44-50). Such local caching is particularly relevant 
for backward navigation in a user’s browser. Requests that are cached at the local level 
are not counted as hits in the sever log under consideration and cannot be adjusted for 
(Nicholas, Huntington et al. 2002, 71).  
Fourth, time measurement is of limited value because of undetectable variance in 
caching, load-up time, and information density. Caching affects the number of pages 
recorded and the page view time. When a user's request is directed to the local cache, the 
server log cannot record the point of time of the operation. Subsequent requests to the 





in time. Therefore, local caching leads to an upward bias of page view time. Load-up 
time depends on the time of the day because the number of simultaneously accessing web 
users influences file delivery speed. It also depends on the speed of a user's internet 
connection, and on the number of files downloaded. The greater the information density 
of a given web page, the longer it takes to download the page (Nicholas, Huntington et al. 
2002, 67-71). 
Fifth, the duration of a session cannot be provided exactly because, technically, 
users log on, but they do not log off. Consequently, the log file does not contain any log-
off entries. Instead, user inactivity is used as a proxy measure. If a user does not request 
any web data for a specified period of time, the server automatically terminates the 
session (Nicholas, Huntington et al. 2002, 64).  
2.6.2 Implementation and limitations of web-based experiments 
Technical options for implementing online experiments must consider certain advantages 
and disadvantages. 
Generally, online experiments can be implemented using either server-side or 
client-side programming. While client-side programs run on users’ computers, server-
side programs run on the remote machine that the user accesses over the internet; that is, 
a server. Server-side programming does not require a special computer system or 
browser, and therefore ensures that the experiment will be visible on the screens of all 
internet users.  
Client-side programs, on the other hand, can run with JavaScript or Java—





executed on the client's computer, they do not require much of the server's capacity. A 
potential disadvantage is that they can run properly only if the user’s browser is allowed 
to execute those kinds of programs (Reips 2002b, 248; Birnbaum 2004, 807-808).  
Client-side programs may introduce platform-dependent biases when certain users 
allow program execution but others do not. Vice versa, the use of certain technologies 
may indicate something special about a given user. For example, a study by Buchanan 
and Reips demonstrated that Macintosh users reached higher scores on an “openness” 
scale, and that the average education of users who allowed JavaScript programs to be 
executed was lower than that of those who did not allow JavaScript (Buchanan and Reips 
2001). Therefore, to prevent bias from self-selection, Reips recommends using the “most 
basic and widely available technology” for conducting web-based experiments (Reips 
2002b, 248). On the other hand, already in 2004, Birnbaum diagnosed that "one now 
expects to find JavaScript and Java on most users' machines" (Birnbaum 2004, 808). 
In principle, client-side programs should produce the same output, regardless of 
computer systems and browsers. That ideal, however, cannot always be achieved, given 
the large variety in existing hardware and software (Reips 2002a, 246). Birnbaum 
therefore recommends testing new client-side programs with the major computer 
systems, browsers, and browser versions in use (Birnbaum 2004, 809). 
An important challenge in web-based experiments is the possibility of receiving 
multiple submissions from a given participant. Multiple submissions cannot be detected 
unless the website “visitor” can be clearly identified (Peterson 2004, 50). 
Generally, several remedies for multiple submissions are available if users are 





they do not know about the experiment, however, the available options are reduced.  
One option is to ascertain whether several submissions came from computers with 
the same internet protocol (IP) address. Today, unfortunately, many IP addresses are 
assigned dynamically. In such a system, whenever a new user logs on, the provider may 
assign a new IP address (Birnbaum 2004, 814). In the context of using IP addresses for 
identification, several scenarios are conceivable in which 1) a person participates more 
than once by using the same computer or IP address, 2) a person participates more than 
once by using different computers, 3) different persons participate, using the same 
computer, 4) multiple datasets with different IP addresses come from the same computer, 
and 5) multiple datasets come from different computers but have the same IP address 
assigned from proxy servers—either for all the webpages or for individual page elements 
(Reips 2002b, 250). 
Alternatively, one can use cookies to determine whether a user has previously 
participated in the experiment. A cookie is an identification number that is stored on a 
participant's computer (Birnbaum 2004, 815). Some researchers deem placing cookies 
unreliable because they are considered problematic by many users (Nicholas, Huntington 
et al. 2002, 67) and "will exclude a large portion of participants" from the experiment 
(Reips 2002b, 251). Yet, contrary empirical findings do exist. In one study, users were 
randomly assigned to either a cookie or a non-cookie treatment. The treatment had no 
effect (p=0.271) on the number of pages requested by participants (Drèze and Zufryden 
1998, 16). Nevertheless, the experimenter cannot know whether a user has previously 
participated using another computer, or whether he or she has deleted the cookie. Both 





addition, by using cookies, one cannot detect when different users have accessed the 
website with the same computer; that is, with the same cookie (Drèze and Zufryden 1998, 
15).  
Another problem is that stimulus delivery over the internet cannot be fully 
controlled. Even if the experiment can run on the client computer, the stimulus designed 
by the experimenter may be received differently by users, given the variety in existing 
software, computers, monitors, and speakers. For example, color displays may vary 
between systems. That is true even for so-called "Web-safe colors" (Birnbaum 2004, 812) 
that were supposed to be the same on every system. Since individuals quickly adapt to 
fixed background conditions, and since perception by the same individual is constant, 
variation in perception between users can be disregarded in many cases (Birnbaum 2004, 
811-812). 
The dropout of experiment participants may bias results. A dropout is a user who 
begins participating in a given experiment, but leaves before completing it. Dropout 
seriously threatens internal validity in between-subject experiments because it can lead to 
false results, even if experimental conditions have been randomly assigned and the 
dropout rates of both the control group and the treatment group are the same (Birnbaum 
2004, 816-817). 
Recruitment for web-based experiments cannot be fully controlled if it is done 
passively. “Passive” implies that one simply lets users find the experimental website 
through search engines or hyperlinks. Given the internet's dynamic nature, one cannot 
predict or control how hyperlinks will develop in the future. Depending on which other 





participate. Given the dynamic nature of the internet, it would be unrealistic to aim for a 
sample that represented a stable population of web users as such. Regardless of the 
chosen recruitment technique, the obtained sample might not be representative of a 
particular population because of potential self-selection problems (Birnbaum 2004, 818-
820). 
Response bias may occur, depending on the choice of input devices, such as 
check boxes, pull-down selection lists, or the size of text boxes (Birnbaum 2004, 821-
822).  
Experimenter bias is not a major concern because web-based experiments can be 
highly standardized. Moreover, they can be documented so that they can be easily 
replicated (Birnbaum 2004, 822). 
Finally, web-based experiments may involve technical configuration errors—such 
as uncontrolled open access to unprotected experimental directories, disclosure of 
confidential participant data through internet addresses, and revelation of the experiment 
structure through file and folder titles (Reips 2002a, 241-247). 
The last two sections have shown a variety of limitations inherent in web-based 
research and experimenting. Those that are relevant to this dissertation are discussed in 
chapters three and four. 
2.7 Discussion 
A review of the literature has shown a mismatch among suggestions derived from theory, 
empirical findings, and activities in the policy community with respect to life-cycle cost 





providing monetary information may help reduce consumers’ cognitive efforts. The few 
experimental studies that contrast physical and monetary information, however, provide 
only ambiguous hints as to whether life-cycle cost disclosure is really effective. Finally, 
despite the lack of clear evidence regarding its effectiveness, life-cycle cost disclosure is 
currently being used on many energy efficiency websites or being discussed in the 
context of conventional labeling. 
Putting those findings into perspective requires a broader look at current research 
on environment-related information programs. Open questions for future research 
include, how consumers demand and use information, how success of information 
provision programs can be measured, how information is related to real action, and how 
information technology can be effectively used for information programs (Wilbanks and 
Stern 2002, 341-346). Brewer et al. suggest studying how messages should be designed 
to suit audiences’ attention patterns and cognitive capacities, as well as looking at 
intermediary groups that try to provide information to consumers (Brewer and Stern 
2005, 74-76).  
Such research needs call for an appropriate form of evaluation of the effectiveness 
of life-cycle cost disclosure. All evaluations have to deal with the counterfactual problem, 
or the “fundamental problem of causal inference” —that one cannot observe a unit that is 
treated and, at the same time, not treated (Holland 1986, 947). When feasible and 
implemented correctly, randomized experiments represent the best approach to creating a 
counterfactual and to evaluating treatment effects (Rossi, Freeman et al. 1999; Harrison 
and List 2004). Still, randomization can be applied in different settings. The experiments 





participants were not intending to buy anything, or, they were susceptible to experimenter 
effects—introduced, for example, by the sales staff.  
One way of handling both issues is to conduct field experiments on the internet in 
which the participants will not know that they are in the experiment. In web-based 
experiments, consumer behavior can be tracked unobtrusively by evaluating consumers’ 
click-stream data, as stored in server log files (Hofacker and Murphy 2005, 239). 
Moreover, conducting field experiments in a commercial context motivates participants, 
circumventing the problem of inadequate financial incentives (Hertwig and Ortmann 
2001). 
Although that kind of research in conjunction with actual companies is still rare, 
click-stream data from field experiments has been used. For example, Murphy, Hofacker, 
and Bennett (2001) randomly assigned website visitors to four different websites and 
measured the effect on click-through behavior. In a more recent experiment, Moe (2006) 
conducted a field experiment about the timing of pop-up promotions on a high-traffic 
information website.  
Of course, a web-based experiment cannot aim at creating the same environment 
that exists in an actual store. Nevertheless, it can serve as a kind of yardstick as to what 
effect size can be possibly expected from life-cycle cost disclosure in physical stores. 
Concentrating on appliances and cost figures purifies the results from experimenter 
effects that physical experiments usually have to deal with. Unlike simulated laboratory 
experiments, web-based experiments offer real incentives to consumers who are actually 
intending to buy an appliance.  





entire population as long as only a subset of the population uses the internet. Still, such 
experiments may considerably expand our knowledge about the effects of life-cycle cost 
disclosure. Moreover, with an increasing market share of direct online sales, the results 
from internet field experiments play an increasingly important role.  
Those considerations were the basis for developing and implementing the two 






Chapter 3: Experimental online price comparison 
3.1 Introduction 
The overarching question of this dissertation is whether life-cycle cost disclosure makes 
online-shoppers opt for more energy-efficient household appliances. To answer it, I 
implemented a randomized field experiment in a price comparison engine (shopbot), and 
in an online shop. The following sections contain the data description (3.2), the 
hypotheses (3.3), the research methods (3.4), and the results (3.5) for the shopbot. In 
section 3.6, I discuss the limitations of the shopbot experiment. An analogous 
presentation of the online shop experiment can be found in chapter 4. 
3.2 Data 
The experimental data for cooling appliances stems from a shopbot that is integrated into 
WEB.DE, one of Germany’s largest internet portals (www.web.de) that was established 
in 1995. A recent market study estimated that WEB.DE had 10.5 million “unique users” 
in an average month and ranged third overall as a vehicle for advertising (AGOF 2006). 
WEB.DE offers a mix of information, entertainment and price comparison shopping.  
Price comparison shopping can be started by clicking on, and navigating between 
listed product categories and products. Alternatively, users can type a specific term 
directly into a search field. Only navigational click-stream data, however, was collected 
for this experiment. Figure 5 in appendix I depicts the introductory shopping page at the 
WEB.DE portal. 





company that provides the technology and the underlying database with product data 
from manufacturers. Energy-efficiency information in the database is consistent with the 
requirements of the EU appliance labeling directive (EC 1994; EC 2003). Based on this 
data, the shopbot allows for a comparison of individual product offers from final online 
retailers. Retailers can access the system and provide the current prices of the products 
they are offering. Over time, the range of products offered and associated product prices 
are therefore subject to change. 
Mentasys collected users’ click-stream data for refrigerators, fridge-freezers, and 
freezers in the form of server log files. Chest freezers—although also available through 
the shopbot—were not part of the experiment given a low level of related click-throughs 
and relatively high implementation cost. Incomplete data was recorded in a separate log 
file. Potential reasons for incomplete data encompassed expired server sessions, technical 
server change due to server breakdown, and the rejection of session cookies by internet 
users. 
Mentasys also automatically identified and removed hits from non-human user 
agents with the aid of available blacklists for Internet Protocol addresses and user-agent 
information, and provided the resulting log files. Each line in the log file contained 
information about a given product that was shown to, or clicked on by a user. Each click-
through was associated with a specific online merchant. Table 83 in appendix V gives an 
abridged example of the log file format.  
Additional data regarding gasoline prices for the time period of the experiment 
was obtained from the Association of the German Petroleum Industry (MWV 2006). 





days, and the removal of remaining hits from non-human user agents. Days are referred 
to as invalid for those days on which the experimental set up deviated from the agreed 
layout due to unforeseen software problems. Due to proprietary considerations, these 
days are not revealed in detail here. Hits from non-human user agents were identified 
through the keywords “bot”, “crawl” “spider” or “mail”, respectively, in the user-agent 
string of the log file. No click-through was recorded for any of these agents. 
3.3 Hypotheses 
With the data from WEB.DE, I want to test the following hypothesis:  
H1a: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost does not make online shoppers opt for household 
appliances that are different in terms of their energy efficiency.” 
H1b: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost makes online shoppers opt for household 
appliances that are different in terms of their energy efficiency.” 
The hypotheses are nondirectional—implying a two-tailed test—because of the 
ambiguity of prior research findings. Although I do expect that the provision of life-cycle 
cost will lead to higher mean energy efficiency, I cannot a priori exclude the possibility 
that the information disclosure may instead lower it.  
This possibility requires a closer look at prior research. As described in section 
2.5, the empirical evidence regarding the effectiveness of information programs in 
general, and monetary cost disclosure in particular is ambiguous. Nevertheless, none of 
the experimental research closely related to life-cycle cost disclosure suggests that 
monetary information provision may in fact lead consumers to systematically buy less 





perspective to the larger body of research on decision support systems (Scott Morton 
1984, 14-16). Here, a small number of experiments from the early 1980s are reported in 
which users of decision support systems actually performed worse than the control group 
(Sharda, Barr et al. 1988, 140-145). Nevertheless, a recent study of two decision support 
systems on the internet that comes closest to the proposed experiment reports an 
improvement in both decision quality and a reduction in decision effort (Häubl and Trifts 
2000). All in all, a two-tailed test seems to be more appropriate. 
A question closely related to energy use is whether life-cycle cost disclosure 
actually changes the estimated life-cycle cost in the treatment group: 
H2a: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost does not make online shoppers opt for household 
appliances that are different in terms of their estimated life-cycle cost.” 
H2b: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost makes online shoppers opt for household 
appliances that are different in terms of their estimated life-cycle cost.” 
A third pair of hypotheses refers to the economic effect of life-cycle cost for the 
providing website. Since the business model of the shopbot relies on generating click-
throughs to final retailers, the total number of clicks is of crucial importance: 
H3a: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost does not change the number of click-throughs to 
final retailers.” 
H3b: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost changes the number of click-throughs to final 
retailers.” 
These hypotheses are non-directional, too, because on the one hand, life-cycle cost 
disclosure may make the information more helpful and convincing. On the other hand, it 





like the interface less than consumers in the control group (Chiang, Dholakia et al. 2005). 
3.4 Method 
In this section, I describe the experimental research design (3.4.1), the treatment (3.4.2), 
the procedure that participants followed (3.4.3), the chosen measures (3.4.4), and the 
regression models I applied (3.4.5). 
3.4.1 Design 
All experiments described in this dissertation are two-group posttest-only randomized 
experiments (Trochim 2004) with cross-sectional data from different internet users. The 
control group always received the regular product price information, whereas the 
treatment group was, in addition, offered information about estimated operating and life-
cycle cost. 
3.4.2 Treatment 
The treatment encompasses the display and calculation of cost (3.4.2.1), the display of 
usage assumptions and their adjustment (3.4.2.2), the default assumptions for prices and 
preferences (3.4.2.3) and the technical implementation of the treatment (3.4.2.4). 
3.4.2.1 Display and calculation of life-cycle cost 
Different from the control group, the treatment group was offered additional operating 
and life-cycle costs. On most web pages, the treatment group saw an equation in the 
following format:  





These costs were provided for each product. On certain web pages, individual cost 
components were provided separately. A full documentation of all relevant web pages 
and cost formats is provided in appendix I.  
While the control group received the same information in both rounds, the 
treatment group was shown two distinct treatments in two separate experimental rounds. 
These rounds differed with respect to the underlying assumptions, the calculation of 
operating cost, and the presentation of life-cycle cost. Table 5 exhibits all experimental 
conditions for a sample refrigerator. Each figure in the table represents a basic building 










Visual stimuli for sample refrigerator 
Control 
Treatment round 1 
 
 
• Time horizon:  
5 years 
• Price of electricity: 
0.16 € / kWh 




• Time horizon:  
9 years 
• Price of electricity: 
0.16 € / kWh 
In each experimental condition, the first line shows the refrigerator model. It is 
followed by price information, and cost information, where applicable. The price 
information refers to a specific final retailer (here: “baur.de”). Operating cost can be 
adjusted by clicking on “Betriebskosten”. The before-last paragraph contains basic 





capacity, and refrigerator type. The last line indicates the number of alternative retailers 
that offer the same product. 












where P = appliance purchase price [€], Ct = yearly operating cost [€/year],  
N = chosen time horizon [years], and r = discount rate.  
For continuously working cooling appliances, operating costs are calculated as  
EEt CPC *=  
where PE  = price of electricity [€/kWh], and CE  = consumption of energy 
[kWh/year]. CE  is provided as EU energy label information (EC 1994; EC 2003). PE was 
held constant over time, and consumers were told explicitly about the static character of 
the estimation (see figure 2 in the next section).  
This simplification disregards shipping, installation, and maintenance cost, which 
is consistent with what most of the energy efficiency websites reviewed in chapter 2 
present. As long as these additional costs do not vary systematically by appliance 
efficiency, it does not matter when comparing different models (McMahon, McNeil et al. 
2005, 160).  
By means of the additional life-cycle cost information, users in the treatment 
group were also able to sort and filter appliances by life-cycle cost.  
3.4.2.2 Display of usage assumptions and their adjustment 





life-cycle cost estimation. For presenting the present value of future operating cost to 
consumers, I considered two alternative forms of discounting. After pre-testing direct 
discounting, I eventually settled for indirect discounting.  
Direct discounting could have potentially been implemented by asking explicitly 
for a user’s individual discount rate, or, alternatively by offering “choice tasks”, 
“matching tasks”, “rating tasks”, or “price tasks” (Frederick, Loewenstein et al. 2002) as 
described in section 2.4.4.3. Mentasys, the implementing company, pre-tested the first 
option and asked users explicitly about their discount rate in a test version of the 
experimental price comparison. The resulting feedback, however, indicated a lack of 
comprehension and usability. Therefore, direct discounting was abandoned, and indirect 





At its core, the notion of indirect discounting put forward here implies that 
undiscounted operating cost can be reduced in two alternative ways. Figure 1 shows how 
undiscounted operating cost (1) can be reduced by means of direct discounting (2) or by 
reducing the underlying time horizon (3). 
Figure 1: Indirect discounting with an equivalent reduction in time horizon 
Different from conventional direct discounting (2), the here proposed alternative 
relies on a calculatory shortening of the underlying time horizon (3). In principle, the 
effect is the same: the estimated initial operating costs get reduced. This does not mean 
that the actual physical lifetime of a given appliance cannot be longer than the specified 
time horizon. A reduction in the reference time horizon simply changes the measuring 
rod regarding the relative cost-effectiveness for a list of appliances. In this way, indirect 
discounting (3) can substitute for direct discounting (2).  
Practically, consumers therefore only had to specify a reference time horizon for 




























Figure 2: Adjustment of assumptions in the shopbot’s treatment group  
 
The first paragraph in figure 2 explains that the estimation relies on adjustable 
assumptions (shown in the second paragraph), and that the default assumptions represent 
average values. It also cautions that the estimation is static in nature and that it does not 
reflect potential future changes in electricity prices. The three paragraphs at the bottom 
illustrate the estimation formula with a sample calculation and make explicitly clear that 
the sample calculation does not refer to any appliance currently looked at by the 
consumer. 
3.4.2.3 Default assumptions for estimating operating cost 
The estimation of operating cost for cooling appliances requires default values for the 





The default discount rate should in principle be rooted in empirical estimates from 
the literature. Unfortunately, there is no single discount rate. Instead, implicit discount 
rates estimated in the early 1980s for household appliances in the United States ranged 
from about 0% to 300%. From the most recent survey I could identify concerning 
hypothetical refrigerator purchasing decisions of Germans, one can infer an implicit 
discount rate of 18% (or less). 
For the purpose of indirect discounting, this inference can be turned upside-down: 
given an implicit discount rate of 18% and the known average service life of household 
appliances in Germany, one can calculate a reduced time horizon that can substitute for 
direct discounting. In other words, one can determine the value of operating cost for an 
equivalent time horizon (ETH) that must be equal to the conventionally discounted 















where Ct = annual operating cost in year t, T = the known average service life of a 
given household appliance, r = discount rate, ETH = equivalent time horizon. For 













Given an exogenous implicit discount rate of 18%, and a known average service 
life of 14.4 years for refrigerators, the equivalent time horizon equals about 5 years. 
Practically, in the experiment, these 5 years were presented to consumers as a default 





consumers adjusted the time horizon to their personal needs, they implicitly changed the 
discount rate. The resulting overall equation for life-cycle cost is, therefore, given as: 
EE CPETHPLCC **+=  
where P = appliance purchase price [€], ETH = equivalent time horizon [years],  
PE  = price of electricity [€/kWh], and CE  = consumption of energy [kWh/year]. 
One problem in setting up the experiment was the difference in known service life 
between refrigerators (14.4 years) and freezers (18 years) which would have required 
differentiated time horizons for each appliance type. Consumers, however, were able to 
switch between appliance types and may have assumed that the estimation of operating 
cost remains the same for all appliances. Therefore, I applied one common service life 
(14.4 years) and one derived equivalent time horizon of 5 years to all cooling appliances 
in the first round of the experiment.  
The second treatment round represented a more normative approach to consumer 
decision-support. The yardstick was a rational agent who tries to make beneficial 
investments and whose implied discount rate can be expected to converge on the market 
interest rate. Here, I chose an implicit discount rate of about 6% that was closer to the 
then current long-term interest rate of about 4% (Deutsche Bundesbank 2006). Since 
consumers may consider the investment into a cooling appliance as somewhat risky 
(Sutherland 1991, 81; Frederick, Loewenstein et al. 2002) , the remaining difference 
between 4% and 6% was supposed to cover this risk premium. 















Price of electricity  0.16 €/kWh 2005 Mean value for Germany 
(VDEW 2005)  
Service life of 
refrigerator 
14.4 years 2004 
Service life of 
freezer 
18 years 2004 
Mean values for Germany 
from representative survey 
(GfK 2006)  
Equivalent time 
horizon  
(treatment round 1) 
5 years 2004 Common value for all 
cooling appliances based on 
implicit discount rate of 18% 
derived from (Kuckartz and 
Rheingans-Heintze 2004, 81) 
Equivalent time 
horizon  
(treatment round 2) 
9 years 2006 Common value for all 
cooling appliances based on 
implicit discount rate of 
about 6%; closer to then 
current long-term interest 
rate of about 4% (Deutsche 
Bundesbank 2006) 
3.4.2.4 Technical implementation of the experiment 
The technical implementation encompassed randomization and controlled separation of 
the two experimental groups by means of cookies and different internet addresses, as well 
as the use of JavaScript.  
In principle, randomization in online experiments can be achieved by using a 
random number generator and assigning users to experimental conditions depending on 
the generated number. Alternatively, the two experimental conditions can be assigned on 
an alternating basis (Hofacker and Murphy 2005, 240). In this experiment, conditions 





request for a web page by sending material for condition A, and set a cookie for future 
recognition of the user's initial experimental condition. Analogously, the next incoming 
user received material for condition B, and so on.  
Two different sorts of cookies were utilized for separating the two experimental 
groups. If a given user’s browser denied persistent cookies with an expiration date of 
several months later, the server tried to set a session cookie that would expire upon 
closure of the user’s browser. As long as a user’s cookie was recognizable, the server was 
able to assign the same initial experimental condition. If users accepted no cookies at all, 
experimental conditions would switch all the time. The resulting click stream was logged 
in a separate log file not included in the main analysis.  
Depending on the experimental condition, users were directed to Uniform 
Resource Locators with different content. These varied in one letter (“A” or “B”, 
respectively), as shown in table 7. 






















dummy variable on user characteristics and testing the null hypothesis that all coefficients 
were zero (Stock and Watson 2003, 390). Since users participated anonymously in the 
experiment, the only user characteristics available were those transmitted to the server as 
part of the user-agent variable. From this variable, I extracted information regarding 
browser and operating system. Additional user characteristics were available through the 
information about previously visited websites contained in the “referrer” string. I 
differentiated users coming from Google, from German websites (.de), Austrian websites 
(.at), and Swiss websites (.ch).  
Finally, full delivery of visual stimuli in the treatment group required that users 
had JavaScript activated on their computers.  
3.4.3 Procedure 
In order to assure realistic conditions for this field experiment, data was collected without 
obtaining participants’ informed consent prior to participation. This procedure had been 
approved by the University of Maryland’s Institutional Review Board (Application 
No. 01591). 
The figures referred to in this section can all be found in appendix I unless 
otherwise noted. Figure 4 illustrates the experimental process. After arriving at the 
homepage of the web portal, consumers started the price comparison engine. The 
introductory price comparison page can be seen in figure 5. From this page, users could 
enter the experiment in two different ways. They could either move along the following 
path: “household appliances”> “cooling appliances” > “freezers” (or “fridge-freezers” or 





Alternatively, they could click directly on “refrigerators” (see figure 5) to reach a product 
list of different refrigerators. Due to layout restrictions of the website, this direct path was 
available only for refrigerators, and not for the two other appliance types. 
Random assignment occurred before users could see the price comparison for the 
first time. Operating and life-cycle cost for the treatment group were estimated based on 
default usage assumptions as listed in table 6. Treatment round one had a default time 
horizon of five years, and treatment round two a default time horizon of nine years.  
In both experimental groups, the default sorting of products was by popularity. 
This is illustrated in figure 7 (control) and figure 8 (treatment). The order in which 
hyperlinks to final retailers occurred in those product listing was determined through an 
algorithm which was independent of the experimental condition. Instead, the algorithm is 
a function of the percentage of past click-throughs to a given retailer, his specified 
marketing budget, and cost per click-through. 
Users in both groups could sort the product listing by purchase price, and product 
name. Also, they could filter products by manufacturer, price range, capacity, energy 
efficiency class, and type. In addition, users in the treatment group could adjust the 
underlying assumptions for the calculation of operating costs (see figure 2 in 3.4.2.2), 
sort the product listing by life-cycle cost, and filter products within a specified range of 
life-cycle cost. Figure 10 depicts a product listing for refrigerators with a capacity greater 
or equal to 200 liters that is sorted by life-cycle cost.  
Furthermore, both experimental groups could choose to see an in-depth 
comparison with detailed product characteristics in matrix format. The matrix for the 





cycle cost respectively (figure 11).  
 Finally, users in both experimental groups could focus on a given product and 
move on to a price comparison of final retailers for the one product under consideration. 
This listing provided additional information from individual retailers, for example with 
respect to delivery time and shipping cost. Users could sort the listing by delivery time, 
product price, and retailer name. In the treatment group, users additionally received life-
cycle cost estimates (figure 9). 
 At several steps in the process could users click-through to the website of a final 
online retailer whose product offer appeared in a newly opened browser window. The 
original browser window showing the experimental shopbot remained the same as before. 
3.4.4 Measures 
Measures included several dependent and independent variables. Most variables referred 
to products for which users had clicked-through to a final retailer, and this kind of 
clicking-through was possible at several stages in the process. One of these possibilities 
stood out regarding its lack of related purchase price information. Different from other 
hyperlinks, the links to Ebay (e.g. in figure 7 or figure 9) had no visible price tag 
associated. That is, neither Ebay’s purchase price nor related life-cycle cost was easily 
comparable before a click-through occurred. Therefore, the relatively small number of 
clicks to Ebay was discarded.  
The dependent variable of primary interest was the standardized yearly energy 






Further dependent variables were the total number of click-throughs per user, as 
well as life-cycle cost. Since life-cycle cost by definition was not shown to users in the 
control group, these users had to be assigned life-cycle cost estimates derived from 
common default assumptions about price and time horizon. All dependent variables of 
interest are shown in table 8.  
Table 8: Key dependent variables in the shopbot experiment 
Dependent variable Meaning / Comment 
energy Energy use of appliance [kWh/year] 
lccost Estimated life-cycle cost of appliance [€],  
simulated for control group based on default assumptions 
ct count Count of click-throughs per user 
 
While potential independent variables abounded, only few of them were 
consistently available for a sufficiently large number of observations. These included the 
capacity, price, energy efficiency class, brand, and merchant of a given appliance. They 
are shown in table 9. 
Table 9: Key independent variables in the shopbot experiment 
Independent variable Meaning 
treatment Treatment dummy variable   
category Cooling appliance category dummy variables 
price Appliance price [€] 
capacity Total capacity of the appliance [L] 
efficiency class Energy efficiency class (A - F) dummy variables 
merchant Final retailer dummy variables 
brands Appliance brand dummy variables 
cookie Cookie type (persistent/session cookie) 







For testing hypothesis H1a —that the energy-efficiency of chosen products is unaffected 
by the treatment—I used the following regression model: 
energy i= β0 + β1 treatmenti + β2 Zi + ui    
where energy = energy use [kWh/year] for cooling appliance i, treatment = 
treatment dummy variable, Z = vector of covariates (see below), and u = error term. This 
basic model was estimated for the three distinct categories “refrigerators”, “fridge-
freezers”, and “freezers”. In addition, I also employed a logarithmic specification: 
ln(energy) i= β0 + β1 treatmenti + β2 Zi + ui  
This form of the model implied that life-cycle cost disclosure would lead to a 
constant percentage change in energy use. Both models were also estimated for life-cycle 
cost as the dependent variable. All of these models were estimated with ordinary least 
squares. 
Potential covariates were integrated into the models where appropriate. In 
principle, adding independent variables may explain more variance and estimate the 
treatment effect more efficiently (Neter and Wasserman 1974, 686; Stock and Watson 
2003, 384). The addition of covariates assumes “conditional mean independence” (Stock 
and Watson 2003, 420) which requires that the treatment be not correlated with other 
independent variables. This is true for pre-treatment characteristics that are not influenced 
by the treatment (Neter and Wasserman 1974, 688). Given these restrictions, I only 





variable. The ordinary least squares coefficients of the covariates are generally not 
consistent—different from the coefficient of the randomly assigned treatment (Stock and 
Watson 2003, 383).  
As a special case, the vector of covariates Z included interactions between 
appliance capacity and the treatment dummy. This specification covered the possibility 
that the treatment effect might vary. Since consumers may—depending on appliance 
size—deem efficiency more or less important, the size of the treatment effect may depend 
on appliance capacity.  
For investigating the hypothesis H3a that the treatment does not change online 
shoppers’ number of click-throughs to final retailers, I relied on chi-square tests of 
statistical independence and a negative binomial regression model of the following form: 
CTCOUNT i= β0 + β1 treatmenti + β2 Zi + ui  
where CTCOUNT = number of click-throughs per user i, treatment = treatment 
dummy variable, Z = vector of covariates, and u = error term. The range of potential 
covariates is greatly reduced here because CTCOUNT refers to a sum of click-throughs. 
While each click-through refers to individual product characteristics, the sum of click-
throughs can only be associated with characteristics that are stable over time and do not 
change with every click, such as browsers. 
3.5 Results 
Results from the shopbot experiment are differentiated by treatment rounds and appliance 
categories. Section 3.5.1 presents results from the first treatment round with an 





round with a time horizon of nine years. All results are discussed in section 3.6. 
3.5.1 First treatment round 
The quality of the results reported below depends on stimulus delivery, successful 
randomization, cookie acceptance, and the handling of problematic clicking behavior. 
Stimulus delivery did not always work as planned due to unexpected software 
system behavior. Therefore, I discarded click-throughs recorded during the periods of 
incomplete treatment implementation. See figure 27 in appendix V for the remaining 
click-throughs over time.  
Randomization worked correctly when looking at all users visiting the 
experimental website. The distribution of those users who actually clicked-through to 
final retailers, however, was not as equalized (see table 84 in appendix V).  
Persistent cookies were accepted by more than 95% of all users in treatment 
round one (see table 85 in appendix V). The rate of session cookie rejection could not be 
determined because these sessions were indistinguishable from other incomplete data due 
to expired server sessions or technical server change. 
I considered two forms of clicking behavior as problematic. First, if users clicked 
on hyperlinks to the same retailer for exactly the same product in succession, I assumed 
impatience and disregarded the second click-through. Second, a user with a suspiciously 
high number of clicks—which looked like the behavior of a non-human user agent—
made me discard his data entirely. I chose 20 click-throughs as the cut-off point so that I 
had to discard the click-throughs from six users (see table 87 in the appendix). Overall, I 





have biased the analysis, I performed the following robustness check with the remaining 
click throughs: for energy use as the dependent variable, I ran regressions for all 
remaining click-throughs, and in addition, for each user’s final click-through. In this way, 
each user’s influence had equal weight on the results. The results for the total of 1969 
click-throughs are presented in the following sections.  
Overall, nearly 3000 separately identifiable users visited the shopbot in the three 
experimental appliance categories. In each respective category, they were shown more 
than 300 different appliances from more than 25 brands sold by 30 different retailers (see 
table 86 in appendix V.) Appendix V provides more detailed information on the range of 
life-cycle cost (figure 28), energy use box plots (figure 29), energy use histograms (figure 
30), energy efficiency classes (figure 31), life-cycle cost histograms (figure 32), energy 
versus capacity scatter plots (figure 33), and the development of the price of regular gas 
in Germany during the time span of the experiment (figure 35). 
3.5.1.1 Freezers 
Freezers’ raw mean and median energy use are both lower in the treatment group than in 
the control group , as shown in table 10 below. For life-cycle cost, the pattern is less 
consistent. While the mean is lower in the control group, the median is lower in the 





Table 10: Descriptive statistics for freezers’ energy use (shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 170 233.5 238.7 57.2 135.0 664.0 
Treatment 144 228.5 223.0 47.4 135.0 352.0 
Total 314 231.2 226.2 52.9 135.0 664.0 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/year]. 
Table 11: Descriptive statistics for freezers’ life-cycle cost (shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 170 607 585 242 241 1860 
Treatment 144 622 577 243 241 1315 
Total 314 614 580 242 241 1860 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
Table 12 below contains regression results for the logarithm of energy and life-cycle 
cost as dependent variables. In no model is the treatment coefficient on its own 
significant at a 5% level. When controlling for other factors and allowing for an 
interaction between treatment and capacity in model (3), the treatment reduces energy 
use for capacities smaller than 129 liters (p<0.05), and increases energy use for capacities 
greater than 128 liters. For a freezer with the median capacity of 171 liters, the treatment 
leads to an overall increase in energy use by 1.0% (see table 89 in appendix V for 





Table 12: Effect on freezers’ energy use and cost (shopbot round 1) 
 
   ln(energy)   ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT 
       
treatment -0.017 0.00084 -0.17* -0.0056 -0.15 -0.039 
 (0.025) (0.0085) (0.068) (0.013) (0.10) (0.026) 
       
treat.*ln(cap.)   0.035*  0.029  
   (0.014)  (0.021)  
       
ln(capacity)  0.34*** 0.33*** 0.36*** 0.35*** 0.51*** 
  (0.010) (0.011) (0.015) (0.018) (0.027) 
       
constant 5.43*** 4.34*** 4.42*** 4.00*** 4.08*** 4.18*** 
 (0.017) (0.068) (0.071) (0.11) (0.11) (0.17) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.002 0.900 0.902 0.902 0.902 0.743 
N 314 314 314 159 159 314 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
CT: Click-through to online retailer. Models 4 to 5 contain only final CTs and serve as a robustness 
check for models 1 to 3. See figure 34 in appendix V for residual histograms.  
 
3.5.1.2 Fridge-freezers 
Fridge-freezers’ mean and median energy are higher in the treatment group than in the 
control group (table 13). Mean life-cycle cost is lower in the treatment group than in the 
control group, while the opposite is true for median life-cycle costs (table 14). 
Table 13: Descriptive statistics for fridge-freezers’ energy use (shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 288 311.6 288.0 95.8 168.0 770.0 
Treatment 293 317.2 303.0 89.9 117.0 768.0 
Total 581 314.4 299.3 92.8 117.0 770.0 
 





Table 14: Descriptive statistics for fridge-freezers’ life-cycle cost(shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 288 883 690 592 291 4439 
Treatment 293 857 727 517 122 4439 
Total 581 870 698 555 122 4439 
 
 Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were 
therefore simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
Controlling for other factors reduces the standard error of the treatment coefficient  
(table 15). The coefficients in model (3) and (6) imply that being in the treatment group 
leads to a decrease in energy use and life-cycle cost by less than 3%. Yet, none of the 
treatment coefficients is significant at a 5% level.  
Table 15: Effect on fridge-freezers’ energy use and cost (shopbot round 1) 
 
   ln(energy)   ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT 
       
treatment 0.022 0.014 -0.0086 -0.019 -0.0091 -0.026 
 (0.023) (0.017) (0.0061) (0.038) (0.011) (0.020) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.68*** 0.67***  0.69*** 1.40*** 
  (0.026) (0.016)  (0.033) (0.051) 
       
constant 5.70*** 1.85*** 1.41*** 5.73*** 1.37*** -0.87** 
 (0.017) (0.15) (0.10) (0.029) (0.21) (0.32) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No No Yes No Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes No Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.000 0.477 0.940 -0.003 0.944 0.779 
N 581 581 581 237 237 581 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
CT: Click-through to online retailer. Models 4 to 5 contain only final CTs and serve as a robustness 







While both mean and median energy use are lower in the treatment group than in the 
control group (table 16), the opposite is true for mean and median life-cycle cost  
(table 17). 
Table 16: Descriptive statistics for refrigerators’ energy use (shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 594 186.5 179.0 79.5 84.0 525.0 
Treatment 480 183.7 173.3 71.6 84.0 525.0 
Total 1074 185.2 175.0 76.1 84.0 525.0 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/year].  
Table 17: Descriptive statistics for refrigerators’ life-cycle cost (shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 594 626 525 325 205 2790 
Treatment 480 680 585 343 210 3159 
Total 1074 650 554 335 205 3159 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
Table 18 below shows that the treatment coefficient is significant at a 1% level in 
model (2). Accordingly, being exposed to life-cycle cost disclosure on average reduces 
energy use by 4.2% when controlling for appliance capacity and energy efficiency 
classes. This effect, however, gets reduced by about half and does not remain significant 





Table 18: Effect on refrigerators’ energy use and cost (shopbot round 1) 
 
   ln(energy)   ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT 
       
treatment -0.0071 -0.042** -0.024 -0.014 -0.031 0.0053 
 (0.021) (0.016) (0.015) (0.031) (0.021) (0.013) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.25*** 0.15***  0.17*** 0.72*** 
  (0.027) (0.027)  (0.040) (0.023) 
       
constant 5.16*** 4.00*** 4.51*** 5.16*** 3.84*** 2.54*** 
 (0.015) (0.13) (0.18) (0.021) (0.21) (0.14) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes No Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.001 0.479 0.573 -0.001 0.601 0.805 
N 1074 1074 1074 530 530 1074 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, CT: Click-through to 
online retailer. eeclass: energy efficiency class. Models 4 to 5 contain only final CTs and serve as a 
robustness check for models 1 to 3. See figure 34 in appendix V for residual histograms. 
3.5.1.4 Overall energy use and life-cycle costs 
This section refers to the combined click-through observations from all cooling 
appliances. With respect to overall energy use, both the mean and median are higher in 
the treatment group than in the control group (table 19). The same is true for overall life-
cycle cost (table 20). 
Table 19: Descriptive statistics for overall energy use (shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 1052 228.3 215.0 97.4 84.0 770.0 
Treatment 917 233.4 217.0 95.7 84.0 768.0 
Total 1969 230.7 215.0 96.6 84.0 770.0 
 






Table 20: Descriptive statistics for overall life-cycle cost (shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 1052 693 595 422 205 4439 
Treatment 917 727 638 406 122 4439 
Total 1969 709 611 415 122 4439 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
Table 21 below exhibits regressions for energy use and life-cycle cost with several 
covariates. When controlling for other factors, the treatment on average reduces overall 
energy use by 1.8% (model 2) to 3.1% (model 4). Both results are significant at a 5% 
level. The reduction in energy use by 2.5% in model (2) is significant at a 1% level. 
Table 21: Effect on overall energy use and life-cycle cost (shopbot round 1) 
 
   ln(energy)   ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT 
       
treatment 0.024 -0.025** -0.018* -0.031* -0.026 0.0071 
 (0.018) (0.0097) (0.0091) (0.014) (0.014) (0.012) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.33*** 0.30*** 0.33*** 0.31*** 0.78*** 
  (0.015) (0.013) (0.021) (0.019) (0.018) 
       
constant 5.35*** 3.95*** 4.17*** 4.18*** 4.09*** 1.98*** 
 (0.012) (0.081) (0.14) (0.12) (0.11) (0.13) 
       
categories  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
efficiency 
class  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes No 
       
brands  No No Yes No Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq 0.000 0.706 0.744 0.703 0.741 0.683 
N 1969 1969 1969 926 926 1969 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, CT: Click-through to 
online retailer. categories: freezers, fridge-freezers, refrigerators. Models 4 to 5 contain only final 
CTs and serve as a robustness check for models 1 to 3. See figure 34 in appendix V for residuals. 
The effect sizes (f2) of all regressions reported above range from 0.0021 to 0.02 (see 





3.5.1.5 Overall impact on retail volume 
From a business perspective, it is the total number of click-throughs from the shopbot to 
final retailers that matters. Therefore, the question is whether life-cycle cost disclosure 
leads to a change in click-throughs. When looking at raw means in table 22 below, the 
number of click-throughs per user is smaller in the treatment group than in the control 
group (for related histograms see figure 36 in appendix V).  
Table 22: Descriptive statistics for the number of clicks per user (shopbot round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs Users CT count CT count CT count CT count CT count 
Control 1418 0.74 0 1.62 0 15 
Treatment 1492 0.61 0 1.55 0 18 
Total 2910 0.68 0 1.58 0 18 
 
Note: CT: click-throughs 
Moreover, a chi-square test of independence does not reveal a difference in click-
throughs between the two experimental groups that is statistically significant at a 
5% level (p=0.062—see table 93 in appendix V). 
Table 23 below shows negative binomial regression results for the number of click-
throughs per user. Although all models have a poor goodness of fit, they nevertheless 
indicate that the treatment has a negative effect on the number of click-throughs per user. 
In models (1) and (2), the treatment reduces the number of click-throughs per user by 
about 20% when controlling for browser characteristics and appliance categories. This 





Table 23: Effect on the overall number of click-throughs (shopbot round 1) 
 
 Count of click-throughs per user 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All CT All CT All CT/DCT All CT/DCT 
     
treatment -0.19* -0.21** -0.083 -0.12 
 (0.078) (0.077) (0.10) (0.078) 
     
constant -0.30*** -0.98*** -0.15* -0.35*** 
 (0.055) (0.17) (0.061) (0.065) 
     
lnalpha     
constant 1.06*** 0.97*** 1.19*** 1.11*** 
 (0.058) (0.060) (0.074) (0.053) 
     
browsers  No Yes No Yes 
     
categories  No Yes No Yes 
     
pseudo R-sq 0.001 0.015 0.000 0.012 
N 2910 2910 2910 2910 
 
Note: Standard errors of the negative binomial regressions in parentheses.* p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, 
CT: Click-through to retailer. DCT: Models 3 to 4 serve as a robustness check. They include click-
throughs that were discarded in prior models such as subsequent clicks by the same user on exactly 
the same product, or potential clicks from robots. categories: freezers, fridge-freezers, refrigerators. 
3.5.2 Second treatment round 
In the second treatment round, stimulus delivery worked without problems (see figure 37 
in appendix VI for click-throughs over time). Potential problems might have been due to 
randomization, cookie acceptance, and the handling of problematic clicking behavior. 
Randomization worked well for all users, but did not result in an equalized 
distribution of user characteristics among all click-throughs (see table 94 in appendix VI).  
Persistent cookies were accepted by more than 96% of all users in treatment 
round one (see table 95 in appendix VI).  
Problematic clicks due to repeated clicking on the same product or due to a high 
total number of click-throughs amounted to 324 observations and were discarded. The 





one (20 clicks—see table 97 in appendix VI).  
Overall, nearly 2400 separately identifiable users visited the shopbot. In each 
respective appliance category, they were shown more than 250 different appliances from 
more than 20 brands sold by 35 different retailers (see table 96 in appendix VI). 
Appendix VI provides more detailed information on the range of life-cycle cost (figure 
38), energy use box plots (figure 39), energy use histograms (figure 40), energy 
efficiency classes (figure 41), life-cycle cost histograms (figure 42) and energy versus 
capacity scatterplots (figure 43). 
3.5.2.1 Freezers 
Freezers’ mean and median energy use are higher in the treatment group than in the 
control group (table 24). As to life-cycle cost, the mean is lower in the treatment group, 
while the median is lower in the control group (table 25). 
Table 24: Descriptive statistics for freezers’ energy use (shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 114 245.1 245.0 66.3 135.0 664.0 
Treatment 136 248.0 261.0 66.0 135.0 664.0 
Total 250 246.7 256.0 66.0 135.0 664.0 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/year]. 
Table 25: Descriptive statistics for freezers’ life-cycle cost (shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 114 833 786 268 452 2285 
Treatment 136 830 790 291 398 2285 
Total 250 832 790 280 398 2285 
 
 Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were 





 When controlling for other factors (table 26), energy use is higher in the treatment 
group, but never significant at a 5% level. Differently, the treatment decreases life-cycle 
cost. Still, this effect is not significant at a 5% level either. 
Table 26: Effect on freezers’ energy use and cost (shopbot round 2) 
 
   ln(energy)   ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT 
       
treatment 0.012 0.0025 0.0015 -0.051 0.0044 -0.031 
 (0.032) (0.012) (0.0099) (0.048) (0.017) (0.019) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.38*** 0.37***  0.37*** 0.44*** 
  (0.014) (0.013)  (0.020) (0.024) 
       
constant 5.47*** 4.16*** 3.98*** 5.47*** 4.12*** 4.50*** 
 (0.023) (0.068) (0.063) (0.032) (0.079) (0.15) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No Yes Yes No Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes No Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.003 0.860 0.903 0.001 0.905 0.795 
N 250 250 250 119 119 250 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, CT: Click-through to 
online retailer. Models 4 to 5 contain only final CTs and serve as a robustness check for models 1 to 
3. See figure 44 in appendix VI for residual histograms.  
3.5.2.2 Fridge-freezers 
In the fridge-freezer category, the treatment group has both higher mean and median 
energy use than the control group (table 27). The same holds for life-cycle cost (table 28). 
Table 27: Descriptive statistics for fridge-freezers’ energy use (shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 187 309.7 296.0 87.5 137.0 525.0 
Treatment 142 312.5 316.0 80.7 139.0 525.6 
Total 329 310.9 307.0 84.5 137.0 525.6 
 





Table 28: Descriptive statistics for fridge-freezers’ life-cycle cost(shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 187 1047 923 450 501 2719 
Treatment 142 1131 961 599 499 4776 
Total 329 1083 943 521 499 4776 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
When controlling for other factors, none of the treatment effects on energy use or 
life-cycle cost is significant at a 5% level (table 29). 
Table 29: Effect on fridge-freezers’ energy use and cost (shopbot round 2) 
 
   ln(energy)   ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT 
       
treatment 0.014 0.00015 0.00074 -0.0059 0.012 0.017 
 (0.030) (0.0099) (0.0096) (0.013) (0.014) (0.023) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.68*** 0.66*** 0.69*** 0.65*** 1.25*** 
  (0.024) (0.026) (0.024) (0.028) (0.061) 
       
constant 5.70*** 2.17*** 2.25*** 1.22*** 1.94*** -0.26 
 (0.020) (0.18) (0.16) (0.14) (0.14) (0.36) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes No Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.002 0.902 0.920 0.903 0.932 0.765 
N 329 329 329 162 162 329 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
CT: Click-through to online retailer. eeclass: energy efficiency class. Models 4 to 5 contain only 
final CTs and serve as a robustness check for models 1 to 3.  
3.5.2.3 Refrigerators 
Refrigerators had higher mean and median energy use in the treatment group than in the 





Table 30: Descriptive statistics for refrigerators’ energy use (shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 429 207.8 168.0 113.3 84.0 525.0 
Treatment 383 213.6 189.0 109.5 84.0 672.0 
Total 812 210.5 177.0 111.5 84.0 672.0 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/year].  
Table 31: Descriptive statistics for refrigerators’ life-cycle cost (shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 429 801 630 448 273 3237 
Treatment 383 839 647 532 273 3567 
Total 812 819 644 490 273 3567 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
 
Table 32 presents regression results for refrigerators’ energy use and life-cycle cost. 
Table 32: Effect on refrigerators’ energy use and cost (shopbot round 2) 
 
   ln(energy)   ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT 
       
treatment 0.034 0.0096 0.027 -0.023 0.0098 0.015 
 (0.033) (0.020) (0.018) (0.028) (0.025) (0.016) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.51*** 0.39*** 0.51*** 0.41*** 0.73*** 
  (0.024) (0.031) (0.032) (0.039) (0.030) 
       
constant 5.22*** 3.03*** 2.82*** 2.87*** 2.69*** 2.60*** 
 (0.023) (0.14) (0.18) (0.16) (0.19) (0.17) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes No Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq 0.000 0.616 0.718 0.627 0.718 0.800 
N 812 812 812 453 453 812 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, CT: Click-through to 
online retailer. eeclass: energy efficiency class. Models 4 to 5 contain only final CTs and serve as a 





Most treatment coefficients on energy use and life-cycle cost are positive, but none 
of them are significant at a 5% level.  
3.5.2.4 Overall energy use and life-cycle costs  
When combining the observations from all appliance categories, both mean and median 
energy use are higher in the treatment group than in the control group (table 33). The 
same is true for life-cycle cost (table 34). 
Table 33: Descriptive statistics for overall energy use (shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 730 239.7 219.0 109.7 84.0 664.0 
Treatment 661 242.0 223.0 103.7 84.0 672.0 
Total 1391 240.8 223.0 106.9 84.0 672.0 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/year]. 
Table 34: Descriptive statistics for overall life-cycle cost (shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 730 869 733 438 273 3237 
Treatment 661 900 771 522 273 4776 
Total 1391 884 758 480 273 4776 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
In table 35, the treatment effect is scrutinized by adding further covariates. Most 
treatment effects on energy use and life-cycle cost are positive, but none of them are 





Table 35: Effect on overall energy use and life-cycle cost (shopbot round 2) 
 
   ln(energy)   ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT 
       
treatment 0.018 0.0059 0.013 -0.0083 0.011 0.0074 
 (0.024) (0.013) (0.011) (0.018) (0.017) (0.013) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.51*** 0.43*** 0.51*** 0.43*** 0.72*** 
  (0.017) (0.018) (0.023) (0.025) (0.020) 
       
constant 5.38*** 3.23*** 3.77*** 2.86*** 3.54*** 3.24*** 
 (0.017) (0.086) (0.15) (0.12) (0.20) (0.15) 
       
categories  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
efficiency 
class  
No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes No Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.000 0.721 0.776 0.726 0.778 0.743 
N 1391 1391 1391 734 734 1391 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
CT: Click-through to online retailer. categories: freezers, fridge-freezers, refrigerators. eeclass: 
energy efficiency class. Models 4 to 5 contain only final CTs and serve as a robustness check for 
models 1 to 3. See figure 44 in appendix VI for residual histograms. 
3.5.2.5 Overall impact on retail volume 
For the owner of the shopbot, the business-relevant question is whether life-cycle cost 
disclosure leads to a change in the number of click-throughs. According to table 36 
below, the number of click-throughs per user is smaller in the treatment group than in the 
control group (for related histograms see figure 45 in appendix VI).  
Table 36: Descriptive statistics for number of clicks per user (shopbot round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs Users CT count CT count CT count CT count CT count 
Control 1163 0.63 0 1.32 0 14 
Treatment 1194 0.55 0 1.41 0 17 
Total 2357 0.59 0 1.37 0 17 
 





A chi-square test of independence does not reveal a difference in click-throughs 
between the two experimental groups that is statistically significant at a 5% level 
(p=0.22—see table 102 in appendix VI). Negative binomial regressions for the number of 
click-throughs per user indicate a negative effect of the treatment, but the treatment 
coefficient estimates are not significant at a 5% level (table 37). As in treatment round 
one, all of these models have a very poor goodness of fit. 
Table 37: Effect on the overall number of click-throughs (shopbot round 2) 
 
 Count of click-throughs per user 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) 
 All CT All CT All CT/DCT All CT/DCT 
     
treatment -0.13 -0.13 -0.12 -0.13 
 (0.084) (0.084) (0.086) (0.085) 
     
constant -0.47*** -1.48*** -0.26*** -1.26*** 
 (0.059) (0.21) (0.061) (0.21) 
     
lnalpha     
constant 0.92*** 0.84*** 1.10*** 1.03*** 
 (0.071) (0.072) (0.062) (0.063) 
     
browsers  No Yes No Yes 
     
categories  No Yes No Yes 
     
pseudo R-sq 0.000 0.012 0.000 0.011 
N 2357 2357 2357 2357 
 
Note: Standard errors of the negative binomial regressions in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, 
CT: Click-through to retailer. DCT: Models 3 to 4 serve as a robustness check. They include click-
throughs that were discarded in prior models such as subsequent clicks by the same user on exactly 
the same product, or potential clicks from robots. categories: freezers, fridge-freezers, refrigerators. 
3.6 Discussion  
In discussing the shopbot results, I will first deal with the substantive experimental 
outcomes (3.6.2), before addressing general issues of internal validity (3.6.3), external 
validity (3.6.4), measurement (3.6.5), and how I attempted to cope with them, where 





3.6.1 Experimental outcomes 
My three research hypotheses referred to the treatment effect on energy use, estimated 
life-cycle cost, and click-throughs. 
Effects on energy use were only detected in round one of the experiment. This 
may be due to the relatively smaller sample size in round two, which was about one third 
smaller than in round one. Moreover, layout one made it much harder for users to avoid 
noticing the life-cycle cost information. On the other hand, the cost figures were higher in 
round two due to the longer assumed time horizon. On balance, the evidence for a 
negative treatment effect in round one leads to the tentative hypothesis that a prolonged 
experiment in round two would have detected a similar effect on energy use, too.  
No treatment effect on life-cycle cost could be shown in any of the two 
experimental rounds. This finding needs a clarification. Life-cycle costs were only 
simulated for the control group in the sense that they were not actually displayed. Instead, 
they were estimated based on appliances’ energy characteristics and common default 
assumptions. Moreover, different from untreated users, treated users were able to adjust 
the underlying assumptions. Therefore, the life-cycle cost estimates in the two groups 
were asymmetric: based on user-adjusted assumptions (treatment) versus non-adjusted 
default assumptions (control). 
The adjustment of assumptions in the treatment group, however, occurred in so 
few cases that the outcome was not sensitive to the assumptions used (default vs. user-
adjusted) in estimating life-cycle cost. Adjustments are documented in table 91 (appendix 





If consumers were trying to minimize life-cycle cost, one would expect to always 
find lower life-cycle cost in the treatment group than in the control group because life-
cycle cost were not provided in the control group. No such pattern, however, did emerge. 
This finding suggests that the decrease in energy use detected in round one was 
associated with a compensatory increase in appliances prices. As a result, total life-cycle 
cost did not differ significantly between groups. 
The treatment effect sizes for energy use can be deemed “small” (f2=0.02) 
according to a scheme proposed by Cohen (1977, 413) (see table 90 in appendix V). 
The overall interest of users in the disclosed life-cycle cost was very low. Not 
only did less than 5% of all users adjust the underlying assumptions, but also did less 
than 2% of them make use of the sorting and filtering features with respect to life-cycle 
cost (see table 92 in appendix V, and table 101 in appendix VI). Theoretically, these two 
features should facilitate finding the lowest life-cycle cost considerably.  
The click-through rate—i.e. the best available indicator of retail volume—was 
decreased considerably through life-cycle cost disclosure in round one. A potential 
explanation is the higher cognitive cost due to increased information presented on the 
screen. The problem is that this effect is no longer statistically significant (p<0.05) if one 
considers previously discarded click-throughs (repeated clicks on the same product, 
potential robots). Since the exact business model of determining valid click-throughs 
cannot be described in this dissertation for proprietary information concerns, there is 
some uncertainty associated with this finding. In round two, I did not detect such a 
decrease in click-throughs. At any rate, neither a neutral nor a negative effect on click-





themselves—even if this was beneficial regarding the detected decrease in energy use. 
Finally, the outcomes of the analysis proved to be insensitive to the price of 
regular gas (for the price over time see figure 35 in appendix V). Including the price in its 
current or lagged form into the regression models led to insignificant price coefficient 
estimates in most cases, and did not markedly change the treatment coefficient in any 
case. For the sake of simplicity, these coefficient estimates are not reported explicitly. 
In sum, while treatment round two of the experiment suffers from a comparably 
small sample size, the evidence from round one suggests two causal effects of life-cycle 
cost disclosure: first, a decrease in energy use by about 2.5%. And second, a decrease or 
non-existing effect on the number of click-throughs which makes life-cycle cost 
disclosure in the chosen format of round one undesirable from a business perspective. 
The policy implications of the experimental findings will be discussed in section 5.2. 
3.6.2 Internal validity 
Potential threats to internal validity have to do with the temporal precedence of the cause 
(Trochim 2004), the robustness of the coefficient estimates, and the comparability of the 
experimental groups. 
3.6.2.1 Temporal precedence of the cause 
Temporal precedence was guaranteed in nearly all cases. Given the experimental design, 
the treatment group received purchase price, operating and life-cycle cost prior to 
clicking through to a final retailer—with the only exception being direct links to Ebay 
which were lacking associated price and life-cycle cost information. Therefore, the small 





3.6.2.2 Robustness of coefficient estimates 
The treatment coefficient estimates obtained through ordinary least squares were 
scrutinized. To this purpose, I detected potentially influential observations with the 
largest studentized residuals through Bonferroni-adjusted outlier tests. Deleting these 
observations, however, did not make the treatment coefficient leave the confidence 
interval of the respective original regression.  
Normality tests of the regression residuals did in most cases lead to a rejection of 
the normality hypothesis, even after transforming the dependent variables into a more 
normal-like shape by taking logarithms. Although, therefore, I cannot justify the 
assumption of normally distributed error terms substantively, regression coefficient 
estimates have been shown to be robust against this violation in sufficiently large sample 
sizes (Bohrnstedt and Carter 1971, 123). The justification, then, relies on the central limit 
theorem which ensures an asymptotically normal sampling distribution, independent of 
the distribution in the population (Stock and Watson 2003, 43).  
3.6.2.3 Comparability of experimental groups 
Another potential threat to internal validity would be a lack of comparability of the 
treatment and the control group. Comparability requires identical composition, 
predispositions and experiences, and is warranted through randomization (Rossi, 
Freeman et al. 1999, 281).  
For this experiment, randomization was realized by means of alternating 
experimental conditions for each newly incoming user. The alternation of conditions 





influence on the order in which server requests were being processed. Likewise, they had 
no control over other participating users who were unknown and spread out over 
Germany and other countries. Consequently, alternation of experimental conditions can 
be assumed to be equivalent to randomization with random numbers. 
Randomization minimizes the influence of confounding background factors. A 
relevant background factor in this experiment was the presentation of different final 
retailers in the product listings (see 3.4.3); another one was the accompanying 
advertisement for unrelated products on the same screen (see figure 5 and figure 6 the 
appendix I). Moreover, the exact visual stimulus delivery of website colors could not be 
controlled entirely, and may have differed among users due to variance in existing 
software, computers, and monitors (Birnbaum 2004, 811-812). Variance in available 
technology may have also had an impact on the speed of stimulus delivery (Reips 2002b, 
245-246). Further confounding factors included a user’s negative or positive experience 
with a particular appliance brand or a given online retailer, and all kinds of distractions 
that a user may have experienced at home or elsewhere while shopping online.  
Although I examined the success of the random assignment with user 
characteristics such as browser and operating system, this inspection had its own limits. 
User characteristics were extracted from the user-agent string variable transmitted by the 
browser, and this variable could in principle be masked by the user (Tan and Kumar 
2002, 16). Although it is impossible to estimate the amount of masking done, I assume 
that regular users for the most part have no incentive to mask their user-agent variable. 






At first sight, Reips’ concern that cookie technology would “exclude a large 
portion of participants” (Reips 2002b, 251) seems unwarranted given the high acceptance 
rate of persistent cookies of more than 95%. Yet, for technical reasons (see 3.2), I could 
not determine the number of users who rejected both persistent and temporary cookies. 
Therefore, it is impossible to present an overall non-acceptance rate. 
Even a high acceptance of persistent cookies cannot ensure high experimental 
control because users may delete cookies themselves. That is, persistent cookies may be 
accepted by users at first, but deleted later on. Many internet browsers facilitate this 
behavior through an encompassing “clear private data” functionality that includes 
cookies. Unfortunately, those changes cannot be tracked at all. According to a 
representative survey for 2006, 80% of all German internet users are familiar with 
cookies; and 55% of all German internet users erase their cookies, either manually or 
automatically (Fisch and Gscheidle 2006, 438-439). The predecessor survey as of 2004 
differentiated cookie erasure regarding its temporal occurrence. Accordingly, 37% of all 
German internet users erased their cookies directly after each session, and 42% of all 
users erased them at least once a week (van Eimeren, Gerhard et al. 2004, 368). 
If a user returned to the experimental website without having any identifiable 
cookie, he would be randomly assigned again—independent of the group to which he had 
been assigned before. The probability of being assigned to an experimental group 
different from the prior one equaled 0.5. Subsequent returns with new random 
assignments would have further increased this probability. 
Finally, even if all cookies were indeed persistent, I could not rule out the 





example at work, and at home—and that these computers were assigned to different 
experimental conditions. 
The above-described changes reduce the control over subjects’ experimental 
assignment. If the treatment systematically changed users’ propensity to delete their 
cookies, comparability and therefore internal validity would be threatened.  
In sum, comparability is threatened through the use of different computers, of 
temporary cookies, and the erasure of persistent cookies. Unfortunately, the magnitude of 
this threat cannot be quantified.  
3.6.2.4 Potential bias from switching experimental conditions 
Regardless of the reason for a change in experimental condition, one has to ask what kind 
of bias could possibly result from it. Understanding this bias necessitates discriminating 
two basic cases. The first basic case may have occurred when a given user’s assignment 
to the control group was followed by his assignment to the treatment group (“CT” case). 
The second basic case was just the opposite (“TC” case). 
The CT case does not seem to be a major problem. Given that the shopbot was 
already in use and publicly accessible before the beginning of the actual experiment, 
every subject could potentially be CT. In this sense, prior exposure to the pre-
experimental shopbot was like being in the control group later (while the experiment was 
being conducted). It is hard to see, however, why prior exposure to the regular website 
would have a problematic effect on the behavior of a subject that was subsequently 
assigned to the treatment group. Being more familiar with the website may make 





efficiency. Therefore, CT is unlikely to induce bias with respect to energy efficiency. 
TC, on the other hand, means that a subject saw life-cycle cost in the first 
assignment, and received regular product prices without life-cycle cost thereafter. This 
prior exposure to life-cycle cost estimates may have had a “priming” effect. Although 
several sorts of priming can be distinguished, they are all based on the same mechanism: 
if an individual is exposed to a given event, i.e. the prime, he will subsequently have 
easier access to information that already exists in his memory. The result of this increased 
accessibility, however, may differ. For example, it may not necessarily imply that the 
information under consideration is integrated into the individual’s decisions and actions 
(Mandel and Johnson 2002, 236).  
Such priming is likely to make subjects concentrate more on energy cost than they 
would do otherwise, and make them buy appliances that are more efficient. This may 
have decreased the potential difference in energy efficiency between the treatment group 
and the control group and may have made it harder to reject the null hypothesis. The 
potential bias would thus be conservative in nature and would involve underestimating 
the effect of the life-cycle cost disclosure.  
A similar way of putting the TC problem is to say that subjects may have become 
aware of the experiment. For example, as illustrated in section 3.4.2.4, users may have 
been able to discern the experimental structure (“powerprice_A” or “powerprice_B”) 
from the website addresses displayed. Still, given the field character of the experiment, 
online shoppers could be assumed to concentrate on the content of the website rather than 
on unsuspicious sounding website addresses. Moreover, chest freezers were not part of 





upright freezers and chest freezers were shown life-cycle cost for the former, but only 
normal price information for the latter. A consumer who was treated first, but not treated 
thereafter may have wondered what was going on. If he concluded that he was part of an 
experiment about energy efficiency, he may have actively imitated the treatment, and he 
may have put an additional effort into calculating life-cycle cost by himself.  
This problem can never be fully avoided in an online field experiment with open 
access because some treated consumers, i.e. those who have a particular interest in energy 
efficiency, may decide to actively inform other consumers about the existence of the life-
cycle cost disclosure, even without knowing that it is part of an experiment. They may 
use personal web logs or tell institutions that deal with energy efficiency about the new 
feature of the website. Given that this feature was somewhat innovative, those institutions 
may spread the word in their own way. Such information dissemination was clearly out 
of my control and may have biased the results. Still, given the considerable cognitive 
effort and transaction cost associated with these kind of life-cycle cost calculations (if 
done by hand for a whole list of products), it is unlikely that subjects in the control group 
would have reached the same outcome as those in the treatment group.  
Nevertheless, if other researchers interested in energy efficiency issues (see Reips 
2002b, 253) became aware of the experimental character of the website, they may have 
scrutinized the website and may have lead to biased observations.  
A bias that would inflate the treatment effect in the TC case is hard to imagine.  
Such an inflation would imply that users in the control group (who had been in the 
treatment group before) would click on less efficient appliances. A possible cause for this 





(Trochim 2004). Along this line of thought, untreated consumers could potentially have 
become angry and could have purposefully clicked on less efficient appliances than they 
would have done otherwise. This threat, however, appears to be largely theoretical given 
that consumers with limited budgets are unlikely to intentionally shop for appliances that 
cost them more over the long run. In other words, the fact that the experiment was 
conducted in a real purchasing situation seems to limit this threat. 
Finally, the durability of cooling appliances limited the TC threat. Since these 
appliances represent long-term investments, it is unlikely that a given subject bought a 
cooling appliance first, and then returned to the website to buy another appliance of the 
same kind while the experiment was still running. This means that the TC threat 
described is likely to have virtually disappeared once a consumer had made a purchase 
decision. 
Overall, the comparability of the treatment and control group is threatened by the 
use of cookies. The most likely bias, however, is conservative in nature and tends to 
reduce the treatment effect.  
3.6.3 External validity 
Generalizing the findings of this experiment to different contexts may face several 
limitations. In this section, I will discuss the potential influence of other times, places and 
persons (Trochim 2004). 
First, the treatment effect may depend on time. Methodologically, the estimated 
effect represents an average value that refers to cross-sectional data gathered over the 





effect may have been smaller or larger, depending on interfering events that may have 
made consumers more aware of energy efficiency. An example for such interfering 
events may have been perceived changes in energy prices. Yet, the inclusion of the price 
of gas as a well-known indicator of energy price did not improve the fit of the regression 
models (see 3.6.1). Therefore, the treatment effect appears to have been relatively stable 
over time. 
Second, there may have been something specific about the chosen shopbot that 
selectively attracted some consumers more than others. In addition, the shopbot itself had 
two different modes of which the search mode was not part of the experiment (see 3.2). 
Therefore, the experimental findings may be threatened by selection bias. This bias may 
involve a higher representation of online shoppers with an above- or below-average 
interest in issues of energy efficiency. If the experiment participants cared about energy 
efficiency more than average consumers do, those in the control group may have bought 
relatively more efficient appliances even without receiving life-cycle cost. This would 
imply a downward bias of the treatment effect. If, on the other hand, participating 
consumers cared less about energy efficiency than consumers do on average, the 
treatment effect would be biased upwards. The problem of selection bias may result from, 
e.g., the existing hyperlink structure and the kind of advertisement the shopbot runs. 
Consequently, differences between participating consumers and non-participating 
consumers may mask the intervention effect (Rossi, Freeman et al. 1999, 242). This bias 
cannot be estimated. Still, the large number of visitors on the website (see 3.2), and the 
long existence of the website suggest that this may be a minor problem. 





include all appliances on the market. Yet, it contained several hundred models so that 
consumers could get a good overview of the range of purchasing options (see table 86 in 
appendix V, and table 96 in appendix VI).  
In sum, the experimental findings primarily refer to the chosen website and its 
customers. While the results seem to be insensitive to changes in energy prices, they 
might look different for other websites and other consumers. The best way to deal with 
the challenge of further generalizability would be to repeat the experimental disclosure of 
life-cycle cost in various shopbots that differ with respect to website design and with 
respect to the customers they attract. 
3.6.4 Measurement validity 
The dependent and independent variables in this experiment refer to appliances for which 
users had clicked-through to final retailers. Measurement validity is threatened by double 
clicks, and by clicks from non-human user agents. Double clicks-throughs by the same 
user on exactly the same product sold by the same retailer were discarded (see 3.5.1).  
Clicks from non-human user agents were treated at two levels. At a first level, 
these clicks had been filtered by Mentasys with the aid of special blacklists. At a second 
level, I scanned the user-agent string variable for conspicuous keywords (see 3.2), and I 
discarded observations from users with an unusually high total number of click-throughs 
(see 3.5.1).  
The final check for potentially remaining clicks from non-human user agents 
consisted of using two sets of observations for regressions with energy use as the 





to each user’s final click-through. In this way, the influence from any remaining robot 
would have been greatly reduced to a single click-through per robot. Comparing the 
treatment effect on energy use between the two sets of observations shows that the results 
are very similar. Therefore, if any click-throughs from robots did indeed remain in the 
data set with all observations, they did not introduce a large bias. This robustness of the 
results implies high measurement validity.  
3.6.5 Summary of threats to validity 
When feasible and implemented correctly, randomized experiments represent the best 
approach to evaluating treatment effects (Rossi, Freeman et al. 1999; Trochim 2004, 305-
306). Like many experiments, the one described here is not ideal, but suffers from several 
limitations that are summarized in the table below.  
Table 38: Summary of threats to validity (shopbot) 
 




Use of cookies 
for randomization 
Priming,  
imitation of treatment 
– Small given the relatively 
larger cognitive effort 




+ Unlikely given the real 
purchasing situation 
Co-existence of experimental 
shopbot and regular search 
mode on the same shopbot 
website 
Self-selection ? Limits generalizability 
Immeasurable characteristics 
of shopbot (advertising, 
hyperlink structure, 
reputation) 






Chapter 4: Experimental online shop  
4.1 Introduction 
Overall, the online shop experiment was similarly structured as the shopbot experiment. 
In this chapter, I describe the online shop data (4.2) and my hypothesis about the effect of 
life-cycle cost disclosure (4.3), followed by methods (4.4), results (4.5) and the related 
discussion (4.6). In addition to the quantitative evaluation of user behavior, I collected 
qualitative feedback from the treatment group and conducted supplementary in-depth 
interviews to better understand consumers’ perception of life-cycle cost disclosure.  
4.2 Data 
The experimental data for washing machines was gathered from Quelle, a major German 
mail-order business which operates an online shop at www.quelle.de with up to 
nine million website “visits” per month (Quelle 2006). Quelle offers a wide range of 
products including clothes, consumer electronics, and household appliances.  
On the top of its home page, the online shop offers a range of pull-down menus 
from which users can choose products or product categories. After reaching the page with 
washing machines, users have two options how to proceed because on Quelle’s website, 
two independent software systems for washing machines complement each other. One is 
run by Quelle itself. Here, the consumer navigates through menus to see different types 
and classes of washing machines. The other one, a more specialized recommendation 
agent, is embedded in the overall online shop and is independently operated by Mentasys. 





data. Mentasys’ recommendation agent asks consumers about their preferences, and ranks 
all washing machines according to these criteria. Consumers can drop/add machines, 
change their preferences, and compare all available washing machines with each other in 
detail.  
The recommendation agent is accessible in two distinct recommendation modes—
Simple search and Expert search. The two modes differ regarding the scope of initial 
preference elicitation, and with respect to the visual presentation of recommended 
washing machines. Expert search allows for more detailed entering of preferences, and 
provides a more structured output of key appliance attributes.  
Technically, data collection and preparation was done in the same way as for the 
shopbot (see section 3.2). As to the two recommendation modes, pre-treatment 
preferences elicited in the Expert search mode were not logged by the server. Therefore, 
fewer covariates were available for regressions with Expert search data. Moreover, due to 
proprietary information concerns, data that would facilitate estimating the number of 
online purchases per day cannot be disclosed here. 
Additional data regarding gasoline prices for the time period of the experiment 
was obtained from the Association of the German Petroleum Industry (MWV 2006).  
The supplementary qualitative data about users’ perception of life-cycle cost 
disclosure was gathered in two different ways. First, the recommendation agent allowed 
customers to send back anonymous feedback about their shopping experience; and 
feedback from the treatment group was evaluated for this dissertation. Alternatively, 
customers could choose to leave their email address for further communication with the 





participate in in-depth interviews about their perception of life-cycle cost disclosure. 
4.3 Hypotheses 
With the data from Quelle, I propose to test several hypotheses. A more detailed 
reasoning for my choice of two-tailed tests is provided in section 3.3. 
H1a: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost does not make online shoppers opt for household 
appliances that are different in terms of their energy efficiency.” 
H1b: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost makes online shoppers opt for household 
appliances that are different in terms of their energy efficiency.” 
Analogously, a similar null hypothesis (H2a) will be tested regarding the potential change 
in water efficiency of the chosen appliances.  
I will also examine whether the experimental treatment changes the estimated  
life-cycle cost associated with the chosen appliances: 
H3a: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost does not make online shoppers opt for household 
appliances that are different in terms of their estimated life-cycle cost.”  
H3b: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost makes online shoppers opt for household 
appliances that are different in terms of their estimated life-cycle cost.” 
As to the economic impact for the providing website, the online shop’s turnover 





H4a: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost does not change the number of products put into 
the virtual shopping cart.” 
H4b: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost changes the number of products put into the virtual 
shopping cart.”  
 Similarly, the treatment may have an effect on the price of products chosen. 
H5a: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost does not change the price of products put into the 
virtual shopping cart.” 
H5b: “The disclosure of life-cycle cost changes the price of products put into the virtual 
shopping cart.” 
4.4 Method 
This section includes a description of the treatment (4.4.1), the procedure (4.4.2), the 
chosen measures (4.4.3), the regression models (4.4.4) and the qualitative analysis of 
customer feedback (4.4.5). 
4.4.1 Treatment 
In many respects, the treatment in the online shop was similar to the treatment in the 
shopbot described in section 3.4.2. Therefore, I only describe those features in detail that 
differ from the shopbot design. This includes the display and calculation of cost (4.4.1.1), 
the display of usage assumptions and their adjustment (4.4.1.2), the default assumptions 






4.4.1.1 Display and calculation of cost 
While the two recommendation modes available—Simple search and Expert search—had 
their own treatment and control groups, the basic difference between each respective 
experimental condition regarding life-cycle cost disclosure, however, was the same. 
Table 39 shows the experimental conditions in the Simple search mode. All details 









Visual stimuli for sample washing machine 
Control 
Treatment round 1 
• Time horizon:  
4.9 years 
• Price of electricity: 
0.16 € / kWh 
• Price of water: 
3.95 € / m3 
• Standard cycles per 
week: 3  
Treatment round 2 
 
• Time horizon:  
9 years 
• Price of electricity: 
0.16 € / kWh 
• Price of water: 
3.95 € / m3 
• Standard cycles per 
week: 3 
In each experimental condition, the first line contains the appliance model, and 





product features such as energy efficiency class, maximum spin speed, washing 
performance class, loading capacity, and additional washing program information. The 
third paragraph shows price information, and cost information, where applicable. 
Operating cost can be adjusted by clicking on “Betriebskosten”. Via the links in the 
second last line, one can receive more detailed product information, or put the appliance 
into the virtual shopping cart, respectively. In the last line, the user can tick the box for an 
in-depth comparison of appliance alternatives, and receive detailed feedback for each 
product as to how it performs relative to the user’s preferences. 
As in the shopbot case, life-cycle costs (LCC) are estimated based on the 












where P = appliance purchase price [€], Ct = yearly operating cost [€/year],  
N = chosen time horizon [years], and r = discount rate.  
For discontinuously working washing machines, operating costs are calculated as  
kmCPCPC WWEEt **)**( +=  
where PE = price of electricity [€/kWh], CE  = consumption of energy 
[kWh/cycle], PW  = price of water [€/m3], CW  = consumption of water [m3/cycle],  
m = number of cycles per week [cycles/week], and k = 52 [weeks/year]. Both CE and CW  
are based on standard 60°C cotton cycles as defined in the European Commission’s 
labeling directive for washing machines (EC 1995). 
This simplification disregards shipping cost, installation cost, maintenance cost, 





websites reviewed in chapter 2 present. 
4.4.1.2 Display of usage assumptions and their adjustment 
The treatment group was able to actively adjust the usage assumptions that underlie the 
life-cycle cost estimation. For calculating the present value of future operating cost, I 
considered two alternative forms of discounting. After pre-testing direct discounting, I 
eventually settled for indirect discounting as demonstrated in section 3.4.2.2. Figure 3 
illustrates how users were able to adjust the assumptions in the online shop. 
Figure 3: Adjustment of assumptions in the treatment group of the online shop 
 
The first paragraph explains that the estimation relies on adjustable assumptions 
(shown in the second paragraph), and that the default assumptions represent average 
values. It also cautions that the estimation is static in nature and that it does not reflect 





bottom illustrate the estimation formula with a sample calculation and make explicitly 
clear that the sample calculation not refer to any appliance currently looked at by the 
consumer. 
4.4.1.3 Default assumptions for estimating operating cost 
Given the application of indirect discounting, the resulting overall equation for life-cycle 
cost (LCC) is, therefore, given as: 
kmCPCPETHPLCC WWEE **)**(* ++=  
where P = appliance purchase price [€], ETH = equivalent time horizon [years],  
PE = price of electricity [€/kWh], CE  = consumption of energy [kWh/cycle], PW  = price 
of water [€/m3], CW  = consumption of water [m3/cycle], m = number of cycles per week 
[cycles/week], and k = 52 [weeks/year]. 















Price of electricity  0.16 €/kWh 2005 Mean value for Germany 
(VDEW 2005)  
Price of water 3.95 €/m3 2003;2005 Mean value for Germany; 
sum of drinking water price 
(BGW 2005b) and waste 
water price (BGW 2005a) 
Service life 12.7 years 2004 Mean values for Germany 
from representative survey 
(GfK 2006)  
Frequency of use  3 cycles/ 
week 
2002 Rounded to integer (derived 
from 12.2 times per month) 




(treatment round 1) 
4.9 years 2004 Based on implicit discount 
rate of 18% derived from 
(Kuckartz and Rheingans-
Heintze 2004, 81) 
Equivalent time 
horizon  
(treatment round 2) 
9 years 2006 Based on implicit discount 
rate of about 6%; closer to 
then current long-term  
interest rate of about 4% 
(Deutsche Bundesbank 2006)
 
4.4.1.4 Technical implementation of the experiment 
The technical implementation in the online shop differed from the shopbot case (3.4.2.4) 
regarding the revelation of the experimental structure, the checking of randomization and 
the use of JavaScript. 
 The experimental structure was impossible to discern from the internet addresses 






















 For the purpose of checking the success of random assignment, more user 
characteristics were available. Not only could I regress the treatment dummy on user 
characteristics distilled from the user-agent variable such as browser and operating 
system used; I also regressed the treatment variable on pre-treatment preferences elicited 
in the Simple search recommendation mode.  
Moreover, JavaScript needed to be activated on users’ computers. JavaScript was 
required for seeing all pull-down menus of the online shop in general, and for starting the 
recommendation agent in particular. 
4.4.2 Procedure 
In order to assure realistic conditions for this field experiment, data was collected without 
obtaining participants’ informed consent prior to participation. This procedure had been 
approved by the University of Maryland’s Institutional Review Board (Application 
No. 01591). The interviews were conducted over the telephone after obtaining the 





The figures referred to in this section can all be found in appendix II unless 
otherwise noted. Figure 12 illustrates the experimental process at the online shop. 
Consumers arrived at the homepage of the online shop (figure 13) and started the 
recommendation agent which offered them a choice between two alternative 
recommendation modes—Simple search and Expert search (figure 14). In the Simple 
search mode, the subsequent preference elicitation consisted of five different questions 
(figure 15), while in the Expert search mode, users could specify up to 12 preferences 
(figure 16 and table 79). Both modes covered questions regarding the general sort of the 
sought-after washing machine, its price range, the size of the user’s household, the likely 
location where the appliance would be used, and the preferred manufacturer.  
 Random assignment occurred before users could see the agent’s washing machine 
recommendations for the first time. Operating and life-cycle cost for the treatment group 
were estimated based on default usage assumptions as listed in table 40. Treatment round 
one had a default time horizon of 4.9 years, and treatment round two a time horizon of 
nine years.  
The display of products differed between the two recommendation modes. Simple 
search presented one main recommendation, and two alternative products on the first 
page, and users could see more alternatives only by moving on to subsequent pages. 
Figure 17 exhibits a Simple search recommendation for the control group, whereas figure 
18 shows the same recommendation for the treatment group. Expert search, on the other 
hand, presented a much longer list of products without differentiating explicitly between 
a main “recommendation” on top, and less prominent “alternatives” below. Figure 19 





Regardless of the chosen recommendation mode, users in the treatment group 
could adjust the underlying assumptions for the calculation of operating costs (see figure 
3 in 4.4.1.2) In addition, in round two of the experiment, they could also choose to 
receive additional information about the significance of operating cost (figure 20) 
 Furthermore, both experimental groups could choose to see an in-depth 
comparison in matrix format with detailed product characteristics. The matrix for the 
treatment group consisted of two additional lines showing operating and life-cycle cost, 
respectively (figure 21). 
 Finally, the recommendation agent allowed users to receive detailed feedback for 
each product as to how it performed relative to the user’s preferences (figure 22). 
4.4.3 Measures 
Most of the dependent and independent variables used in this experiment refer to 
products that users had put into the virtual shopping cart by clicking on a specific link. 
The dependent variables of primary interest were energy and water consumption 
per standard washing cycle. Further dependent variables were purchase price, operating 
cost, and life-cycle cost. Since life-cycle cost by definition was not shown to users in the 
control group, these users had to be assigned life-cycle cost estimates derived from 
common default assumptions about price and time horizon. All dependent variables of 






Table 42: Key dependent variables in the online shop experiment 
Dependent variable Meaning / Comment 
energy Energy use of appliance [kWh/standard cycle] 
water  Water use of appliance [m3/standard cycle] 
lccost Estimated life-cycle cost of appliance [€],  
simulated for control group based on default assumptions 
ct count Count of click-throughs per user 
price Price of appliance [Euro] 
 
The independent variables used are shown in Table 43. 
Table 43: Key independent variables in the online shop experiment 
Independent variables Meaning / Comment 
treatment Treatment dummy variable   
mode Recommendation mode (Simple search/Expert search)  
price Price of appliance [€] 
capacity Total capacity of the appliance [L] 
efficiency class Energy efficiency class (A - F) dummy variables 
brands Appliance brand dummy variables 
programs Dummy variables for short wash cycle and other programs 
price difference Difference between regular and special price [€] 
preferences User preference (size, type, price) dummy variables  
cookie Cookie type (persistent/session cookie) 
firefox, msie, opera, mac Browser dummy variables (extracted from user-agent) 
 
4.4.4 Models 
I used the following regression model for testing hypothesis H1a—that the energy-





energy i= β0 + β1 treatmenti + β2 Zi + ui    
where energy = energy use [kWh/cycle] for cooling appliance i, treatment = 
treatment dummy variable, Z = vector of covariates (see below), and u = error term. This 
basic model was estimated separately for each recommendation mode. In addition, I also 
employed a logarithmic specification: 
ln(energy) i= β0 + β1 treatmenti + β2 Zi + ui  
This form of the model implied that life-cycle cost disclosure would lead to a 
constant percentage change in energy use. Similar models were estimated for water use, 
estimated life-cycle cost, and appliance prices as dependent variables. I estimated all 
models with ordinary least squares. 
As a special case, the vector of covariates Z included interactions between 
appliance capacity and the treatment dummy.  
For investigating the hypothesis H3a that the treatment does not change online 
shoppers’ number of click-throughs to final retailers, I relied on chi-square tests of 
statistical independence and a negative binomial regression model of the following form: 
CTCOUNT i= β0 + β1 treatmenti + β2 Zi + ui  
where CTCOUNT = number of click-throughs per user i, treatment = treatment 
dummy variable, Z = vector of covariates, and u = error term. The range of potential 
covariates is greatly reduced here because CTCOUNT refers to a sum of click-throughs. 
While each click-through refers to individual product characteristics, the sum of click-
throughs can only be associated with characteristics that are stable over time and that do 





4.4.5 Supplementary analysis of user feedback 
This section describes the online form used for obtaining customer feedback on the 
recommendation agent (4.4.5.1), and the in-depth telephone interviews conducted with a 
subgroup of those customers who actually returned the feedback form (4.4.5.2). 
4.4.5.1 Feedback form 
The feedback form consisted of questions (1) regarding overall customer satisfaction with 
the performance of the recommendation system, (2) regarding the importance of 
individual features, (3) whether the customer could find a suitable washing machine, 
(4) whether the customer had already visited another consumer website that offers 
operating cost information, (5) whether the customer had any other suggestions, and 
(6) whether the customer was interested in having recommendation agents available for 
products other than washing machines. Figure 23 in appendix III exhibits the feedback 
form. 
For questions 1, 3, and 4, users could choose their respective answers from pull-
down menus (table 80 in appendix III). Questions 2 and 5 allowed users to tick one or 
more boxes for providing one or more answers, respectively. Finally, users could leave 
their email address for follow-up contact.  
Note that in both the feedback form and the telephone interviews, the term “life-
cycle cost” was avoided. Instead, I only referred to “operating cost” for better 
comprehension. Nevertheless, I implicitly referred to life-cycle cost because those were 





4.4.5.2 Telephone interview 
Participants were recruited through the online shop's feedback form. Those that left an 
email address were asked by email whether they would be available for a follow-up 
interview. If they answered in the affirmative, I called them at home, asked for their 
informed consent to be interviewed, and offered them a 10 Euro gift certificate for 
participation. All interviews were completed without any dropout, and participants 
received their gift certificates. I recorded all interviews on minidisk, transcribed them, 
and erased the minidisks thereafter. 
Patton (1990) distinguishes three forms of qualitative, open-ended interviews: the 
informal conversational interview, the general interview guide approach, and the 
standardized open-ended interview (Patton 1990, 280). The interviews conducted for this 
dissertation followed the general interview guide approach in that I had a “general plan of 
inquiry” (Babbie 2004, 300) rather than a list of standardized questions. This procedure 
kept the interview flexible enough and provided an opportunity for participants to address 
topics of their own choice. 
The following issues were addressed in the interviews: (1) The participant's 
reaction to, and understanding of the disclosed operating cost, (2) assumptions that 
underlie the calculated operating cost, their potential adjustment, and the role of rising 
energy prices, (3) the importance of energy efficiency for the participant, (4) his/her 
knowledge of alternative information channels regarding energy efficiency of appliances, 
(5) his/her personal opinion about the future of operating cost disclosure, and (6) his/her 






Results from the online shop experiment are differentiated by treatment rounds and 
recommendation modes. Section 4.5.1 contains results from the first treatment round with 
an underlying time horizon of 4.9 years, and section 4.5.2 those from the second 
treatment round with a time horizon of nine years. All results are discussed in section 4.6. 
4.5.1 First treatment round 
While stimulus delivery worked as planned, randomization, cookie acceptance and 
problematic clicking behavior needed to be considered in detail. 
The days during which the stimulus was delivered and click-through data was 
gathered are documented in figure 46 in appendix VII. 
Randomization worked well for all users visiting the experimental website. The 
distribution of those users who actually clicked-through to final retailers, however, was 
not as equalized (see table 103 in appendix VII). 
Persistent cookies were accepted by more than 92% of all users in treatment 
round one. Rejection of persistent cookies occurred exclusively in the Expert search 
mode (see table 104 in appendix VII).  
Problematic clicks due to repeated clicking on the same product or due to a high 
total number of click-throughs amounted to 2927 observations and were discarded. The 
cut-off point for an usually high total number of click-throughs was 20 (see table 106 in 
appendix VII). 
Overall, about 46000 separately identifiable users visited the online shop during 





150 washing machines from 7 different brands (see table 105 in appendix VII.)  
Appendix VII provides more detailed information on the range of life-cycle cost 
(figure 47), energy use box plots (figure 48), energy use histograms (figure 49), energy 
efficiency classes (figure 50), water use (figure 51) life-cycle cost histograms (figure 52), 
and energy versus capacity scatter plots (figure 53). 
4.5.1.1 Simple search 
In the Simple search recommendation mode, both mean and median energy use are lower 
in the treatment group than in the control group (table 44). The same is true for mean 
water use, while median water use is the same in both groups (table 45). Mean life-cycle 
cost is relatively higher in the treatment group; median life-cycle cost is the same (table 
46). 
Table 44: Descriptive statistics for energy use (Ssearch online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 624 0.943 0.95 0.103 0.83 1.36 
Treatment 611 0.942 0.85 0.106 0.68 1.36 
Total 1235 0.943 0.89 0.105 0.68 1.36 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/cycle]. 
Table 45: Descriptive statistics for water use (Ssearch online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  water water water water water 
Control 624 44.71 42 4.4 35 60 
Treatment 611 44.69 42 4.4 34 60 
Total 1235 44.70 42 4.4 34 60 
 







Table 46: Descriptive statistics for life-cycle cost (Ssearch online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 624 716 681 94 605 1312 
Treatment 611 723 681 122 407 1741 
Total 1235 719 681 109 407 1741 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
Table 47 below shows regression results for energy use, water use, and life-cycle 
costs. When controlling for other factors, the treatment reduces energy use by 1.2% in 
model (4). This effect is significant at a 5% level.  
Table 47: Effect on energy use, water and cost (Ssearch online shop round 1) 
 
  ln(energy)  ln(water) ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT All CT 
       
treatment -0.0015 -0.0055 -0.0078 -0.012* -0.0062 0.0037 
 (0.0061) (0.0037) (0.0053) (0.0046) (0.0038) (0.0057) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.75*** 0.68*** 0.76*** 0.59*** 0.31*** 
  (0.024) (0.027) (0.026) (0.025) (0.037) 
       
constant -0.064*** -1.14*** -1.26*** -1.11*** 3.12*** 6.31*** 
 (0.0042) (0.11) (0.16) (0.13) (0.088) (0.16) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
       
other features  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
preferences  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.001 0.652 0.571 0.678 0.550 0.480 
N 1235 1235 780 780 1235 1235 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, CT: Click-through to put 
appliance into virtual shopping cart. Models 3 to 4 contain only final CTs and serve as a robustness 
check for models 1 to 2. See figure 54 in appendix VII for residual histograms.  
4.5.1.2 Expert search 





than in the control group (table 48). Mean water use is lower in the treatment group; 
median water use is the same (table 49). Regarding life-cycle cost, the treatment group 
has a higher mean, but does not differ from the control group with respect to the median 
(table 50). 
Table 48: Descriptive statistics for energy use (Esearch online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 617 0.917 0.85 0.107 0.57 1.19 
Treatment 534 0.920 0.85 0.103 0.57 1.36 
Total 1151 0.918 0.85 0.105 0.57 1.36 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/cycle]. 
Table 49: Descriptive statistics for water use (Esearch online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  water water water water water 
Control 617 43.15 42 4.7 35 56 
Treatment 534 42.60 42 4.3 35 60 
Total 1151 42.89 42 4.5 35 60 
 
Note: Water in [L/cycle]. 
 
Table 50: Descriptive statistics for life-cycle cost (Esearch online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 617 726 716 101 605 1312 
Treatment 534 755 716 159 477 2447 
Total 1151 739 716 132 477 2447 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
Table 51 exhibits regression results for energy, water use and life-cycle cost. Water 
use is reduced through the treatment by 1.1% on average (p<0.05), holding other factors 






Table 51: Effect on energy use, water and cost (Esearch online shop round 1) 
 
  ln(energy)  ln(water) ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT Final CT Final CT All CT All CT 
       
treatment 0.0037 0.0049 0.0049 0.0037 -0.011* 0.027** 
 (0.0067) (0.0048) (0.0044) (0.0051) (0.0048) (0.0085) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.64*** 0.67*** 0.75*** 0.41*** 0.17*** 
  (0.025) (0.024) (0.020) (0.030) (0.032) 
       
constant -0.094*** -1.18*** -1.34*** -1.25*** 3.47*** 6.62*** 
 (0.0047) (0.041) (0.029) (0.052) (0.094) (0.060) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
other features  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.001 0.499 0.591 0.688 0.391 0.180 
N 1151 1151 1151 704 1151 1151 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, CT: Click-through to put 
appliance into virtual shopping cart. Models 4 to 5 contain only final CTs and serve as a robustness 
check for models 1 to 3. See figure 54 in appendix VII for residual histograms. 
4.5.1.3 Overall energy use, water use, and life-cycle costs 
This section refers to the combined observations from both recommendation modes. The 
two experimental groups do not differ in terms of their median energy use, but mean 
energy use is higher in the treatment group (table 52). The median is also the same for 
water use, but mean water use is lower in the treatment group (table 53). As to life-cycle 





Table 52: Descriptive statistics for overall energy use (online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 1241 0.930 0.85 0.105 0.57 1.36 
Treatment 1145 0.932 0.85 0.105 0.57 1.36 
Total 2386 0.931 0.85 0.105 0.57 1.36 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/cycle]. 
Table 53: Descriptive statistics for overall water use (online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  water water water water water 
Control 1241 43.93 42 4.6 35 60 
Treatment 1145 43.71 42 4.5 34 60 
Total 2386 43.83 42 4.5 34 60 
 
Note: Water in [L/cycle]. 
Table 54: Descriptive statistics for overall life-cycle cost (online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 1241 721 703 98 605 1312 
Treatment 1145 738 714 141 407 2447 
Total 2386 729 703 121 407 2447 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
When controlling for other factors (table 55), the treatment coefficients for water 
use and life-cycle cost are significant at a 5% level. Accordingly, being in the treatment 
group is associated with a decrease in water use by 0.72% and with an increase in life-





Table 55: Effect on overall energy use, water and cost (online shop round 1) 
 
  ln(energy)  ln(water) ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT All CT All CT 
       
treatment 0.0018 0.00025 0.00029 -0.00054 -0.0072* 0.014** 
 (0.0046) (0.0035) (0.0032) (0.0039) (0.0033) (0.0053) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.57*** 0.66*** 0.72*** 0.47*** 0.34*** 
  (0.020) (0.017) (0.020) (0.021) (0.031) 
       
mode   -0.0038 -0.0034 -0.021*** 0.031*** 
   (0.0033) (0.0040) (0.0033) (0.0053) 
       
constant -0.079*** -1.15*** -1.27*** -1.23*** 3.36*** 5.74*** 
 (0.0032) (0.029) (0.017) (0.047) (0.068) (0.13) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
other features  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq -0.000 0.419 0.515 0.574 0.403 0.256 
N 2386 2386 2386 1484 2386 2386 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
CT: Click-through to put appliance into virtual shopping cart. mode: recommendation mode  
(Simple search, Expert search). Model 4 contains only final CTs and serves as a robustness check for 
models 1 to 3. See figure 54 in appendix VII for residual histograms. 
The effect sizes (f2) of all regressions reported above range from 0.0021 to 0.0092 
(see table 109 in appendix VII). 
4.5.1.4 Overall impact on retail volume 
From a business perspective, the turnover generated by the recommendation agent is 
important—which depends on both appliance prices and click-throughs. Table 56 shows 
that the sum of prices is higher in the control group, while the mean price is higher in the 






Table 56: Descriptive statistics for appliance prices (online shop round 1) 
  
N Sum Mean SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  price price price price price 
Control 1241 588884 475 99 350 1039 
Treatment 1145 550522 481 106 300 1039 
Total 2386 1139406 478 103 300 1039 
 
Note: Prices in [Euros] 
Table 57: Descriptive statistics for number of clicks per user (online shop round 1) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs users CT count CT count CT count CT count CT count 
Control 23195 0.054 0 0.38 0 19 
Treatment 23073 0.050 0 0.37 0 18 
Total 46268 0.052 0 0.37 0 19 
 
Note: CT: click-throughs 
A chi-square test of independence shows that prices are not differently distributed 
across the two experimental groups at a 5% level, but p=0.057 (see table 114 in appendix 
VII). Another chi-square test for the number of click-throughs makes it much harder to 
reject the hypothesis of independence (p=0.36—see table 113 in appendix VII). 
Table 58 below presents regression results for appliance prices. The treatment leads 
to a decrease in appliance prices for small capacities, and to an increase in prices for large 
capacities. In model (1), the treatment effect is negative for capacities smaller than 6 
liters, and positive otherwise. In model (3), the treatment effect is negative for capacities 
smaller than 5 liters, and positive otherwise. At the median capacity (5 L), the treatment 
effect increases price by 0.31% (see table 108 in appendix VII for capacity quartiles). 
The number of click-throughs is not significantly affected by the experimental 
conditions at a 5% level when controlling for other factors (see table 59 below), but the 





Table 58: Effect on appliance prices (online shop round 1) 
 
  ln(price)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Simple search Expert search Overall 
    
treatment -0.35** -0.26 -0.19* 
 (0.11) (0.14) (0.084) 
    
treat.*ln(cap.) 0.20** 0.17* 0.12* 
 (0.063) (0.084) (0.049) 
    
ln(capacity) 0.10 -0.098* 0.085* 
 (0.055) (0.046) (0.037) 
    
mode   0.037*** 
   (0.0061) 
    
constant 7.21*** 6.88*** 7.20*** 
 (0.18) (0.079) (0.067) 
    
efficiency class  Yes Yes Yes 
    
brands  Yes Yes Yes 
    
other features  Yes Yes Yes 
    
preferences  Yes No No 
    
adj. R-sq 0.516 0.181 0.425 
N 1235 1151 2386 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
mode: recommendation mode (Simple search, Expert search).  
Table 59: Effect on the overall number of click-throughs (online shop round 1) 
 
 Count of click-throughs per user  
   
treatment -0.072  
 (0.061)  
   
mode 0.77***  
 (0.062)  
   
constant -7.71***  
 (0.28)  
   
lnalpha   
constant 2.04***  
 (0.050)  
   
browsers  Yes  
   
pseudo R-sq 0.199  
N 46268  
 
Note: Standard errors of the negative binomial regressions in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  





4.5.2 Second treatment round 
Figure 55 (in appendix VIII) shows the click-throughs from the second treatment round 
over time. Potential problems might have been due to randomization, cookie acceptance, 
and the handling of problematic clicking behavior. 
Randomization worked well for all users. Different from the other results 
described in this dissertation, it also worked well for click-throughs (see table 115 in 
appendix VIII). 
Persistent cookies were accepted by more than 90% of all users with all rejections 
of persistent cookies occurring in the Expert search mode (see table 116 in appendix 
VIII). 
Problematic clicks due to repeated clicking on the same product or due to a high 
total number of click-throughs amounted to 2123 observations and were discarded. The 
cut-off point for an usually high total number of click-throughs was the same as in round 
one (20 clicks—see table 118 in appendix VIII).  
Overall, about 95000 separately identifiable users visited the shopbot. In each 
respective appliance category, they were shown more than 160 different appliances from 
7 brands (see table 117 in appendix VIII).  
Appendix VIII provides more detailed information on the range of life-cycle cost 
(figure 56), energy use box plots (figure 57), energy use histograms (figure 58), energy 
efficiency class histograms (figure 59), water use histograms (figure 60), life-cycle cost 





4.5.2.1 Simple search 
Median energy use, water use, and life-cycle cost are the same in both experimental 
groups. Mean energy use is lower in the treatment group (table 60), and the same holds 
for mean water use (table 61). Differently, mean life-cycle cost is higher in the treatment 
group (table 62). 
Table 60: Descriptive statistics for energy use (Ssearch online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 498 0.999 1.02 0.111 0.57 1.36 
Treatment 492 0.990 1.02 0.112 0.57 1.36 
Total 990 0.994 1.02 0.112 0.57 1.36 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/cycle]. 
Table 61: Descriptive statistics for water use (Ssearch online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  water water water water water 
Control 498 45.80 48 4.7 34 60 
Treatment 492 45.38 48 4.8 34 60 
Total 990 45.59 48 4.8 34 60 
 
Note: Water in [L/cycle]. 
Table 62: Descriptive statistics for life-cycle cost (Ssearch online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 498 950 901 134 798 1650 
Treatment 492 959 901 159 682 1780 
Total 990 955 901 147 682 1780 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
When controlling for other factors, the treatment has a negative effect on energy use 
that is statistically significant at a 5% level (table 63). Being in the treatment group 





Table 63: Effect on energy use, water and cost (Ssearch online shop round 2) 
 
  ln(energy)  ln(water) ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT All CT All CT 
       
treatment -0.0091 -0.0058 -0.0069* -0.0081* -0.0036 -0.0011 
 (0.0072) (0.0036) (0.0030) (0.0037) (0.0042) (0.0050) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.80*** 0.91*** 0.92*** 0.76*** 0.41*** 
  (0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.027) (0.041) 
       
constant -0.0073 -1.38*** -1.73*** -1.38*** 2.73*** 6.43*** 
 (0.0050) (0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.051) (0.091) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
other features  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
preferences  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq 0.001 0.752 0.845 0.834 0.622 0.683 
N 990 990 990 712 990 990 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
CT: Click-through to put appliance into virtual shopping cart. eeclass: energy efficiency class. 
Model 4 contains only final CTs and serves as a robustness check for models 1 to 3.  
See figure 63 in appendix VIII for residual histograms. 
4.5.2.2 Expert search 
Both mean and median energy use are lower in the treatment group than in the control 
group (table 64). The same is true for mean water use, while median water use is the 
same (table 65). Similarly, mean life-cycle cost is lower in the treatment group, and 





Table 64: Descriptive statistics for energy use (Esearch online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 542 0.954 0.95 0.119 0.57 1.36 
Treatment 533 0.936 0.89 0.111 0.57 1.19 
Total 1075 0.945 0.94 0.115 0.57 1.36 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/cycle]. 
Table 65: Descriptive statistics for water use (Esearch online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  water water water water water 
Control 542 42.92 42 4.9 35 60 
Treatment 533 42.36 42 4.5 35 56 
Total 1075 42.65 42 4.7 35 60 
 
Note: Water in [L/cycle]. 
Table 66: Descriptive statistics for life-cycle cost (Esearch online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 542 956 901 135 798 1650 
Treatment 533 947 901 144 549 2043 
Total 1075 951 901 139 549 2043 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
Table 67 below presents regression results for energy use, water use and life-cycle 
cost. The treatment on average reduces energy use by 0.92% (model 2) to 1% (model 3). 





Table 67: Effect on energy use, water and cost (Esearch online shop round 2) 
 
  ln(energy)  ln(water) ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT All CT All CT 
       
treatment -0.018* -0.0092* -0.010*** -0.0096* -0.0097* -0.00059 
 (0.0075) (0.0037) (0.0031) (0.0038) (0.0046) (0.0062) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.91*** 1.00*** 1.00*** 0.84*** 0.34*** 
  (0.017) (0.015) (0.017) (0.029) (0.035) 
       
constant -0.055*** -1.58*** -1.75*** -1.74*** 2.75*** 6.43*** 
 (0.0055) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.032) (0.059) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes Yes No Yes 
       
other features  No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq 0.004 0.758 0.833 0.849 0.537 0.408 
N 1075 1075 1075 725 1075 1075 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
CT: Click-through to put appliance into virtual shopping cart. eeclass: energy efficiency class. 
Models 4 to 5 contain only final CTs and serve as a robustness check for models 1 to 3.  
See figure 63 in appendix VIII for residual histograms. 
4.5.2.3 Overall energy use, water use, and life-cycle costs  
When combining the observations from both recommendation modes, both mean and 
median energy use are lower in the treatment group (table 68). The same is true for water 
use (table 69). Mean life-cycle cost is also lower in the treatment group, while median 





Table 68: Descriptive statistics for overall energy use (online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  energy energy energy energy energy 
Control 1040 0.975 1.02 0.118 0.57 1.36 
Treatment 1025 0.962 0.95 0.115 0.57 1.36 
Total 2065 0.969 0.95 0.116 0.57 1.36 
 
Note: Energy in [kWh/cycle]. 
Table 69: Descriptive statistics for overall water use (online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  water water water water water 
Control 1040 44.30 44 5.0 34 60 
Treatment 1025 43.81 42 4.9 34 60 
Total 2065 44.06 42 5.0 34 60 
 
Note: Water in [L/cycle]. 
Table 70: Descriptive statistics for overall life-cycle cost (online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  lccost lccost lccost lccost lccost 
Control 1040 953.3 901 134 798 1650 
Treatment 1025 952.6 901 151 549 2043 
Total 2065 953.0 901 143 549 2043 
 
Note: Life-cycle cost in [Euro]. Life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore 
simulated for the control group based on default assumptions. 
Table 71 shows that the treatment affects both energy and water use when 
controlling for other factors. It reduces energy use by 0.77% (model 2) to 0.83% 
(model 3). These results are significant at a 1% level. The treatment also reduces water 





Table 71: Effect on overall energy use, water and cost (online shop round 2) 
 
  ln(energy)  ln(water) ln(lccost) 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All CT All CT All CT Final CT All CT All CT 
       
treatment -0.014* -0.0077** -0.0083*** -0.0083** -0.0074* 0.00031 
 (0.0053) (0.0026) (0.0021) (0.0026) (0.0034) (0.0043) 
       
ln(capacity)  0.86*** 0.95*** 0.96*** 0.73*** 0.48*** 
  (0.0090) (0.0095) (0.014) (0.020) (0.026) 
       
mode   -0.0024 -0.0041 -0.034*** 0.034*** 
   (0.0023) (0.0028) (0.0036) (0.0046) 
       
constant -0.032*** -1.49*** -1.49*** -1.76*** 2.92*** 6.65*** 
 (0.0038) (0.016) (0.0081) (0.039) (0.023) (0.044) 
       
efficiency 
class  
No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
other features  No No Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
adj. R-sq 0.003 0.762 0.840 0.846 0.537 0.459 
N 2065 2065 2065 1437 2065 2065 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
CT: Click-through to put appliance into virtual shopping cart. mode: recommendation mode  
(Simple Search, Expert search). Model 4 contains only final CTs and serves as a robustness check for 
models 1 to 3. See figure 63 in appendix VIII for residual histograms. 
The effect sizes (f2) of all regressions reported above range from 0.0024 to 0.011 
(see table 121 in appendix VIII). 
4.5.2.4 Overall impact on retail volume 
Turnover depends on prices and the number of click-throughs. The sum of prices is 
higher in the control group, while mean price is higher in the treatment group (table 72) 





Table 72: Descriptive statistics for appliance prices (online shop round 2) 
  
N Sum Mean SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs  price price price price price 
Control 1040 508091 488.5 132 299 1160 
Treatment 1025 500772 488.6 129 299 1160 
Total 2065 1008863 488.6 131 299 1160 
 
Note: Prices in [Euros] 
Table 73: Descriptive statistics for number of clicks per user (online shop round 2) 
  
N Mean Median SD Min. Max. All click-
throughs users CT count CT count CT count CT count CT count 
Control 47665 0.022 0 0.22 0 15 
Treatment 47692 0.021 0 0.23 0 16 
Total 95357 0.022 0 0.22 0 16 
 
Note: CT: click-throughs 
The hypothesis that price and treatment are statistically independent cannot be 
rejected at a 5% level—but p=0.050 (see table 126 in appendix VIII). The hypothesis that 
the number of click-throughs and the treatment are independent is much harder to reject 
(p=0.58—see table 125 in appendix VIII). 
The tables below contain regression results for prices (table 74) and the number of 
click-throughs (table 75). When controlling for other factors, the treatment does not have 





Table 74: Effect on appliance prices (online shop round 2) 
 
  ln(price)  
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Simple search Expert search Overall 
    
treatment -0.0041 -0.0093 0.00037 
 (0.0095) (0.013) (0.0092) 
    
ln(capacity) 0.11* -0.085 0.22*** 
 (0.054) (0.068) (0.053) 
    
mode   0.074*** 
   (0.0096) 
    
constant 6.40*** 6.56*** 6.88*** 
 (0.12) (0.096) (0.057) 
    
efficiency class  Yes Yes Yes 
    
brands  Yes Yes Yes 
    
other features  Yes Yes Yes 
    
preferences  Yes No No 
    
adj. R-sq 0.626 0.171 0.212 
N 990 1075 2065 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001, mode: recommendation 
mode (Simple search, Expert search). 
Table 75: Effect on the overall number of click-throughs (online shop round 2) 
 
 Count of click-throughs per user  
   
treatment -0.020  
 (0.060)  
   
mode 0.95***  
 (0.062)  
   
constant -7.47***  
 (0.16)  
   
lnalpha   
constant 2.14***  
 (0.056)  
   
browsers  Yes  
   
pseudo R-sq 0.237  
N 95357  
 
Note: Standard errors of the negative binomial regression in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01,  





4.5.3 Feedback forms 
A total of 72 customers from the treatment group sent feedback to comment on the 
performance of the recommendation system.  
Overall, 47% of respondents evaluated the system as “good” or “excellent”, 
whereas 51% rated it “less good” or “poor” (see figure 24 in appendix III). For each 
rating, customers provided detailed reasons. Among these reasons, the “result of the 
recommendation” was mentioned most often. The second most important reason was 
“user guidance” for those customers who gave a more positive rating overall, and 
“questions asked” for those who gave a more negative rating. A total of 11 customers 
mentioned “operating cost disclosure” as a reason, and all of them provided a positive 
rating overall (i.e. “good” or “excellent”). This positive evaluation of operating cost 
disclosure did not change markedly between experimental treatment rounds.  
With respect to the recommendation agent’s effect, less than 10% of those 
customers who provided feedback actually bought the washing machine directly at the 
online shop. More than 40% stated that they found a machine, but just wanted to gather 
information, and did not buy the machine (see figure 25 in appendix III). 
 Only two out of 72 customers had already visited other websites that provide 
operating cost information for household appliances. A large majority responded with 
“No”, or did not answer the question at all (see figure 26 in appendix III). 
Finally, many customers provided additional comments. Most were very specific 
and only partially helpful for a systematic future improvement of the recommendation 





is why they are not relevant for this dissertation.  
4.5.4 Telephone interviews 
A total of five females and three males from all over Germany participated in the 
telephone interviews.  
Five individuals had used the recommendation agent during the first experimental 
round, and three during the second. All of them had used the Simple search mode of the 
recommendation agent. The youngest individual was in his twenties, the oldest more than 
60 years old. Concerning education, less than half of them had pursued graduate studies 
at a university. Nearly all of them were employed at the time of the interview, and nearly 
all of them had used the internet since the early or mid-1990s. Table 81 (appendix III) 
gives an overview of basic demographics of all participants, and table 82 contains the 
interview transcripts. In the following sections, I summarize the results sorted by the 
interview topics. 
4.5.4.1 Reaction to, and understanding of the disclosed operating cost 
Participants' initial reactions when seeing the disclosed operating cost for the first time 
ranged from astonishment to no reaction at all. One participant described operating cost 
disclosure as a matter of course, but admitted later that she did not look at the output from 
the recommendation agent in detail. Two of the participants from round two of the 
experiment could not remember having noticed the operating cost at all. Among these 
two, one explicitly explained that she was focusing on physical electricity and water use 
instead because cost figures were too much depending on prices, on which she had no 





seeing the operating cost.  
One participant from the first round criticized the visual presentation of operating 
and life-cycle cost in round one as being too large and too dominant relative to other 
features. She also made clear that operating cost were much less important for her than 
the purchase price because operating cost occurred for all washing machines. Most 
participants understood the meaning of the disclosed operating cost.  
4.5.4.2 Underlying assumptions, their adjustment, and role of energy prices 
The underlying assumptions and their calculation were understandable for most 
participants. One of them mentioned that, at first, he and his wife did not understand that 
they were able to adjust the underlying assumptions in order to receive more suitable 
output from the calculation. Later on, however, they learned how to do this.  
Another participant mentioned the importance of the online shop’s reputation. He 
intuitively trusted the calculation because of his overall trust in the online shop. 
Therefore, he did not bother finding out more about the calculation and the underlying 
assumptions. Had it been another shop, he would not have trusted it as much.  
One participant from the first round initially did not understand the underlying 
time horizon of the cost calculation, but later found out about it. One participant assumed 
that the default assumptions represented average values for German consumers. Overall, 
most of the participants did not adjust the default assumptions. One of them made clear 
that he did not know his exact local price of electricity or the local price of water. 
Another one stated that in his view, the default time horizon of nine years (in round two) 





Potentially escalating energy prices were not an important factor for most 
participants.  
4.5.4.3 Importance of energy efficiency for the participant 
The technical efficiency of washing machines was of vital importance for nearly all 
participants. Some mentioned “water efficiency” or “energy efficiency” in particular 
whereas others did not specify what they were referring to exactly.  
One participant explained that her way of choosing between appliances was to 
look for machines that carried the best or the second-best efficiency category label, that is 
“A” or “B”, respectively.  
Two others cautioned that the water efficiency of a given machine should not be 
too low because this could lead to insufficient washing performance.  
4.5.4.4 Knowledge of alternative information channels  
Alternative information channels regarding the energy efficiency of appliances were 
mentioned by most participants. Two of them mentioned (offline) retailers, while two 
others referred to internet websites by themselves.  
When asked specifically about alternative websites that provide operating cost 
information for appliances, only one participant remembered vaguely having heard about 
the existence of such a site. Nevertheless, he had not visited it. Instead, he had visited the 
site from his local electricity utilities. This pattern was also described by another 





4.5.4.5 Personal opinion about the future of operating cost disclosure 
Participants’ personal opinion about the value and the future of operating cost disclosure 
differed widely. The lowest common denominator for most participants was to provide 
optional operating cost disclosure for continuously running appliances such as cooling 
appliances. Regarding other contexts, fewer participants were convinced of the usefulness 
of operating cost disclosure.  
One of the participants from round two suggested that in the experiment, 
operating cost were displayed too early in the process.  
Other appliances for which one or more participants deemed operating cost 
disclosure useful were computers, televisions, dish washers, dryers, and conventional 
light bulbs vis-à-vis compact fluorescent lights.  
One participant recommended concentrating on the physical units instead of 
monetary units because the latter were depending on prices. Prices, in turn, could change 
too often so that monetary values could hardly give meaningful guidance for one’s 
purchasing choice. 
4.5.4.6 Further comments 
Further comments from participants predominantly did not refer to operating cost 
disclosure in any way, with three exceptions: One participant underscored the importance 
of purchase price information and demanded a less prominent visual representation of 
operating cost. Another participant demanded an explanation for the default time horizon, 






The discussion will concentrate on the substantive experimental outcomes (4.6.1) and on 
user feedback (4.6.3). Threats to validity have, for the most part, already been dealt with 
in section 3.6 for the shopbot case. Any remaining issues concerning the online shop will 
be presented in section 4.6.2. Finally, user feedback will be discussed in section 4.6.3. 
4.6.1 Experimental outcomes 
My five research hypotheses referred to the treatment effect on energy use, water use, 
estimated life-cycle cost, appliance prices, and click-throughs.  
Treatment effects on energy use were consistently negative in both experimental 
rounds (where significant at a 5% level). Surprisingly, no overall effect could be detected 
in round one although life-cycle costs were more prominent, and the sample size was 
larger than in round two. Therefore, the longer assumed time horizon in round two seems 
to have been decisive for the outcome.  
Water use also got consistently reduced through the treatment. In both rounds, the 
effect amounted to a reduction of about 0.7%  
The effect on life-cycle cost was positive in round one. A tacit assumption of life-
cycle cost minimization through consumers would be hard to reconcile with such a 
finding.  
Since life-cycle costs were not disclosed to the control group, they had to be 
simulated for comparing life-cycle cost between treatment and control. This simulation 
for the control group was based on common default assumptions. Consequently, the life-





assumptions (treatment) versus non-adjusted default assumptions (control).  
An alternative would have been to derive life-cycle cost from non-adjusted 
default assumptions for both groups. In such a comparison, none of the treatment 
coefficients would have been significant at a 5% level in round one (see table 112 in 
appendix VII) or round two (see table 124 in appendix VIII). In other words, the few 
positive effects on life-cycle cost were sensitive to the adjustment of assumptions in the 
treatment group (see table 110 in appendix VII, and table 122 in appendix VIII). 
In terms of size, the treatment effect for energy use, water use, and life-cycle cost 
can be deemed “small” (f2=0.02) (Cohen 1977, 413) (see table 109 in appendix VII, and 
table 121 in appendix VIII). 
Given the online shop’s business model, the number of click-throughs and the 
prices of clicked appliances jointly matter for turnover. In round one, both effects were 
ambiguous and depended on capacity. In round two, no effect could be found in the 
regression analyses. Yet, the hypothesis of independence of treatment and price could 
nearly be rejected at a 5% level (p=0.05). Since the product of click-throughs and 
appliance prices—that is, the best available indicator of turnover—was lower in the 
treatment group, this finding suggests the possibility of a negative impact on retail 
volume. Regardless of the exact effect, both a neutral or negative effect constitute a 
barrier for private firms to adopt life-cycle cost disclosure by themselves—even if such a 
feature is beneficial regarding the detected decrease in energy use. 
Lastly, including the price of gas in its current or lagged form as a covariate did 
not change the experimental results noticeably, if at all (for the price over time see figure 





In sum, the following treatment effects could be detected: first, a decrease in 
overall energy use by 0.83% in round two. Second, an overall increase in life-cycle cost 
by 1.4% in round one—which, however, is very sensitive to the assumptions used in the 
calculation of life-cycle cost. Third, a decrease in water use by about 0.7% in both 
experimental rounds. Fourth, an ambiguous or non-existing impact on retail volume 
which does not make life-cycle cost disclosure in the chosen format attractive by itself 
from a business perspective. The policy implications of the experimental findings will be 
discussed in section 5.2. 
4.6.2 Validity 
Most threats to validity discussed for the shopbot (3.6) also apply to the online shop 
experiment. Further issues have to do with external and measurement validity. 
4.6.2.1 External validity 
First, the clicking behavior of users may tell something about their spatial distribution. As 
described above (4.5.1), I discarded a high number of repeated click-throughs on the 
same product. These double-clicks seem to indicate user impatience because of low 
bandwidth internet connections and associated slow data flow. According to a recent 
survey, about half of all German internet users have high-speed internet access (van 
Eimeren and Frees 2006, 408). Since high bandwidth connections are less available in 
rural areas, it may be that the online shop attracts a relatively high proportion of users 
from those areas. It is unclear, however, in what way this could potentially bias the 
treatment effect. 





subset of all products and brands available in the market. In the online shop, the range of 
washing machines (see table 105 in appendix VII) was smaller than what is available 
through shopbots like, for example, WEB.de. Moreover, products from only seven 
different brands were offered while WEB.de presents more than 20 brands. Therefore, a 
generalization of the experimental findings to the whole product range in the market 
seems to be limited. The larger the range of products with respect to energy use, the 
greater a treatment effect could potentially be. Given the online shop’s restricted range of 
products, the most likely bias would reduce the treatment effect size. 
Finally, the experimental recommendation agent was only one of two alternative 
ways to buy a washing machine in the online shop (see 4.2). Users who navigated 
through the regular online shop interface were not included in the sample. Given different 
information needs and search behavior, and given the existing variance in users’ ability to 
cope with hierarchical menu structures (Norman 1991), the direction of any potentially 
resulting bias is unknown. 
4.6.2.2 Measurement validity 
Different from cooling appliances, washing machines are used discontinuously with a 
variety of programs at varying temperatures. This diversity in usage, however, could not 
be reflected in the experimental design given a lack of appropriate data. Instead, the 
values for energy and water use refer to standard 60°C cotton cycles as defined in the 
European Commission’s labeling directive for washing machines (EC 1995). Any 
treatment effect reported here must therefore be interpreted as an average change in 





and depends on individual consumer behavior. 
4.6.2.3 Summary of threats to validity 
Table 76 below summarizes potential threats to validity.  
Table 76: Summary of threats to validity (online shop) 
 




Use of cookies 
for randomization 
Priming,  
imitation of treatment 
– Small given the relatively 
larger cognitive effort 




+ Unlikely given the real 
purchasing situation, 
otherwise problematic 
Restricted range of products 
and brands offered 
Restricted range of 
energy use 
– Limits generalizability  
Co-existence of experimental 
recommendation agent and 
regular shopping interface 
within the same given online 
shop 
Self-selection ? Limits generalizability 
Immeasurable characteristics 
of online shop  
(advertising, hyperlink 
structure, reputation) 
Self-selection ? Limits generalizability 
 
4.6.3 User feedback 
Feedback forms and qualitative interviews refer to opinions from consumers who self-
selected into filling the form and being interviewed. These views can therefore shed light 
on certain issues but cannot be deemed representative of the population of online 
shoppers visiting the online shop. 
While understanding life-cycle cost in general did not seem to be a problem, 





Two distinct forms of visual cost presentation were chosen in the two treatments 
rounds. In round one, all cost factors were integrated in one line whereas in round two, 
operating and life-cycle cost was disclosed in a separate line subsequent to the purchase 
price. Moreover, the treatment in round two encompassed an additional line showing the 
assumed time horizon, and an information button to explain how to adjust the underlying 
assumptions (see 4.4.1.1).  
Responses from interview participants illustrate the principal problem with 
finding an adequate design for life-cycle cost disclosure. One participant from round one 
underscored the primacy of purchase price information and criticized the visual 
dominance of operating cost figures. His comment was one of the reasons why the 
treatment format was changed in the second round. Conversely, two participants from the 
second round could not remember having noticed the operating cost at all. 
These reactions make clear that the choice of format involves difficult trade-offs. 
On the one hand, if consumers dislike a given visual format, their propensity to click-
through may get reduced. Also, too many pieces of information may make the cognitive 
load too high. This is important when considering one respondent’s comment who would 
also like to see annualized operating cost. On the other hand, information needs to be 
placed prominently enough to attract the attention of consumers who may be in an early 
screening stage of their purchasing process (Häubl and Trifts 2000, 7).  
Another aspect of search behavior was described by one interview respondent. He 
explained that he was basically looking for a product that outperformed his old washing 
machine in terms of energy and water use. Another interview participant stated that he 





operating cost as a measuring rod. These comments indicate a tendency to not optimize 
economically, but to follow much simpler heuristics—a finding that would be consistent 







Chapter 5: Conclusions 
5.1 Summary of experimental findings  
Table 77 below summarizes all findings from the experimental life-cycle cost disclosure. 
In the shopbot, consumers clicked-through to final online retailers. In the online shop, 
they put appliances into the virtual shopping cart. Both forms of product-specific clicks 
were evaluated by means of multiple regression analysis. 
Table 77: Summary of all treatment effects that are significant at a 5% level  
 
Dependent variables Energy use  
[kWh/unitb]  




  Impact on  
    retail volumed 
Treatment rounda 1 2 1 2 1 2 1 2 
Cooling appliances (shopbot)       
 Freezers +/−e    n/a n/a   
 Fridge-freezers     n/a n/a   
 Refrigerators -4.2%    n/a n/a   
Overall -2.5%    n/a n/a -23%f  
N (total) 1969 1391 1969 1391 1969 1391 1969 1391 
Washing machines (online shop)       
 Simple search mode -1.2% -0.81%     +/−e  
 Expert search mode  -1.0  % +2.7%g  -1.1  % -0.97%   
Overall  -0.83% +1.4%g  -0.72% -0.74% +/−e  
N (total) 2386 2065 2386 2065 2386 2065 2386 2065 
Note: n/a: not applicable  
a) default time horizon for life-cycle cost estimation: 5 years (shopbot round 1),  
     9 years (shopbot round 2), 4.9 years (online shop round 1), 9 years (online shop round 2).  
b) unit: [year] for cooling appliances, and [cycle] for washing machines 
c) life-cycle costs were only shown to the treatment group and were therefore simulated for the 
    control group based on default assumptions  
d) number of click-throughs (shopbot); combination of click-throughs and appliance prices  
    (online shop) 
e) direction of the effect depends on appliance capacity  
f) not significant anymore and reduced to about -10% if previously discarded click-throughs  
    (repeated clicks, potential robots) are included  
g) not significant anymore when life-cycle costs are estimated based on non-adjusted default 





Life-cycle cost disclosure consistently reduced energy use. The overall reduction in 
energy use ranged from 2.5% in the shopbot case (round 1) to 0.83% in the online shop 
(round 2). These reductions, however, refer to different treatments. 
In the shopbot, the treatment consisted of placing life-cycle cost at a very prominent 
position; that is, in the same line and with equal font size as the purchase price. 
Moreover, operating cost was estimated based on a relatively short time horizon (5 years) 
that corresponds to a high implicit discount rate. 
In the online shop, the reduction occurred in a setting in which life-cycle cost 
always appeared as secondary information with a smaller font size. Also, estimated 
operating cost figures were relatively larger because of the longer underlying time 
horizon (9 years) that reflected a lower implicit discount rate. Given these differences in 
treatment, the reductions in energy use cannot be directly compared between the shopbot 
and the online shop.  
Life-cycle cost disclosure also reduced the overall water use of washing machines 
by about 0.7% in both experimental treatment rounds. 
Despite those significant reductions in energy and water use associated with the 
treatment, estimated life-cycle costs were affected in only two cases. They represented 
increases in life-cycle cost for washing machines; but these increases were highly 
sensitive to the exact calculation of operating cost. When using common default 
assumptions for both experimental groups, no significant effects on life-cycle cost 
remained.  
Only one unambiguous impact on retail volume could be detected—a reduction in 





with the reduction in energy use in round one of the experiment. 
The assumptions regarding the underlying time horizon for operating cost 
estimation were rarely adjusted by users in the treatment group. In each experimental 
round, less than 5% of all treated users changed the default time horizon. In the shopbot 
case, users in the treatment group were also able to sort and filter product lists by life-
cycle cost. Yet, less than 3% of them made use of these functions. 
The last finding requires a comment. By definition, sorting and filtering by life-
cycle cost would have considerably facilitated life-cycle cost minimization. Given the 
rare use of these functions, one may wonder how rational consumers' behavior actually 
was. Although my research hypotheses were motivated by different theoretical 
perspectives on decision-making, this dissertation could not answer the question whether 
consumers behave as rational optimizers, or whether they follow different heuristics. The 
reason is that empirically discriminating between optimizing and other patterns of 
behavior can be difficult (March 1994, 20). Methodologically, laboratory experiments 
facilitate differentiation because they allow for setting up specific decision alternatives. 
Such an artificial set up, however, was unfeasible in the field experiment described here. 
Under these field conditions, a better identification of consumer actions would have 
required comprehensive knowledge of all product attributes. Given the lack of data with 
respect to several characteristics, I did not attempt to identify a particular kind of 
consumer behavior. 
All in all, the evidence suggests that life-cycle cost disclosure has an effect on 
consumer behavior. It leads individuals to opt for more energy-efficient cooling 





efficient washing machines. Both effects make life-cycle cost disclosure a potentially 
interesting approach for environmental policy. From a business perspective, however, 
implementing life-cycle cost disclosure offers no direct benefits because it goes along 
with a negative or neutral impact on retail volume. 
5.2 Policy implications 
Whether the effects reported here are substantively important from a policy perspective is 
primarily a question about costs and benefits. Both costs and benefits of life-cycle cost 
disclosure depend on the scale of its implementation.  
Maximum scale would necessitate that life-cycle cost become an integral part of 
mandatory energy-efficiency labels. Given the static character of conventional labels, 
however, consumers would not be able to individually adjust the underlying assumptions.  
On the other hand, the experimental findings reported above suggest that only a small 
fraction of consumers would be interested in changing the default assumptions anyway. 
In any case, integrating life-cycle cost into mandatory labels requires a high degree of 
consensus regarding the default assumptions used. Moreover, it is unclear to what extent 
the treatment effects from the online experiments reported here are applicable to 
purchasing situations in physical stores that include interactions with sales personnel. 
Those are the problems associated with implementing life-cycle cost disclosure at 
maximum scale. 
A smaller solution would be to implement life-cycle cost disclosure merely on the 
internet. Although online sales of large household appliances are growing, their share in 





2005). Still, for electronic commerce across all product categories, about 50% of all 
Germans report having incorporated available online information into their purchasing 
process, and about 45% of all Germans deem price comparisons to be the single most 
important element (Nielsen/Netratings 2004; van Eimeren, Gerhard et al. 2004). These 
figures demonstrate that the internet and price comparisons are important for the 
purchasing process even if the final purchase itself still occurs predominantly in physical 
stores.  
Providing life-cycle cost on the internet could be pursued through voluntary 
initiatives. The largest obstacle to such initiatives would probably be the missing direct 
business incentive for implementation. Still, voluntary life-cycle cost disclosure may be 
publicly supported by non-governmental organizations. Implementation could therefore 
prove to be at least indirectly beneficial in terms of public relations.  
5.2.1 Costs of life-cycle cost disclosure 
Determining the costs of implementing life-cycle cost disclosure in detail is beyond the 
scope of this dissertation. Instead, I will only raise key issues concerning the possible 
implementation options. 
 Option one—the mandatory, large-scale labeling approach—is associated with 
high information requirements that may make it prohibitive. Life-cycle cost information 
as defined in this dissertation consists of lifetime operating costs and product retail price. 
While the former can be supplied by manufacturers, the latter is only known to retailers. 
Providing information about both cost components therefore involves several actors. 





predominantly rely on manufacturers’ information about product characteristics (du Pont, 
Schwengels et al. 2005, 112). Such a more than incremental change in the labeling 
system is, therefore, likely to involve considerable cost. 
A possible alternative that comes closest to full life-cycle cost disclosure would 
be the provision of lifetime operating cost; that is, operating cost estimated over the entire 
lifetime of a given appliance. Consumers would then need to add these costs to the 
product price by themselves if they wanted to determine life-cycle cost.  
The effect of lifetime operating cost disclosure, however, cannot be directly 
inferred from this dissertation because its focus was on the provision of both lifetime 
operating cost and life-cycle cost. Consequently, it cannot answer the question whether 
the disclosure of lifetime operating cost on its own would lead to similar results. The 
results may in fact differ, given the cognitive effort associated with adding price and 
lifetime operating cost manually. Still, the results may indicate the overall direction of the 
effect. Lifetime operating cost provision is currently under discussion in the US and the 
European Union (see 2.4.5).  
All in all, the costs of implementing changes to mandatory labels depend on the 
institutional setting and the number of actors involved. If additions to the label could be 
easily linked with planned label revisions or updates, the incremental costs of 
implementation might be relatively small. Otherwise, costs would be much larger. 
The second option, voluntary life-cycle cost disclosure on the internet, may also 
vary in terms of implementation cost. In the European Union, all vendors of household 
appliances are mandated to supply energy use information with the label anyway—data 





nature: digital product information can be available in separate database fields, or it can 
be part of an encompassing string variable. With separate data fields, implementing life-
cycle cost disclosure should be relatively inexpensive. In the latter case, however, the 
opposite would be true. Extracting specific information from string variables is prone to 
errors. Only a future standardization in electronic product catalogues might lower this 
hurdle.  
These general considerations show that both possible approaches for 
implementation—large-scale and small-scale—may come at different cost.  
5.2.2 Benefits of life-cycle cost disclosure 
Understanding potential benefits requires looking at the estimated amount of CO2 under 
consideration, and the associated value.  
Table 127 in appendix IX contains order-of-magnitude estimates for potential 
CO2 reductions in Germany through life-cycle cost disclosure. The key assumption is a 
large-scale mandatory implementation of the disclosure on all energy efficiency labels for 
household appliances. Starting from this assumption, the total amount of CO2 mitigated 
would be in the range of 10 to 20 thousand metric tons per year—that is, less than 
0.01 percent of Germany’s total anthropogenic CO2 emissions of 853 million tons in 
2000 (EWI 2005).  
The monetary benefits of such an emission reduction would depend on the value 
of a ton of CO2. According to current predictions for Germany which assume a moderate 
climate policy for the years to come, tradable permits for CO2 may cost up to 15 





Multiplying expected permit cost and CO2 reductions leads to maximum benefits 
in the range of 150,000 to 300,000 EUR(2000)/year. These figures represent an upper 
bound for the benefits that can be expected from a large-scale implementation of life-
cycle cost disclosure in Germany. Analogously, a voluntary implementation on the 
internet would lead to smaller maximum benefits. They would depend on how many 
websites participate in the disclosure, and on how the market share of online appliance 
purchases develops over time.  
The preceding quantification of benefits neglected two aspects. First, I 
disregarded potential savings in water use through more efficient washing machines and 
dishwashers. Second, I did not attempt to quantify second order effects induced by life-
cycle cost disclosure. It may well be that this form of monetary cost presentation 
stimulates long-term learning processes on the part of consumers. But it would be hard to 
evaluate those effects in any kind of field experiment—which was the focus of this 
dissertation. 
All things considered, if life-cycle disclosure for household appliances can be 
institutionalized at relatively low cost, it may have tangible benefits. Yet, the magnitude 
of the figures derived here indicates that potential benefits may not justify a complex 
bureaucratic realization.  
This analysis does not provide an argument against energy labeling as such. It 
simply cautions that the incremental effect of adding monetary information to existing 
energy labels may not pass a simple cost-benefit test. In such a case, investing in 
alternative CO2 reduction measures and related policies may be more valuable.  





Future changes in energy prices may lead to larger effects of life-cycle cost disclosure on 
consumer behavior. Other than that, several aspects of life-cycle cost disclosure should be 
further examined in the future. 
5.3 Avenues for future research 
Apart from clarifying the implementation cost of life-cycle cost disclosure, avenues for 
future research have to do with the generalizability of my findings, with database 
completeness, the instruments used, the time horizon, the framing of cost information, 
and new information technology. 
First of all, external validity would generally benefit from conducting similar 
experiments in other countries with different energy cost, water cost and existing 
efficiency labeling systems. In principle, the scope of experimental life-cycle cost 
disclosure could also be extended to other energy-consuming durable goods such as cars. 
Second, more complete databases will provide a better understanding of consumer 
decision-making. In the shopbot experiment described here, not every final retailer 
revealed his shipping costs. Consequently, these costs could not be integrated into the 
calculation of life-cycle cost without reducing the shopbot’s functionality. In this regard, 
future life-cycle cost experiments in shopbots should strive for data completeness as 
much as possible. 
Third, the instruments described in this dissertation are click-throughs. They 
describe actual consumer behavior, but cannot provide a description of final purchasing 
choices. In the shopbot, no obligation for consumers whatsoever resulted from clicking-





virtual shopping cart of the online shop. Due to a lack of integration in software systems, 
however, purchase data could not be collected as part of this project. Therefore, the final 
step in the cause-and-effect chain from information disclosure to consumer action is still 
missing.  
The problem is that there may be a systematic difference in behavior between the 
treatment and the control group. Two opposite effects are conceivable. On the one hand, 
treated consumers may, on average, feel better informed through life-cycle cost 
disclosure. They may feel more confident about the kind of appliance they want to buy. 
On the other hand, being confronted with life-cycle cost information may be surprising or 
demanding for some consumers. It may stimulate doubts and induce a longer search for 
alternatives. In such a case, the short term effect of life-cycle cost disclosure shown here 
may get diffused over the course of the extended product search. These opposed 
scenarios call for research on life-cycle cost disclosure that actually measures the final 
purchasing decision. 
Fourth, future research should examine differences in information format. Various 
alternative formats are thinkable for presenting monetary information to consumers: as 
yearly operating cost, lifetime operating cost, life-cycle cost, and annualized life-cycle 
cost. Each format could be evaluated relative to the others. Annualized cost may have an 
exposed position compared to other figures if consumers can better plan their 
expenditures on such a basis.  
Fifth, what has not been assessed in the context of energy cost disclosure so far is 
the framing of the cost information. Loss aversion (Kahneman and Tversky 1979) may 





cost savings may be evaluated differently than surcharges of the same amount. Life-cycle 
cost disclosure as such usually aims at presenting the true long-run cost of a given 
appliance, and this is predominantly done by presenting additional cost information. 
Consequently, it would be worth evaluating monetary information disclosure that 
represents operating cost of a more energy efficient model as cost savings compared to 
more inefficient reference models. Such a procedure, of course, assumes that information 
about comparable models and related savings is sufficiently available.  
Sixth, one should evaluate the disclosure of life-cycle cost in conjunction with 
environmental information. With more and more governmental and non-governmental 
institutions planning on making CO2-related information available for products and 
services, the question is whether this information disclosure has any effect. While life-
cycle cost information as defined here refers to private cost, environmental information 
for the most part represents external cost. The question is whether these two pieces of 
information can be meaningfully integrated so that consumers can process them 
cognitively, and so that the information has an effect on consumer purchasing behavior. 
Finally, in extending Lund’s (1978) vision of computer-based decision-support 
for life-cycle cost disclosure, one can even think beyond the internet. For consumers, the 
future holds the increased use of information systems in conjunction with Radio 
Frequency Identification (RFID) at the point of sale (Strüker, Sackmann et al. 2004). 
These systems would combine in-store appliance energy characteristics with interactive 
adjustment of life-cycle cost estimates through consumers. And they would allow for a 





Appendix I: shopbot screenshots 






Figure 5: Introductory web page of the shopbot 
 










































Appendix II: online shop screenshots 






Figure 13: Introductory web page for washing machines in the online shop 
 


















1 “nebensächlich” “nebensächlich” “nebensächlich” 
2 “1-2 Personen” “Keller oder 
Waschküche” 
“AEG” 




5   “Miele” 
6   “Privileg” 
7   “SILENTIC” 
8   “Siemens” 
 






Table 79: Answer options in the pull-down menus of the Expert search mode 
Question 
Option 
“Hersteller?”   
1 “bitte wählen”   
2 “AEG”   
3 “Bosch”   
4 “Matura”   
5 “Miele”   
6 “Privileg”   
7 “Siemens”   
8 “SILENTIC”   
    
Question 
Option 
“Fassungsvermögen?” “Schleudertouren?” “Zusatzprogramme?” 
1 “bitte wählen” “bitte wählen” “bitte wählen” 
2 “mindestens 4 kg” “mindestens 1000 
U/min” 
“Beladungserkennung” 
3 “mindestens 5 kg” “mindestens 1200 
U/min” 
“prog. Timer” 
4 “mindestens 6 kg” “mindestens 1400 
U/min” 
“Schaumkontrolle” 
5  “mindestens 1600 
U/min” 
“Wolleschonung” 
6   “Energiesparfunktion” 






1 “bitte wählen” “bitte wählen” “bitte wählen” 
2 “Kindersicherung” “mindestens A plus” “höchstens 40 Liter” 
3 “Wasserschutz” “mindestens A” “höchstens 45 Liter” 
4 “Wasserstopp” “mindestens B” “höchstens 50 Liter” 
    
Question 
Option 
“Bauart?” “Bauform?” “Platzprobleme?” 
1 “bitte wählen” “bitte wählen” “bitte wählen” 
2 “Toplader “Unterbaugerät” “geringe Breite (bis 50 
cm)” 
3 “Frontlader”  “geringe Tiefe (bis 50 
cm)” 











































Appendix III: feedback evaluation 










“Wie fühlen Sie 
Sich beraten?” 




“Haben Sie schon einmal eine 
spezielle Betriebskosten-
Webseite besucht?” 
1 “Sehr gut” “Ja, und ich habe 
sie gleich hier 
gekauft” 
“Nein” 




3 “Weniger gut” “Ja, aber ich 




4 “Schlecht” “Nein” “Ja, www.spargeraete.de” 
5   “Ja, www.stromeffizienz.de” 
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 82: Interview transcripts 
 
Interview topics 
1. The participant's reaction to and understanding of the disclosed operating cost  
2. Assumptions that underlie the calculated operating cost, their potential adjustment,  
    and the role of rising energy prices 
3. Importance of energy efficiency for the participant 
4. Knowledge of alternative information channels regarding energy efficiency of appliances 
5. Personal opinion about the value and the future of operating cost disclosure 
6. Further comments 
Interview No. 1 
1 Ich war im ersten Moment ein bisschen erstaunt und habe dann erst einmal geguckt, wie sich 
die Betriebskosten zusammensetzen. Weil das ist ja so dargestellt wie ein Gesamtpreis, 
hinterher. Und da musste ich erstmal einen Moment gucken, wie sich das zusammensetzt, weil 
Betriebskosten fallen ja nun bei jeder Waschmaschine an. Da ist es mir im Großen und 
Ganzen - ich will nicht sagen - egal, weil erstmal nebensächlich, die Betriebskosten. Mich 
interessiert dann, wenn ich so etwas sehe, erst einmal der Preis der Maschine an sich. Und so, 
wie das dargestellt ist, das ist ja ziemlich groß und in rot - der Komplettpreis - das fand ich 
dann in dem Moment erst einmal erstaunlich.  
2 Das war schon ganz klar. Man kann das ja dann entsprechend unter Betriebskosten anklicken, 
und das war dann eigentlich schon einsichtig, wie sich das errechnet. Wobei das ja immer nur 
geschätzte Werte sind. Man geht dann ja immer von einer Standardfamilie aus, und Standard-
Wäschen in der Woche und Standard-Wäschen im Jahr, und daraus errechnet man das dann. 
Ich habe mir das angeguckt, und gesehen: Aha, so setzt sich das zusammen, und habe das 
dann so gelassen. Weil, wie schon gesagt, mich die Betriebskosten so primär nicht interessiert 
haben. Mich hat ja erstmal die Maschine und der Preis interessiert. Mir war die Maschine 
wichtig, weil das ist eine Summe die - selbst, wenn man sie auf Raten kauft - man erst einmal 
aufbringen muss. Betriebskosten ergeben sich im laufenden Betrieb über das Jahr verteilt. Und 
mir persönlich ist dann der Preis der Maschine - so wie er dort dargestellt wird - viel wichtiger 
als die Betriebskosten. 
3 Ist schon ein wichtiger Punkt für die Entscheidungsfindung: was für eine Energieeffizienz-
Klasse ist das, was für eine Wasch-Effizienzklasse, wie viel Wasser verbraucht die Maschine, 
wie viel kann man laden? Wie freundlich ist die Bedienung? Ist eine große Öffnung da? Also 






5 Mir reicht diese Klassifizierung schon. Da gibt es auch im Katalog bei Quelle entsprechende 
Tabellen, da wird ausgeführt, was A, B und C ist. Diese Effizienzklassen gibt es ja auch bei 
anderen Geräten. Und da reicht mir das eigentlich schon, wenn ich das im groben weiß. Ich 
muss das nicht unbedingt mathematisch festmachen an einem Betrag, den ich dann errechne. 
Und ich weiß, wenn das Klasse A hinsichtlich der Energie-Effizienz ist, dann weiß ich auch, 
dass weniger Energie verbraucht wird als z.B. bei "G". Also das ist mir dann klar, und dann 
muss ich das auch nicht explizit ausrechnen. Ich denke, da hat jeder seine eigene Meinung. 
Der eine sieht es so, der andere kann es vielleicht besser an Zahlen festmachen. Ich finde das 
immer hilfreich, wenn die Möglichkeit zumindest angeboten wird. Wir haben Kühlschränke 
oder besser gesagt Gefrierschränke gekauft Anfang letzten Jahres und, - da muss man halt 
suchen. Es sind so viele Sachen im Angebot. So viele Klasseneinteilungen. Man muss dann 
halt sehen: was bringt das Gerät, was leistet das Gerät, und welche Energie-Effizienz-Klasse 
ist das letztendlich? Irgendwo muss man das auch ein bisschen in Relation sehen. 
6 Ich würde die Betriebskosten nicht unbedingt gleich an erster Stelle nennen, sondern ich 
würde schon vorrangig den Preis der Maschine kennzeichnen. Und dann die Betriebskosten 
vielleicht daneben - kann ja ruhig gleich groß sein. Vielleicht anstatt in rot in schwarz. Also 
schon ein bisschen von der Optik her ändern. Also ich finde es nicht schlecht, wenn das auch 
so ein Berater bei Quelle für andere Geräte angeboten wird. Ich muss sagen, die Maschine, die 
mir der Berater als erste Wahl angeboten hat, die hätte ich auch genommen, und war dann 
doch ein bisschen enttäuscht, als ich die bestellen wollte und dann nachher die Meldung kam: 
"die Maschine ist ausverkauft". Damit war ich nicht so ganz zufrieden, dass die Maschine, die 
als das Modell angeboten wird, schon ausverkauft ist. Solche Artikel sollte man dann auch 
rauslassen aus dem Berater. Ich habe die in den Warenkorb gepackt, wollte den abrufen, und 
da stand "ausverkauft". Im Warenkorb wird auch manchmal ein Alternativartikel angeboten, 
aber auch das war in diesem Fall nicht möglich. Im Grunde genommen ist dann das ganze im 
Sande verlaufen. 
Interview No. 2 
1 Ich war überrascht über die Höhe, weil auf den ersten Blick nicht erkennbar war, dass es über 
die gesamte Nutzungsdauer war. Wenn man darauf geklickt hat, hat man ja gesehen, dass 4,9 
Jahre die Grundlage war. Das war neu, weil ich so etwas noch nie gesehen habe und ich mir 
über die Kosten nicht im Klaren war, aber das war dann in Ordnung sozusagen. 
2 Das war alles klar, ich musste es nur noch einmal anpassen - die Anzahl der Maschinen pro 
Woche. Nein, ich kenne meinen genauen Strompreis nicht; ich kenne auch nicht die 
Wasserkosten. Wobei der Strompreis, der da erschien, schien in Ordnung zu sein. Ich fand die 
Unterschiede bei den einzelnen Maschinen nicht so extrem. Ich hatte gedacht, dass die 
Unterschiede größer sind. Aber wenn man das über 5 Jahre rechnet, ist es nicht so, dass es sich 
lohnt, dafür 100 Euro mehr auszugeben für die Waschmaschine. [Den Zeithorizont 
anzupassen], habe ich nicht überlegt. 
3 Ich gucke immer, dass es im A oder B ist, ohne, dass ich mir bewusst bin über die 
Konsequenzen davon. Ich vergleich dann eher Maschinen untereinander nach den Kriterien. 
Das sind ja bei der Waschmaschine drei oder zwei. Ich komme da durcheinander mit den 






4 Darauf schaue ich auch im Laden immer bei allen Produkten. [Andere Internetseiten kenne 
ich] nicht für Elektrogeräte. Ich habe mal meinen Stromverbrauch kontrollieren lassen. Die 
Seite weiß ich aber nicht mehr. Und das passte ziemlich genau. Das war ein ganz gutes 
Ergebnis. 
5 Ich finde das ist eine interessante Information. Dieses Thema wird auch an Bedeutung 
gewinnen. Das ist auch sinnvoll bei Computer, Fernseher (was den ganzen Tag läuft). Wenn 
man sich da bewusst wäre über die jährlichen Kosten - das würde das Bewusstsein erhöhen 
6 Das Layout war in Ordnung und angemessen. Man kauft sich ja ein Gesamtkostenpaket. Das 
könnte man sich noch einmal jährlich darstellen. Vielleicht eine Notiz, warum 4,9 Jahre 
angekommen werden für die Lebensdauer. Mein Problem: die Tür in der Küche ist 50cm breit 
und die Waschmaschine muss dadurch passen. Ich konnte das nicht direkt mit einer Anfrage 
lösen, weil man nur entweder Breite oder Tiefe angeben kann. Und entweder Frontlader oder 
Toplader entscheiden konnte. Das hat mein Problem nicht gelöst. 
Interview No. 3 
1 Das fand ich super. Das fand ich absolut spitze. Das war für mich neu. Das war sofort klar. 
Das war schön übersichtlich, und finde ich auch gut, dass man das dann vergleichen kann.  
2 Da habe ich nicht näher nachgeguckt. Was ja da stand, war 4-Personen-Haushalt. Ich denke 
mal, das sind Durchschnittswerte, wie oft da Waschmaschinen genutzt werden. Ich denke, da 
sind für alle gleiche Maschinenladungen. Und dann variieren am Ende nur die Zahlen, je 
nachdem, wieviel Stromverbrauch und Wasserverbrauch eine Maschine hat. Die 
[Energiepreise] gehen ja leider nach oben. Energiekosten sind für mich auch wichtig. 
3 Da habe ich immer drauf geachtet, dass - wenn ich mir etwas Neues zulege - das Maschinen 
sind, die einen niedrigen Wasserverbrauch und Stromverbrauch haben. 
4 [Eine solche Internetseite sehe ich] zum ersten Mal.  
5 Ich denke, das ist schwierig. Für Spülmaschinen wäre es noch interessant. Und Kühlgeräte. 
Für Herde wäre das ja schwierig. 
6 Ich hätte es schön gefunden, wenn auch noch spezielle Programme angeboten würden. Wenn 
ich Wasche - ich habe einen großen Haushalt, und ich mache oft das Kurzprogramm. Und das 
war nun überhaupt nicht ersichtlich. Das war für mich wichtig, und da musste ich mich nun 
trotzdem wieder durchwurschteln. Also dass man da ein paar Möglichkeiten mehr hätte, 
herauszufinden, was die geeignete Waschmaschine ist. Und was ich schade fand: zum Beispiel 
hatte ich Privileg angeklickt als Marke und trotzdem wurde mir Miele und alles auch mit 
angezeigt. Da habe ich gedacht, das ist ja doof. Es war Privileg dabei, aber eben auch Privileg. 
Interview No. 4 
1 Ja gut, ich habe erst die Gesamtkosten angeguckt und gedacht: "Mensch, das ist weniger!" 
Und dann habe ich gesehen: "hoppla, das sind die Betriebskosten". Das habe ich nicht 





2 Ich habe gedacht, dass das schon stimmt. Habe nirgendwo draufgeklickt. Bei Quelle, habe ich 
gedacht, da stimmt das schon. Wenn ich es woanders gemacht hätte, dann hätte ich dem nicht 
so getraut. Soweit [an steigende Energiepreise] habe ich nicht gedacht. Das hat keine Rolle 
mehr gespielt. Wenn man die Maschine hat, dann ist es ja vorbei. Soweit ging’s nicht. 
3 [Das ist] schon wichtig. Ich habe schon geschaut, dass ich eine sparsame Maschine nehme, 
wobei ich gleichzeitig drauf geschaut habe, die mit dem allergeringsten Wasserverbrauch 
wollte ich nicht, weil ich dem nicht getraut habe. Nicht die mit dem allergeringsten Verbrauch 
habe ich dann genommen, aber die nächste Stufe. Aber die mit viel Verbrauch hätte ich 
natürlich nicht genommen. Wasser ist ja auch gleichzeitig Strom. 
4 [Auf Energieeffizienz habe ich] schon irgendwie drauf geachtet, aber heute schon mehr. Das 
habe ich sonst noch nicht [auf anderen Internetseite] gesehen.  
5 Man kennt es ja von Kühlschränken her, da macht das schon Sinn. Der ist ja im Dauerbetrieb. 
Ohne Dauerbetrieb ist das vielleicht zweitrangig. 
6 Ich habe gedacht, so kann es nicht gedacht sein. Ich wusste im Prinzip schon, welche 
Maschine ich wollte, die im Test gut abgeschnitten hat. Ich habe den normalen Berater 
benutzt. Da konnte ich eingeben, was ich wollte, es ist alles gekommen, nur diese Maschine 
nicht. Und dann habe ich gedacht, dass kann eigentlich nicht gewollt sein. Später bin ich noch 
in die Profiberatung gegangen und habe die irgendwie raus gebracht. Ich habe es mit allem 
ausprobiert, aber die Maschine war nicht drin. Aus meiner Sicht macht die Trennung zwischen 
Profi- und Normalberatung nicht viel Sinn. Das ist mein Gedanke. 
Interview No. 5 
1 Die Anzeige ist für mich eigentlich selbstverständlich. Ehrlich gesagt habe ich es mir nicht 
ganz genau angeguckt, deswegen kann ich dazu eigentlich nicht viel sagen. 
2 Die Änderung von Energiepreisen kommt mir bei anderen Gelegenheiten eigentlich mehr. 
Hierbei eigentlich nicht. 
3 Ja, aber da gibt es einige Dinge, die mir nicht gefallen. Es wird ja viel auch über 
Wasserersparnis gesprochen was die Waschmaschinen betrifft. Ich habe eine Waschmaschine, 
die wenig Wasser verbraucht, aber die Wäsche wird nicht sauber und das gefällt mir überhaupt 
nicht. Da ist mir zu wenig Wasser drin, dadurch wird das Waschpulver überhaupt nicht 
verteilt. Da habe ich schlechte Erfahrung. Also wenig Wasser ist für mich bei einer 
Waschmaschine überhaupt nicht wichtig. Die Energie ja, aber nicht das Wasser. 
4 Habe ich immer nur bei Quelle gemacht. 
5 Bei Geschirrspülern macht man das doch schon, oder? Bei Fernsehern muss es nicht 
unbedingt sein. Bei Kühlgeräten auch. Das ist wichtig. 
6 Ich fand die Waschmaschinen-Suche sehr unübersichtlich. Für einen 1-Personen-Haushalt ist 
das nicht so richtig deutlich geworden. Danach wurde nicht richtig gefragt bei der 
Haushaltsgröße. 1-2 Personen reicht mir nicht. Es ist eine, nicht zwei. Das ist schon sehr viel. 





1 Kann ich jetzt nicht sagen. Helfen Sie mir auf die Sprünge. Welche Parameter sieht man da als 
erstes? Danach habe ich gar nicht geguckt. Ich habe auf Stromverbrauch und Wasserverbrauch 
geachtet. Und das ist ja alles besser, als was ich bis dato hatte. Die Betriebskosten helfen mir 
echt nichts, denn da kann ich nicht dran drehen. Ich gucke auf den Wasserverbrauch, und der 
ist super. Und der Stromverbrauch ist auch besser als bisher. Und was die tatsächliche 
Umrechnung in Kosten angeht - das ist nachher Sache des Energieversorgers und der 
Wasserwirtschaft, die ja ihre Preise unabhängig davon gestalten, wie viel oder wie wenig ich 
verbrauche. Mir reichen die Zahlen so - bei Strom in kWh, bei Wasser in Liter. Und das sind 
meine Vergleichsparameter. Die sind schon immer sehr gut. 
2 [Sind steigende Energiepreise wichtig?] Ja klar, aber das sind wie gesagt Parameter, die ich 
nicht ändern kann. 
3 [Effizienz war wichtig-] die letzten 15-20 Jahre doch schon. 
4 Ich informiere mich über die Info-Materialien im Fachhandel. [Das] kommt immer dann, 
wenn etwas kaputt geht. Das letzte mal bei Kühlschränken. Wir haben auf etlichen 
Internetseiten geguckt. Bei Bewag oder Geräteherstellern, aber konkret kann ich keine 
Angaben mehr machen. 
5 Die Preise ändern sich ja jährlich. Deshalb hilft es mir nicht, wenn unter dem Strich steht:" Sie 
verbrauchen - was stand da: für einen Vier-Personen-Haushalt - 194 €. Hilft mir nichts die 
Zahl, weil der Stromverbrauch regional sehr unterschiedlich ist. Privat gucke ich bei anderen 
Geräten nach dem Verbrauch in kWh. Das ist eine Größe, die über die Jahre ja konstant bleibt. 
Die Einheit bleibt konstant. Beim Preis gibt es ja jährlich oder ein zweimal Preiserhöhungen, 
so dass ich das letzten Endes nicht beeinflussen kann. Von daher ist für mich wichtig zu 
sehen: okay, so eine Waschmaschine braucht so und soviel Liter Wasser. Und demzufolge so 
viel Strom. Für andere Leute kann das sehr sinnvoll sein. Manch einer sagt vielleicht: "ich 
habe über das Jahr so und soviel Euro und das muss über das Jahr reichen". Das sind vielleicht 
andere Gesichtpunkte, so dass das andere sehr betrifft. 
6 Wir haben einen Waschtrockner gesucht, und über die Menüführung wurde mir die Frage 
nicht angeboten. Es gab nur Waschmaschine oder Trockner. 
Interview No. 7 
1 [An die Reaktion] kann ich mich nicht mehr erinnern. Das hat mich in dem Moment noch gar 
nicht so interessiert, eigentlich. 
2 Das hat mich gar nicht weiter interessiert, weil mich ja erstmal eine Maschine interessiert. Es 
gibt tausend Maschinen mit tausend Betriebsarten, und ich habe mich noch nicht einmal für 
eine entschieden. Von daher hat mich das zu dem Zeitpunkt nicht interessiert. [Steigende 
Energiepreise sind] bei einer Waschmaschine nicht so wichtig, weil wir da nicht die Mengen 
haben. Das gleiche gilt für Wasser. 
3 Darüber habe ich mich vorher schon informiert, über die einzelnen Effizienz-Klassen: E, etc. 
damit habe ich mich vorher schon auseinander gesetzt.  






5 Die Betriebskostenanzeige ist einfach zu früh. Wenn ich mich für eine Maschine interessiere - 
ich habe ja auf anderen Seiten noch weiter geguckt - dann interessiert mich das schon ein 
bisschen. Aber ich möchte erst einmal die passende Maschine haben, weil ich kann nicht mit 
Energieeffizienz an den Markt gehen - von meiner Seite aus - und ganz zum Schluss habe ich 
eine 3-Kilo-Maschine, womit ich nichts anfangen kann. Für mich ist das das letzte, worauf ich 
- das ist noch ein Entscheidungskriterium zum Schluss, aber nicht das erste 
Entscheidungskriterium. Wo ich das zum Beispiel interessanter finden würde, wäre bei 
Gefriergeräten. Weil da das Gerät das ganze Jahr läuft. Wie gesagt, meine Waschmaschine 
läuft dreimal in der Woche. Da brauche ich mich nicht großartig drum zu kümmern. 
6 Mich hat die Seite weder angesprochen, noch hat sie ihren Zweck erfüllt. Da kann ich bei 
Ebay eine größere Auswahl treffen. 
Interview No. 8 
1 Ja, war mir ziemlich klar. Ich habe das Gerät deswegen auch ausgewählt, weil ich mir schon 
vorher mit der Stiftung Warentest Gedanken darüber gemacht habe, was eine Maschine im 
Jahr verbraucht. Das war das schon ungefähr - damit habe ich gerechnet. Das war für mich der 
entscheidende Kaufgrund. Zuerst haben wir nicht verstanden, dass wir unsere eigenen Daten 
eingeben mussten für Energiepreis und Wasserpreis. Ich habe das mit meiner Frau zusammen 
gemacht. Beim zweiten Mal haben wir dann gesehen: Halt - unsere Daten müssen eingegeben 
werden, damit es die richtigen Daten auswirft. 
2 Das war in Ordnung. Ich denke mal, dass das Durchschnittswerte von der Bundesrepublik 
Deutschland sind, wobei die für uns nicht relevant waren. Strompreis war in Ordnung, 
Wasserpreis war - den hätte ich gerne, den Wasserpreis. Sie meinen den Wasser- und 
Strompreis in den nächsten 10 Jahren? [genau] Da mache ich mir aus einem Grund Gedanken, 
aber nicht aus dem, den Sie sich vielleicht denken. Wir haben einen landwirtschaftlichen 
Betrieb mit eigenem Brunnen, und ich habe mir darüber Gedanken gemacht, ob ich vielleicht 
das Wasser für die Waschmaschine aus dem Brunnen herausnehmen soll. Die Waschmaschine 
ist drei Tage vorher kaputt gegangen. Ich habe sie auseinander genommen, habe reingeschaut, 
habe gesagt: "Das geht nicht mehr." Und dann war die Frage, wo gucken wir - übrigens ist das 
bei allen Elektrogeräten so - nicht nur auf den Anschaffungspreis, sondern auch auf die 
Verbrauchskosten im Lauf der Jahre... wir sind von 10 Jahren ausgegangen. Das Programm 
hat aber glaube ich nur 9 Jahre angezeigt. Das ist ein bisschen kurz für eine Waschmaschine. 
10 Jahre sollte die mindestens laufen - mindestens! Als Anregung noch: die Nutzungsdauer ist 
zu kurz gewesen, meines Erachtens. Für mich sollte eine Maschine 10, 12 Jahre eigentlich 
laufen. 
3 - 
4 Ich habe gehört, dass es andere Effizienz-Internetseiten geben soll, das habe ich aber erst im 
Nachhinein gehört. Irgendwo habe ich das gelesen. Da gibt es eine "Sparseite" oder so etwas. 
Habe ich irgendwo gehört oder gelesen. Die waren mir aber vorher überhaupt nicht bekannt. 





5 Das kommt auf die Geräte an. Beim Toaster nicht, beim Fernseher könnte ich mir das schon 
vorstellen, wobei der ja auch nicht so viel verbraucht. Energiesparlampen bzw. normale 
Lampen würden mich interessieren. Kühlschrank ist sehr interessant, Gefriertruhe, Trockner 
auch. Alles was kühlt oder wärmt, das wäre das. 
6 Mir ist nicht klar gewesen, dass meine Anfrage nicht an Quelle, sondern an einen Dritten geht. 
Ich dachte, das geht bei Quelle an irgendeinen Kundenberater oder Sachbearbeiter, der 
Waschmaschinen verkauft. Da müsste eine Möglichkeit sein, spezielle Fragen zu stellen. Dann 
fällt mir noch etwas anderes ein: wir haben zuerst eine Waschmaschine gefunden, dann bin ich 
dazugekommen. Wir haben das System ausgemacht und nach einer halben Stunde wieder 
hochgefahren. Und dann haben wir die Waschmaschine nicht mehr gefunden - es hat eine 
Viertelstunde gedauert, bis wir die Waschmaschine wieder gefunden hatten. Das ist vielleicht 




















Appendix V: shopbot experiment round 1 


















1 02:54:47 yes view no 5 68 1130 306.6 323 
2 02:54:47 yes view no 19 1442 379.9 500 480 
3 02:54:47 yes view no 16 70 1329 313.9 315 
4 02:54:47 yes view no 13 73 2419 460 422 
5 02:54:47 yes view no 1 105 569 273.8 310 
6 02:54:47 yes view no 5 121 418 266.5 195 
7 02:55:07 yes click on 
image 
no 19 1442 379.9 500 480 
8 02:55:35 yes click on 
name 
yes 19 1442 379.9 500 480 
9 02:56:01 yes view no 5 738 536 336 311 
10 02:56:01 yes view no 16 125 409 233.6 237 
11 02:56:01 yes view no 5 76 1330 306.6 323 
12 02:56:01 yes view no 25 94 706.99 350.4 273 
13 02:56:01 yes view no 10 114 399 306.6 273 
14 02:56:01 yes view no 13 883 399 329 283 
15 02:56:01 yes view no 1 127 639 277.4 318 
16 02:56:01 yes view no 13 71 1549 313.9 311 
17 02:56:01 yes view no 5 1508 720 358 318 
18 02:56:01 yes view no 5 1485 489 241 277 
19 02:56:25 yes click on 
image 
yes 5 1508 720 358 318 
Note: The click-through in line 7 was not included in the sample for further analysis because it referred to 












Table 84: Randomization check for users and clicks (shopbot round 1) 
 
 Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All users All clicks Freezers Fridge-f. Fridges 
      
linux -0.282* -0.458** -0.503*  -0.402* 
 (0.117) (0.142) (0.254)  (0.179) 
      
mac -0.0542 -0.0146 -0.643 -0.687 0.150 
 (0.0802) (0.123) (0.530) (0.513) (0.135) 
      
msie55 -0.000834 0.103 -0.227 0.0625 0.254* 
 (0.0822) (0.0906) (0.238) (0.278) (0.110) 
      
msie60 -0.0650 0.00394 -0.212 -0.152 0.109 
 (0.0390) (0.0659) (0.193) (0.127) (0.0839) 
      
firefox10 -0.0499 -0.0257 -0.00988 -0.217 0.0157 
 (0.0502) (0.0753) (0.211) (0.143) (0.0981) 
      
firefox15 -0.0817 -0.0382 -0.0570 -0.304* 0.0900 
 (0.0439) (0.0697) (0.211) (0.133) (0.0886) 
      
netscape -0.138 0.0585 -0.643  0.254 
 (0.130) (0.137) (0.398)  (0.152) 
      
opera -0.0676 0.00754 -0.176 -0.187 0.133 
 (0.0666) (0.0930) (0.228) (0.176) (0.132) 
      
google 0.0111     
 (0.0203)     
      
referrerDE -0.0127     
 (0.0280)     
      
referrerAT -0.0649     
 (0.125)     
      
referrerCH -0.295*     
 (0.141)     
      
Prob > F 0.236 0.034 0.080 0.054 0.033 
adj. R-sq 0.001 0.004 0.020 0.011 0.008 
N 2910 1969 314 581 1074 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Models 3 to 5 include click-throughs to the respective appliance categories. The four last coefficients 






Table 85: Cookie acceptance (shopbot round 1) 
  
Cookie type Control Treatment Total  
All users     
Persistent % 96.8 96.8 96.8  
Temporary % 3.2 3.2 3.2  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0013 Pr = 0.971  
     
Freezers     
Persistent % 99.1 99.1 99.1  
Temporary % 0.9 0.9 0.9  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0002 Pr = 0.989  
     
Fridge-freezers     
Persistent % 97.0 96.6 96.8  
Temporary % 3.0 3.4 3.2  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0613 Pr = 0.804  
     
Refrigerators     
Persistent % 96.3 96.7 96.5  
Temporary % 3.7 3.3 3.5  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.1676 Pr = 0.682   
 















Freezers (Overall) 321 26 35  
Control 320 25 34  
Treatment 306 25 35  
Fridge-freezers (Overall) 622 34 36  
Control 611 33 35  
Treatment 611 32 36  
Refrigerators (Overall) 788 32 37  
Control 781 30 36  
















Table 87: Total number of click-throughs per user (shopbot round 1) 
  
Total number of 
click-throughs 
Number of users 
(Control) 
Number of users 
(Treatment) 
Total  
1 263 279 542  
2 98 98 196  
3 56 43 99  
4 35 19 54  
5 12 11 23  
6 8 6 14  
7 7 2 9  
8 5 2 7  
9 7 3 10  
10 1 2 3  
11 6 5 11  
12 1 3 4  
13 2 3 5  
14 1 0 1  
15 0 1 1  
16 1 0 1  
18 0 1 1  
20 0 1 1  
22 1 0 1  
27 1 0 1  
28 0 1 1  
35 0 1 1  
38 0 1 1  
50 0 1 1  
Total 505 483 988  
 





Figure 29: Energy use box plots for clicked appliances (shopbot round 1) 
 







Figure 31: Energy efficiency classes by appliance types (shopbot round 1) 
 







Table 88: Price quartiles for clicked appliances (shopbot round 1) 
  
 N Min. p25% p50% p75% Max. 
  price price price price price 
Freezers     
Control 170 42 253 399 550 1329 
Treatment 144 42 277 392 595 1119 
Total 314 42 275 398 569 1329 
       
Fridge-freezers     
Control 288 30 332 475 808 4019 
Treatment 293 30 348 465 752 4019 
Total 581 30 344 470 799 4019 
       
Refrigerators     
Control 594 109 244 409 609 2419 
Treatment 480 105 298 449 693 2788 
Total 1074 105 270 429 649 2788 
       
Overall     
Control 1052 30 269 429 635 4019 
Treatment 917 30 300 449 685 4019 
Total 1969 30 285 441 659 4019 
 
Note: Prices in [Euro] 
 
Table 89: Capacity quartiles for clicked appliances (shopbot round 1) 
  
 N Min. p25% p50% p75% Max. 
  capacity capacity capacity capacity capacity 
Freezers     
Control 170 38 94 176 208 454 
Treatment 144 38 94 167 211 335 
Total 314 38 94 171 208 454 
       
Fridge-freezers     
Control 288 154 240 267 315 602 
Treatment 293 135 242 283 319 602 
Total 581 135 240 277 315 602 
       
Refrigerators     
Control 594 45 131 152 290 532 
Treatment 480 45 137 197 291 532 
Total 1074 45 135 156 291 532 
       
Overall     
Control 1052 38 137 202 291 602 
Treatment 917 38 150 225 291 602 
Total 1969 38 140 219 291 602 
 












Figure 34: Residuals of selected models (shopbot round 1) 
 
Note: Residuals of models with significant treatment coefficients. 
 
Table 90: Effect size index f2 for linear regression models (shopbot round 1) 
 
Mode Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Freezers   0.020    
Fridge-freezers       
Refrigerators  0.0068     
Overall  0.0035 0.0021 0.0051   
Note: Effect sizes only from those models with significant (p<0.05) treatment coefficient(s).   






Table 91: Assumed time horizon in the treatment group (shopbot round 1) 
 
Assumed  




(No. of users) 
Adjustment, no 
click-through 
(No. of users) 
Adjustment and 
click-through(s) 
(No. of users) 
Total 
1 0 29 3 32 2.1% 
5* 1458 0 0 1458 97.7% 
10 0 0 2 2 0.1% 
Total 1458 29 5 1492 100.0% 
Note: *default 
 
Table 92: Sorting by life-cycle cost in the treatment group (shopbot round 1) 
Function  
with respect to  
life-cycle cost 
Function off  
 
(No. of users) 
Function on, 
no click-through 
(No. of users) 
Function on,  
click-through(s) 
(No. of users) 
Total  
Sorting  1486 3 3 1492  
Filtering  1492 0 0 1492  
 
 























 Number of 
users 
(Treatment) 
 Total  
0 945 66.6% 1039 69.6% 1984 68.2% 
1 255 18.0% 276 18.5% 531 18.2% 
2 95 6.7% 93 6.2% 188 6.5% 
3 52 3.7% 36 2.4% 88 3.0% 
4 26 1.8% 15 1.0% 41 1.4% 
5 11 0.8% 11 0.7% 22 0.8% 
6 8 0.6% 2 0.1% 10 0.3% 
7 5 0.4% 2 0.1% 7 0.2% 
8 5 0.4% 0 0.0% 5 0.2% 
9 7 0.5% 3 0.2% 10 0.3% 
10 2 0.1% 5 0.3% 7 0.2% 
11 4 0.3% 6 0.4% 10 0.3% 
13 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.1% 
14 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
15 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.1% 
17 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 
18 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 
Total 1418 100.0% 1492 100.0% 2910 100.0% 









Appendix VI: shopbot experiment round 2 








Table 94: Randomization check for users and clicks (shopbot round 2) 
 
 Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 All users All clicks Freezers Fridge-f. Fridges 
      
linux 0.00740 0.0789   0.184 
 (0.135) (0.297)   (0.299) 
      
mac 0.000752 0.435*** -0.333 0.122 0.650*** 
 (0.0976) (0.130) (0.574) (0.242) (0.159) 
      
msie523 -0.472 -0.689  -0.592  
 (0.509) (0.508)  (0.547)  
      
msie55 0.0570 0.523*** 0.167 -0.136 0.773*** 
 (0.0981) (0.141) (0.454) (0.326) (0.167) 
      
msie60 0.0367 0.217** 0.222 -0.0624 0.322** 
 (0.0487) (0.0804) (0.290) (0.159) (0.0988) 
      
firefox10 0.0314 0.126 -0.0833 0.0690 0.153 
 (0.0654) (0.0983) (0.321) (0.183) (0.129) 
      
firefox15 0.0246 0.261** 0.238 0.0211 0.356*** 
 (0.0518) (0.0829) (0.293) (0.163) (0.103) 
      
netscape 0.0567 0.0427  -0.469 0.270 
 (0.137) (0.213)  (0.384) (0.256) 
      
opera 0.0307 -0.0192 0.667 -0.327 -0.0247 
 (0.0751) (0.144) (0.454) (0.243) (0.199) 
      
google 0.00240     
 (0.0222)     
      
referrerDE -0.0151     
 (0.0328)     
      
referrerAT -0.0734     
 (0.170)     
      
referrerCH 0.0430     
 (0.168)     
      
Prob > F 0.999 0.000 0.247 0.419 0.000 
adj. R-sq -0.005 0.015 0.008 0.001 0.035 
N 2357 1391 250 329 812 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  
Models 3 to 5 include click-throughs to the respective appliance categories. The four last coefficients 






Table 95: Cookie acceptance (shopbot round 2) 
  
Cookie type Control Treatment Total  
All users     
Persistent % 96.8 96.8 96.8  
Temporary % 3.2 3.2 3.2  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0013 Pr = 0.971  
     
Freezers     
Persistent % 99.1 99.1 99.1  
Temporary % 0.9 0.9 0.9  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0002 Pr = 0.989  
     
Fridge-freezers     
Persistent % 97.0 96.6 96.8  
Temporary % 3.0 3.4 3.2  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0613 Pr = 0.804  
     
Refrigerators     
Persistent % 96.3 96.7 96.5  
Temporary % 3.7 3.3 3.5  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.1676 Pr = 0.682   
 















Freezers (Overall) 272 25 31  
Control 261 24 30  
Treatment 262 25 30  
Fridge-freezers (Overall) 525 30 29  
Control 518 30 29  
Treatment 518 30 29  
Refrigerators (Overall) 1072 31 35  
Control 1011 30 35  
















Table 97: Total number of click-throughs per user (shopbot round 2) 
  
Total number of 
click-throughs 
Number of users 
(Control) 
Number of users 
(Treatment) 
Total  
1 243 210 453  
2 85 64 149  
3 33 40 73  
4 18 15 33  
5 13 5 18  
6 7 7 14  
7 3 3 6  
8 3 5 8  
9 4 1 5  
10 1 4 5  
11 2 1 3  
12 0 1 1  
13 0 1 1  
16 0 1 1  
17 1 0 1  
18 0 1 1  
22 1 1 2  
23 1 0 1  
31 1 1 2  
Total 416 361 777  
 
Note: Users with more than 20 click-throughs were not included in subsequent analyses.  






Figure 40: Energy use histograms for clicked appliances (shopbot round 2) 
 
 






Figure 42: Life-cycle cost histograms for clicked appliances (shopbot round 2) 
 
Table 98: Price quartiles for clicked appliances (shopbot round 2) 
  
 N Min. p25% p50% p75% Max. 
  price price price price price 
Freezers     
Control 114 159 325 447 619 1329 
Treatment 136 120 279 415 669 1329 
Total 250 120 299 432 650 1329 
       
Fridge-freezers     
Control 187 32 345 489 750 2049 
Treatment 142 30 385 498 869 4019 
Total 329 30 379 492 786 4019 
       
Refrigerators     
Control 429 105 265 399 669 2569 
Treatment 383 32 250 436 679 2899 
Total 812 32 254 409 669 2899 
       
Overall     
Control 730 32 299 441 669 2569 
Treatment 661 30 280 449 699 4019 
Total 1391 30 290 449 695 4019 
 






Table 99: Capacity quartiles for clicked appliances (shopbot round 2) 
  
 N Min. p25% p50% p75% Max. 
  capacity capacity capacity capacity capacity 
Freezers     
Control 114 45 100 184 220 454 
Treatment 136 38 100 198 225 454 
Total 250 38 100 195 224 454 
       
Fridge-freezers     
Control 187 159 233 278 318 532 
Treatment 142 131 253 283 318 594 
Total 329 131 249 283 318 594 
       
Refrigerators     
Control 429 45 137 160 275 532 
Treatment 383 45 140 189 288 532 
Total 812 45 140 175 284 532 
       
Overall     
Control 730 45 145 216 290 532 
Treatment 661 38 145 221 291 594 
Total 1391 38 145 220 291 594 
 













Figure 44: Residuals of selected models (shopbot round 2) 
 
Note: Residuals of models with significant treatment coefficients. 
 
Table 100: Assumed time horizon in the treatment group (shopbot round 2) 
 
Assumed  




(No. of users) 
Adjustment, no 
click-through 
(No. of users) 
Adjustment and 
click-through(s) 
(No. of users) 
Total 
1 0 43 0 43 3.6% 
5 0 4 2 6 0.5% 
9* 1145 0 0 1145 95.9% 
Total 1145 47 2 1194 100.0% 
Note: *default 
Table 101: Sorting by life-cycle cost in the treatment group (shopbot round 2) 
Function  
with respect to  
life-cycle cost 
Function off  
 
(No. of users) 
Function on, 
no click-through 
(No. of users) 
Function on,  
click-through(s) 
(No. of users) 
Total  
Sorting  1183 6 5 1194  







Figure 45: Number of click-throughs per user (shopbot round 2) 
 








 Number of 
users 
(Treatment) 
 Total  
0 771 66.3% 852 71.4% 1623 68.9% 
1 246 21.2% 221 18.5% 467 19.8% 
2 75 6.4% 58 4.9% 133 5.6% 
3 31 2.7% 32 2.7% 63 2.7% 
4 12 1.0% 7 0.6% 19 0.8% 
5 9 0.8% 3 0.3% 12 0.5% 
6 7 0.6% 4 0.3% 11 0.5% 
7 3 0.3% 5 0.4% 8 0.3% 
8 5 0.4% 4 0.3% 9 0.4% 
9 0 0.0% 2 0.2% 2 0.1% 
10 2 0.2% 2 0.2% 4 0.2% 
11 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.1% 
12 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 
14 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
16 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 
17 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 
Total 1163 100.0% 1194 100.0% 2357 100.0% 







Appendix VII: online shop experiment round 1 







Table 103: Randomization check for users and clicks (online shop round 1) 
 
 Treatment  
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All users Users w/pref All clicks Final CT SimpleSearch ExpertSearch 
       
linux -0.0412 -0.0326 -0.142 -0.173 -0.150 -0.107 
 (0.0393) (0.0474) (0.151) (0.161) (0.287) (0.178) 
       
mac -0.0183 -0.0145 -0.291** -0.165 -0.484** -0.173 
 (0.0275) (0.0340) (0.106) (0.123) (0.165) (0.142) 
       
msie55 0.0573 0.0496 -0.509*** -0.242 -0.368** -0.485*** 
 (0.0327) (0.0423) (0.0860) (0.126) (0.135) (0.117) 
       
msie60 -0.00279 -0.00490 -0.204*** -0.0718 -0.247** -0.169* 
 (0.00551) (0.0134) (0.0554) (0.0810) (0.0781) (0.0793) 
       
firefox10 0.0112 0.0113 -0.223*** -0.110 -0.216* -0.246** 
 (0.0142) (0.0201) (0.0662) (0.0926) (0.0933) (0.0944) 
       
firefox15 0.00616 0.00821 -0.231*** -0.0826 -0.275** -0.180* 
 (0.0105) (0.0168) (0.0600) (0.0858) (0.0855) (0.0851) 
       
netscape 0.0282 0.0108 -0.00351 0.142 -0.166 0.0858 
 (0.0393) (0.0493) (0.135) (0.160) (0.234) (0.168) 
       
opera 0.0363 0.0494 -0.273* -0.0879 -0.329* -0.204 
 (0.0274) (0.0346) (0.109) (0.131) (0.167) (0.146) 
       
preferences  No Yes No No Yes No 
       
Prob > F 0.453 0.693 0.000 0.328 0.000 0.004 
adj. R-sq -0.000 -0.000 0.014 0.001 0.025 0.013 
N 46422 41991 2386 1484 1235 1151 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  







Table 104: Cookie acceptance (online shop round 1) 
  
Cookie type Control Treatment Total  
All users     
Persistent % 99.9 99.9 99.9  
Temporary % 0.1 0.1 0.1  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.3417 Pr = 0.559  
     
All clicks     
Persistent % 97.2 96.4 96.8  
Temporary % 2.8 3.6 3.2  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.4990 Pr = 0.480  
     
SimpleSearch     
Persistent % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
     
ExpertSearch  
Persistent % 94.3 92.1 93.3  
Temporary % 5.7 7.9 6.7  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.8612 Pr = 0.353   
 
Table 105: Variety in products and brands shown (online shop round 1) 
  
Recommendation mode Number of different 
products shown 
Number of different 
brands shown 
  
Simple search 152 7   
Control 150 7   
Treatment 150 7   
Expert search 152 7   
Control 152 7   

















Table 106: Total number of click-throughs per user (online shop round 1) 
  
Total number of 
click-throughs 
Number of users 
(Control) 
Number of users 
(Treatment) 
Total  
1 323 286 609  
2 199 184 383  
3 86 85 171  
4 66 53 119  
5 48 42 90  
6 37 32 69  
7 13 12 25  
8 22 14 36  
9 15 11 26  
10 4 6 10  
11 5 7 12  
12 7 4 11  
13 2 4 6  
14 3 4 7  
15 2 3 5  
16 2 1 3  
17 4 0 4  
18 1 0 1  
19 1 2 3  
20 2 0 2  
21 1 1 2  
23 3 2 5  
24 4 0 4  
25 2 0 2  
26 1 0 1  
29 1 0 1  
35 0 1 1  
38 0 1 1  
42 0 1 1  
69 1 0 1  
Total 855 756 1611  
 






Figure 48: Energy use box plots for clicked appliances (online shop round 1) 
 







Figure 50: Energy efficiency classes by appliance types (online shop round 1) 
 
Note: The “A Plus” category did not exist for washing machines at the time of the experiment. It is a 
supplementary label indicating high energy efficiency and developed by the retailer himself.  






Figure 52: Life-cycle cost histograms for clicked appliances (online shop round 1) 
 
Table 107: Price quartiles for clicked appliances (online shop round 1) 
  
 N Min. p25% p50% p75% Max. 
  price price price price price 
Simple search     
Control 624 350 400 450 500 1039 
Treatment 611 350 400 450 500 900 
Total 1235 350 400 450 500 1039 
       
Expert search     
Control 617 350 400 480 500 1039 
Treatment 534 300 400 500 500 1039 
Total 1151 300 400 500 500 1039 
       
Overall     
Control 1241 350 400 450 500 1039 
Treatment 1145 300 400 450 500 1039 
Total 2386 300 400 450 500 1039 
 





Table 108: Capacity quartiles for clicked appliances (online shop round 1) 
  
 N Min. p25% p50% p75% Max. 
  capacity capacity capacity capacity capacity 
Simple search     
Control 624 5 5 6 6 8 
Treatment 611 3 5 6 6 8 
Total 1235 3 5 6 6 8 
       
Expert search     
Control 617 3 5 5 6 7 
Treatment 534 3 5 5 6 8 
Total 1151 3 5 5 6 8 
       
Overall     
Control 1241 3 5 5 6 8 
Treatment 1145 3 5 5 6 8 
Total 2386 3 5 5 6 8 
 













Figure 54: Residuals of selected models (online shop round 1) 
 







Table 109: Effect size index f2 for linear regression models (online shop round 1) 
 
Mode Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Simple search    0.0086   
Expert search     0.0049 0.0092 
Overall      0.0021 0.0030 
Note: Effect sizes only from those models with significant (p<0.05) treatment coefficient(s).   
f2 = (R2treatment variables- R2no treatment variables)/(1- R2treatment variables ). (Cohen 1977, 410-413)  
 
Table 110: Assumed time horizon in the treatment group (online shop round 1) 
 
Assumed  
time horizon  
[years] 
No adjustment
(No. of users) 
Adjustment, no 
click-through 
(No. of users) 
Adjustment and 
click-through(s) 
(No. of users) 
Total 
0 0 3 0 3 0.0% 
1 0 29 7 36 0.2% 
2 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
2.5 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
3 0 2 0 2 0.0% 
4 0 4 1 5 0.0% 
4.9* 22837 0 0 22837 98.3% 
5 0 23 4 27 0.1% 
6 0 11 2 13 0.1% 
7 0 7 3 10 0.0% 
7.9 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
8 0 16 2 18 0.1% 
8.5 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
9 0 180 4 184 0.8% 
9.5 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
10 0 64 11 75 0.3% 
12 0 2 0 2 0.0% 
15 0 9 0 9 0.0% 
20 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
Total 22837 356 34 23227 100.00% 










[times per week] 
No adjustment
(No. of users) 
Adjustment, no 
click-through 
(No. of users) 
Adjustment and 
click-through(s) 
(No. of users) 
Total 
0 0 5 0 5 0.0% 
0.5 0 2 0 2 0.0% 
1 0 69 8 77 0.3% 
1.2 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
1.4 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
1.5 0 7 2 9 0.0% 
2 0 61 12 73 0.3% 
2.5 0 3 0 3 0.0% 
3* 22905 0 0 22905 98.6% 
3.5 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
4 0 26 5 31 0.1% 
5 0 44 10 54 0.2% 
5.5 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
6 0 18 7 25 0.1% 
6.5 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
7 0 16 2 18 0.1% 
8 0 3 1 4 0.0% 
9 0 2 1 3 0.0% 
10 0 7 0 7 0.0% 
12 0 1 1 2 0.0% 
15 0 1 1 2 0.0% 
20 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
30 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
Total 22905 272 50 23227 100.0% 














Table 112: Robustness check for life-cycle cost (online shop round 1) 
 
   ln(lccost)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ssearch Ssearch Esearch Esearch Overall Overall 
       
treatment 0.0037 0.0000046 0.027** 0.010 0.014** 0.0034 
 (0.0057) (0.0042) (0.0085) (0.0072) (0.0053) (0.0043) 
       
ln(capacity) 0.31*** 0.32*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.34*** 0.32*** 
 (0.037) (0.028) (0.032) (0.029) (0.031) (0.028) 
       
mode     0.031*** 0.025*** 
     (0.0053) (0.0044) 
       
constant 6.31*** 6.27*** 6.62*** 6.71*** 5.74*** 5.79*** 
 (0.16) (0.13) (0.060) (0.049) (0.13) (0.12) 
       
efficiency 
class  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
other features  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
preferences  Yes Yes No No No No 
       
adj. R-sq 0.480 0.619 0.180 0.236 0.256 0.331 
N 1235 1235 1151 1151 2386 2386 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
models (1), (3), and (5): life-cycle cost based on user-adjusted assumptions (treatment) versus 
common default assumptions (control);  














 Number of 
users 
(Treatment) 
 Total  
0 22411 96.6% 22527 97.0% 44938 96.8% 
1 546 2.4% 469 2.0% 1015 2.2% 
2 145 0.6% 141 0.6% 286 0.6% 
3 48 0.2% 42 0.2% 90 0.2% 
4 16 0.1% 19 0.1% 35 0.1% 
5 12 0.1% 13 0.1% 25 0.1% 
6 7 0.0% 8 0.0% 15 0.0% 
7 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 4 0.0% 
8 5 0.0% 2 0.0% 7 0.0% 
9 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
10 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
11 0 0.0% 2 0.0% 2 0.0% 
12 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
18 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
19 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
Total 23195 100.0% 23227 100.0% 46422 100.0% 







Table 114: Price cross-tabulations for all clicked appliances (online shop round 1)  
 
Price Control  Treatment  Total  
299.95 0 0.0% 5 0.4% 5 0.2% 
349.95 62 5.0% 58 5.1% 120 5.0% 
369.95 10 0.8% 3 0.3% 13 0.5% 
379.95 6 0.5% 6 0.5% 12 0.5% 
399 67 5.4% 47 4.1% 114 4.8% 
399.95 327 26.3% 306 26.7% 633 26.5% 
429.95 48 3.9% 41 3.6% 89 3.7% 
444 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 
449 29 2.3% 18 1.6% 47 2.0% 
449.95 119 9.6% 105 9.2% 224 9.4% 
469.95 2 0.2% 1 0.1% 3 0.1% 
479.95 6 0.5% 10 0.9% 16 0.7% 
499.95 384 30.9% 350 30.6% 734 30.8% 
529.95 3 0.2% 1 0.1% 4 0.2% 
549.95 16 1.3% 25 2.2% 41 1.7% 
579.95 15 1.2% 7 0.6% 22 0.9% 
599.95 35 2.8% 28 2.4% 63 2.6% 
619.95 11 0.9% 8 0.7% 19 0.8% 
629.95 5 0.4% 7 0.6% 12 0.5% 
649.95 13 1.0% 6 0.5% 19 0.8% 
679.95 4 0.3% 10 0.9% 14 0.6% 
699.95 51 4.1% 77 6.7% 128 5.4% 
749.95 7 0.6% 5 0.4% 12 0.5% 
799.95 7 0.6% 9 0.8% 16 0.7% 
849.95 4 0.3% 0 0.0% 4 0.2% 
899.95 6 0.5% 6 0.5% 12 0.5% 
979.95 0 0.0% 1 0.1% 1 0.0% 
999.95 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.1% 
1039 3 0.2% 3 0.3% 6 0.3% 
Total 1241 100.0% 1145 100.0% 2386 100.0% 









Appendix VIII: online shop experiment round 2 






Table 115: Randomization check for users and clicks (online shop round 2) 
 
 Treatment 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 All users Users w/pref All clicks Final CT SimpleS CT ExpertS CT 
       
linux -0.00415 0.0107 -0.0701 -0.104 0.343 -0.262 
 (0.0316) (0.0386) (0.136) (0.147) (0.226) (0.170) 
       
mac -0.0165 -0.0217 0.148* 0.0529 0.406** 0.0713 
 (0.0208) (0.0264) (0.0755) (0.0882) (0.143) (0.0901) 
       
msie55 -0.0400 -0.0594 -0.141 -0.102 -0.233 -0.168 
 (0.0304) (0.0382) (0.109) (0.127) (0.180) (0.140) 
       
msie60 0.00375 0.00753 -0.00236 -0.0172 -0.170 0.0329 
 (0.00456) (0.0111) (0.0562) (0.0627) (0.109) (0.0672) 
       
firefox10 0.000600 -0.000771 0.0286 0.0117 -0.106 0.0322 
 (0.0150) (0.0196) (0.0711) (0.0839) (0.128) (0.0892) 
       
firefox15 0.00749 0.0110 -0.00307 0.0262 -0.150 0.00745 
 (0.00782) (0.0133) (0.0582) (0.0653) (0.112) (0.0705) 
       
netscape -0.0198 -0.0145 -0.00922 -0.00709 -0.00717 -0.159 
 (0.0363) (0.0444) (0.144) (0.168) (0.207) (0.212) 
       
opera 0.00793 0.0112 -0.141 -0.149 -0.117 -0.221 
 (0.0228) (0.0287) (0.0944) (0.105) (0.169) (0.116) 
       
preferences  No Yes No No Yes No 
       
Prob > F 0.826 0.842 0.216 0.621 0.057 0.108 
adj. R-sq -0.000 -0.000 0.001 -0.001 0.011 0.005 
N 95388 89498 2065 1437 990 1075 
 
Note: Standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001  







Table 116: Cookie acceptance (online shop round 2) 
  
Cookie type Control Treatment Total  
All users     
Persistent % 99.9 99.9 99.9  
Temporary % 0.1 0.1 0.1  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.7619 Pr = 0.383  
     
All clicks     
Persistent % 95.5 95.3 95.4  
Temporary % 4.5 4.7 4.6  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.0161 Pr = 0.899  
     
SimpleSearch     
Persistent % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
     
ExpertSearch  
Persistent % 91.8 90.2 91.0  
Temporary % 8.2 9.8 9.0  
Total % 100.0 100.0 100.0  
Pearson chi2(1) = 0.3530 Pr = 0.552   
 
Table 117: Variety in products and brands shown (online shop round 2) 
  
Recommendation mode Number of different 
products shown 
Number of different 
brands shown 
 
Simple search (Overall) 162 7  
Control 158 7  
Treatment 159 7  
Expert search (Overall) 162 7  
Control 160 7  
















Table 118: Total number of click-throughs per user (online shop round 2) 
  
Total number of 
click-throughs 
Number of users 
(Control) 
Number of users 
(Treatment) 
Total  
1 425 379 804  
2 145 184 329  
3 85 80 165  
4 54 43 97  
5 33 31 64  
6 17 20 37  
7 10 10 20  
8 9 11 20  
9 7 5 12  
10 6 1 7  
11 5 6 11  
12 0 3 3  
13 1 7 8  
14 2 0 2  
15 1 4 5  
16 1 1 2  
17 2 5 7  
19 0 2 2  
20 0 1 1  
21 2 1 3  
23 2 2 4  
46 1 0 1  
49 1 0 1  
Total 809 796 1605  
 






Figure 57: Energy use box plots for clicked appliances (online shop round 2) 
 






Figure 59: Energy efficiency classes by appliance types (online shop round 2) 
 
Note: The “A Plus” category did not exist for washing machines as an official EU label at the time of the 
experiment. It is a supplementary label indicating relatively high energy efficiency and was 





Figure 60: Water use histograms for clicked appliances (online shop round 2) 
 







Table 119: Price quartiles for clicked appliances (online shop round 2) 
  
 N Min. p25% p50% p75% Max. 
  price price price price price 
Simple search     
Control 498 299 400 400 500 1160 
Treatment 492 299 400 400 550 1160 
Total 990 299 400 400 550 1160 
       
Expert search     
Control 542 299 400 480 580 1160 
Treatment 533 299 400 480 550 1039 
Total 1075 299 400 480 570 1160 
       
Overall     
Control 1040 299 400 449 550 1160 
Treatment 1025 299 400 450 550 1160 
Total 2065 299 400 450 550 1160 
 
Note: Price in [Euro] 
 
Table 120: Capacity quartiles for clicked appliances (online shop round 2) 
  
 N Min. p25% p50% p75% Max. 
  capacity capacity capacity capacity capacity 
Simple search     
Control 498 3 5 6 6 8 
Treatment 492 3 5 6 6 8 
Total 990 3 5 6 6 8 
       
Expert search     
Control 542 3 5 5 6 8 
Treatment 533 3 5 5 6 7 
Total 1075 3 5 5 6 8 
       
Overall     
Control 1040 3 5 5 6 8 
Treatment 1025 3 5 5 6 8 
Total 2065 3 5 5 6 8 
 













Figure 63: Residuals of selected models (online shop round 2) 
 






Table 121: Effect size index f2 for linear regression models (online shop round 2) 
 
Mode Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Simple search   0.0060 0.0076   
Expert search 0.0052 0.0056 0.011 0.0093 0.0043  
Overall  0.0031 0.0043 0.0074 0.0072 0.0024  
Note: Effect sizes only from those models with significant (p<0.05) treatment coefficient(s).   
f2 = (R2treatment variables- R2no treatment variables)/(1- R2treatment variables ). (Cohen 1977, 410-413) 
 
Table 122: Assumed time horizon in the treatment group (online shop round 2) 
 
Assumed  
time horizon  
[years] 
No adjustment
(No. of users) 
Adjustment, no 
click-through 
(No. of users) 
Adjustment and 
click-through(s) 
(No. of users) 
Total 
.1 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
1 0 16 2 18 0.0% 
2 0 2 0 2 0.0% 
3 0 3 1 4 0.0% 
4 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
5 0 4 2 6 0.0% 
6 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
7 0 3 0 3 0.0% 
8 0 3 0 3 0.0% 
9* 47626 0 0 47626 99.8% 
10 0 24 6 30 0.1% 
12 0 3 0 3 0.0% 
15 0 8 1 9 0.0% 
20 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
Total 47626 70 12 47708 100.0% 









[times per week] 
No adjustment
(No. of users) 
Adjustment, no 
click-through 
(No. of users) 
Adjustment and 
click-through(s) 
(No. of users) 
Total 
0.5 0 3 0 3 0.0% 
0.7 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
1 0 32 5 37 0.1% 
1.5 0 4 0 4 0.0% 
2 0 34 6 40 0.1% 
3* 47519 0 0 47519 99.6% 
4 0 29 5 34 0.1% 
4.5 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
5 0 32 6 38 0.1% 
6 0 11 2 13 0.0% 
7 0 8 1 9 0.0% 
8 0 3 3 6 0.0% 
10 0 1 0 1 0.0% 
12 0 2 0 2 0.0% 
Total 47519 161 28 47708 100.0% 







Table 124: Robustness check for life-cycle cost (online shop round 2) 
 
   ln(lccost)   
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
 Ssearch Ssearch Esearch Esearch Overall Overall 
       
treatment -0.0011 -0.0038 -0.00059 -0.0049 0.00031 -0.0030 
 (0.0050) (0.0045) (0.0062) (0.0053) (0.0043) (0.0039) 
       
ln(capacity) 0.41*** 0.42*** 0.34*** 0.31*** 0.48*** 0.46*** 
 (0.041) (0.032) (0.035) (0.032) (0.026) (0.025) 
       
mode     0.034*** 0.033*** 
     (0.0046) (0.0041) 
       
constant 6.43*** 6.40*** 6.43*** 6.49*** 6.65*** 6.66*** 
 (0.091) (0.070) (0.059) (0.054) (0.044) (0.040) 
       
efficiency 
class  
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
brands  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
other features  Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
       
preferences  Yes Yes No No No No 
       
adj. R-sq 0.683 0.727 0.408 0.474 0.459 0.504 
N 990 990 1075 1075 2065 2065 
 
Note: Robust standard errors in parentheses. * p<0.05, ** p<0.01, *** p<0.001,  
models (1), (3), and (5): life-cycle cost based on user-adjusted assumptions (treatment) versus 
common default assumptions (control);  















 Number of 
users 
(Treatment) 
 Total  
0 46937 98.5% 47002 98.5% 93939 98.5% 
1 545 1.1% 521 1.1% 1066 1.1% 
2 119 0.2% 129 0.3% 248 0.3% 
3 40 0.1% 32 0.1% 72 0.1% 
4 12 0.0% 10 0.0% 22 0.0% 
5 3 0.0% 6 0.0% 9 0.0% 
6 5 0.0% 1 0.0% 6 0.0% 
7 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0% 
9 1 0.0% 2 0.0% 3 0.0% 
11 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
12 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
13 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
15 1 0.0% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
16 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 1 0.0% 
Total 47665 100.0% 47708 100.0% 95373 100.0% 







Table 126: Price cross-tabulations for all clicked appliances (online shop round 2) 
 
Price Control  Treatment  Total  
299 10 1.0% 9 0.9% 19 0.9% 
299.95 4 0.4% 4 0.4% 8 0.4% 
329.95 14 1.3% 15 1.5% 29 1.4% 
349.95 25 2.4% 22 2.1% 47 2.3% 
369.95 0 0.0% 2 0.2% 2 0.1% 
379.95 12 1.2% 15 1.5% 27 1.3% 
399 32 3.1% 24 2.3% 56 2.7% 
399.95 385 37.0% 354 34.5% 739 35.8% 
419.95 19 1.8% 7 0.7% 26 1.3% 
429.95 9 0.9% 21 2.0% 30 1.5% 
444 3 0.3% 3 0.3% 6 0.3% 
449 9 0.9% 4 0.4% 13 0.6% 
449.95 74 7.1% 105 10.2% 179 8.7% 
469.95 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.1% 
479.95 16 1.5% 26 2.5% 42 2.0% 
499.95 143 13.8% 134 13.1% 277 13.4% 
529.95 3 0.3% 4 0.4% 7 0.3% 
549.95 46 4.4% 49 4.8% 95 4.6% 
559.95 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
569.95 13 1.3% 11 1.1% 24 1.2% 
579.95 38 3.7% 41 4.0% 79 3.8% 
599.95 24 2.3% 28 2.7% 52 2.5% 
619.95 10 1.0% 9 0.9% 19 0.9% 
629.95 20 1.9% 15 1.5% 35 1.7% 
649.95 5 0.5% 6 0.6% 11 0.5% 
679.95 5 0.5% 2 0.2% 7 0.3% 
699.95 35 3.4% 49 4.8% 84 4.1% 
729.95 31 3.0% 27 2.6% 58 2.8% 
749.95 12 1.2% 5 0.5% 17 0.8% 
769.95 8 0.8% 0 0.0% 8 0.4% 
799.95 17 1.6% 12 1.2% 29 1.4% 
849.95 1 0.1% 3 0.3% 4 0.2% 
899.95 5 0.5% 5 0.5% 10 0.5% 
949.95 1 0.1% 1 0.1% 2 0.1% 
979.95 1 0.1% 0 0.0% 1 0.0% 
999.95 0 0.0% 4 0.4% 4 0.2% 
1039 1 0.1% 4 0.4% 5 0.2% 
1159.95 7 0.7% 4 0.4% 11 0.5% 
Total 1040 100.0% 1025 100.0% 2065 100.0% 
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